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This dissertation aims to answer comprehensively the simple, yet significant 
question of why and how population became a political problem in interwar Japan 
(late 1910s - late 1930s). During Japan’s interwar years, there was a growing call 
among social scientists, social reformers, and government elites to solve “population 
problem (jinkō mondai).” These Japanese intellectuals attributed the population 
problem in Mainland Japan (naichi) to a wide array of social ills including poverty, 
unemployment, and physical, mental, and moral degeneration, and considered various 
solutions to reform the Japanese population. The prevalence of this population 
discourse must be understood as an obvious symptom of the growing attention among 
contemporary Japanese intellectuals and bureaucrats to the population: the size and 
quality of the population became an object of knowledge and an objective of 
government. Moreover, the ambiguous, yet productive category of the Japanese 
population provides a revealing look at the complex social relations and colonial 
mobility in the Japanese Empire. 
This dissertation focuses on modern governmentality and imperialism that 
were embedded in the interwar discourse of the population problem. Using Michel 
Foucault’s conceptualization of discourse, I consider the population discourse to 
encompass different, or even conflicting agendas, languages, and movements that 
 shaped and reshaped the population problem. The close reading of the arguments of 
different population discourses, including Neo-Malthusianism, the proletarian birth 
control and eugenics movement, feminist advocacy for voluntary motherhood, and the 
government's investigation into population problems, reveals the distinctive nature of 
Japan's interwar period in two senses: 1) a dynamic space where various discourses on 
population issues—particularly, birth control, eugenics, and population policy—
continuously interwove sexual and biological issues with politico-economic ones; and 
2) a crucial stage for reconstructing Japanese modernity through integrating scientific 
progressivism, social reformism, and imperial nationalism.  
In sum, in revisiting interwar Japan through the frames of governmentality and 
imperialism, my dissertation illuminates how the multiple discourses on population 
constituted and categorized desirable bodies to reproduce, and how these discourses 
intersected with modern subjectivities—namely, gender, nation, and class. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction:  
The Politics of the Population Problem in Interwar Japan 
 
The advancement of hygiene and sanitation and welfare work in any 
country only increase its population problem. Population must then find 
its outlet through emigration or armed invasion of some other country. 
Each nation must control its population to the point where it will not be 
necessary to make aggression upon its neighbors.1 
 
 On March 14, 1922, Margaret Sanger, the founder of the American Birth 
Control League (founded in 1921), gave a public lecture at the YMCA hall in Tokyo. 
Sanger visited Japan on the invitation of Kaizō-sha, a publishing company in Tokyo, 
to propagate the concept and techniques of birth control. This initial plan for 
promoting birth control, however, was disrupted by the Japanese government; Sanger 
was permitted entry to Japan only under the condition that she would not give any 
public lectures on the use of contraceptives.2 While bypassing this controversial 
subject, Sanger turned her attention to another timely issue, namely, population. In her 
first public lecture in Japan, entitled “War and Population,” Sanger noted that the 
World War had broken out in 1914 mainly due to the rapid population growth in 
Germany. Her reasoning was that prewar German society, without any outlet for its 
surplus population, had resorted to expansionism. Sanger was strongly opposed to this 
militarist solution for domestic social problems, and advocated a peaceful, 
                                                
1 Margaret Sanger, “War and Population,” The Birth Control Review (June 1922): 10. 
2 The Home Ministry of Japan (Naimu-shō) initially refused to issue Sanger a visa on the grounds that 
foreigners who might disturb the public peace and corrupt public morals were forbidden from entering 
the country. However, through persuasion by the Vice Minister of the Foreign Office, Hanihara 
Masanao, who happened to be on the same ferry with Sanger on her way to Japan, the Home Ministry 
gave conditional approval for her entry and allowed her to offer public lectures on issues other than 
contraception. For the details of Sanger’s visit to Japan, there are some contemporary accounts in The 
Birth Control Review as follows: “Margaret Sanger in Japan,” The Birth Control Review (May 1922), 
and “Margaret Sanger in Japan,” The Birth Control Review (June 1922). 
  2 
fundamental panacea instead: controlling the size of the population.  
 Why did Sanger raise the question of overpopulation during her first visit to 
Japan? How did Japanese audiences respond to this warning sign about the growing 
population in Germany? In fact, it was neither coincidental nor surprising that Sanger 
associated the issue of overpopulation with expansionism and militarism as typified in 
Germany before the outbreak of World War I. Sanger’s remark that “Japan has 
problems today which are becoming as great as those of Germany in 1914” clearly 
indicated that the population question should no longer be foreign to Japan.3 For 
Sanger, who supported Neo-Malthusianism, which advocated birth control as a means 
of addressing overpopulation and its resultant social problems, the population question 
corresponded to the problem of overpopulation, which, she argued, would lead to 
domestic social problems as well as international conflicts.4 Although she was forced 
to stay silent about birth control, which from her Neo-Malthusian view she believed 
was the ultimate solution for overpopulation, Sanger pointed to more fundamental 
questions: Why is birth control necessary, particularly in today’s Japan? Why is the 
overflowing population an urgent problem?   
 Sanger’s visit to Japan in 1922 had multiple repercussions on contemporary 
Japanese society. After giving several lectures in Tokyo, Kyoto, and Kobe for 
approximately one month, Sanger left for London, passing through colonial Korea and 
                                                
3 Sanger, “War and Population,” 10.  
4 Neo-Malthusianism began to appear since the late 19th century. One of the pioneering advocates of 
Neo-Malthusianism was the Malthusian League, a British organization established in 1877. While these 
Neo-Malthusian advocates basically agreed to Malthus’ principle of population, which presumed 
increasing imbalance between population growth and food supplies, Neo-Malthusianism differed from 
Malthus’ theory of population in supporting contraception as a solution to overpopulation. Since the end 
of the First World War, some Japanese Fabianists and social reformists began to advocate Neo-
Malthusianism by which they linked surplus population with widespread poverty and race regression as 
a causal relationship. I will delve into a Japanese Neo-Malthusian movement in Chapter 2.  
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China on her way to attend the Fifth International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control 
Conference between July 11 and 14, 1922. The series of Sanger’s lectures addressing 
the question of Japanese population unleashed public debates among Japanese 
intellectuals and social reformers over the question of population growth. Sexologist 
Yamamoto Senji, who served as Sanger’s interpreter during her stay in Kyoto, later 
likened her visit to the Black Ships of the Taishō Era.5 This metaphor of the Black 
Ships, however, is too simplistic to capture the different patterns of repercussion and 
the different attitudes toward modernity that each set of Black Ships brought about in 
Japanese society. While the Black Ships of 1853 were a trigger, if not a direct cause, 
of a complete overhaul of the existing political, economic, and social structures, the 
Black Ships of 1922 sparked a rethinking of population, sexual reproduction 
(seishoku), and motherhood as complex political and social problems. Moreover, 
whereas the former inspired the leaders of the Meiji Restoration to pursue the path 
toward modernization and Westernization, the latter were mostly welcomed by 
intellectuals, socialist activists, and social reformers who were tackling the various 
social issues—poverty, unemployment, physical and moral degeneration, poor living 
standards both in rural and urban areas, and so forth—that they considered the burdens 
of modernity. Given this, the issues and scope of debate on birth control heralded by 
Sanger’s visit to Japan in 1922 went far beyond medical debates over the use of 
contraceptives. The introduction of birth control in the interwar period opened up a 
broader question of how to control, optimize, and govern the Japanese population.        
                                                
5 Yamamoto Senji, “Sanji chōsetsu, ketsuron, sono igō (Birth control, an epilogue, and an afterward),” 
in Yamamoto Senji zenshū (Yamamoto Senji collection) 3, ed. Toshiji Sasaki et al. (Tōkyō: Chōbunsha, 
1979), 592. The original text was published in Taiyō (the Sun) in 1926.  
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My dissertation explores discourses on population at the historical intersection 
of the birth control and eugenic movements in Japan between the late 1910s and the 
late 1930s. As symbolized by the buzzword “population problem” (jinkō mondai) 
deployed by proponents of birth control and eugenics during Japan’s interwar years, 
discussions among Japanese birth control advocates about eugenic contraception grew 
to address population issues. Discourses on population reveal how sexual reproduction 
was invariably represented as the focal point of politics. Feminists, Neo-Malthusian 
social reformists, proletarian activists, and government elites agreed—despite having 
different ideological and political agendas—on the need to control population size and 
improve its “quality.” My dissertation argues that multiple discourses transformed the 
population into qualitatively and quantitatively categorized human bodies, and linked 
individual sexual reproduction to different political subjectivities along national, 
ethnic, economic, and sexual lines. 
Michel Foucault’s conceptualizations of “biopolitics” and “problematization” 
offer a way to approach various technologies for problematizing human populations 
and the government of human life. According to Foucault, “problematization” denotes 
the discursive process of presenting or representing certain things—for example, 
behaviors, phenomena, or processes—as a problem. Simultaneously, problematization 
is “an answer to a concrete situation which is real” rather than an illusory ideology.6 
Foucault thus brings to light the discursive structure of a certain problem which, in 
turn, reproduces social relations through a reordering of things as the problem. The 
                                                
6 Michel Foucault, “Concluding Remarks to the Seminar,” in Discourse and Truth: the 
Problematization of Parrhesia (six lectures given by Michel Foucault at the University of California at 
Berkley, October–November, 1983), Joseph Pearson ed., accessed May 12, 2015, 
http://foucault.info/documents/parrhesia/index.html. 
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question then arises, what things are to be problematized? Foucault’s “biopolitics” is 
an example of problematizing life through the modern mode of government. 
According to Foucault, biopolitics is a new technology of power that “deals with the 
population, with the population as political problem, as a problem that is at once 
scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem.”7 Put another 
way, biopolitics refers to different mechanisms—both disciplinary and regulatory—of 
the power to problematize a specific form of life, that is, the population.  
The widespread use of population problem, regardless of the ambiguity of the 
term, typifies this biopolitical technology of power. Drawing upon Foucault’s 
interlinked concepts, my dissertation delves into multiple mechanisms of power that 
problematize population. It should be noted that my goal is not to analyze 
demographic patterns in Japan during the interwar period in order to clarify the real 
population problem. Rather, my dissertation focuses on the discursive aspects of the 
population problem, in other words, the different languages, ideas, and movements 
that shaped the problem in a way that integrated biological dimensions of human life 
with social issues and political agendas. The “population problem” mainly, but not 
exclusively, referred to overpopulation (kajō jinkō) and was based on eighteenth-
century Malthusian assumptions about future population growth forecasted to exceed 
limited food resources. Meanwhile, those who denied the Malthusian theory—whether 
they supported Marx’s theory of population or a pronatalist policy—defined the 
population problem differently, and offered different solutions accordingly. 
Foucault’s conceptualization of biopolitics is, however, far from a versatile 
                                                
7 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures At the Collège De France, 1975-76, trans. 
David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 279. 
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reference for capturing the complex picture of the politics of problematizing the 
population in interwar Japan. Instead of considering biopolitics as a master key that is 
applicable regardless of historical differences, my dissertation revisits Foucauldian 
biopolitics through the lens of the complexity and heterogeneity of birth control 
debates in Japan. In examining the relationship between knowledge and power, 
Foucault focuses on the nature of modern knowledge as a self-established form of 
truth that constitutes reality as well as individual subjectivity. Close scrutiny of the 
birth control movement in the interwar years, however, reveals how different or even 
conflicting ideas constitute multiple layers of truth; and, by looking at the historical 
context of interwar Japan, intervenes into the sweeping generalization of Foucauldian 
biopolitics. The significance of exploring these multiple layers of knowledge lies in 
their historical situatedness: knowledge production as a continuing and complex 
process within a given society.  
The history of population discourse in interwar Japan vividly illustrates the 
multi-layered aspects of modern knowledge; this does not necessarily reveal flaws in 
the logic of the population problem, but highlights the multiple reconfigurations of 
populations, reproduction, and women’s bodies. Specifically, birth control advocates 
in Japan were largely divided into three groups: Neo-Malthusian social reformers, 
proletarian activists, and feminists. In addition, conflicting views on the population 
problem emerged among these birth control advocates, which essentially evolved into 
an argument between Marxist versus Malthusian approaches to population growth. It 
should be noted that, despite the multiplicity and cacophony of birth control 
movements, birth control advocates agreed upon the eugenic goal of improving the 
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quality of the population, as well as the politicization of human reproduction. Critical 
readings of birth control debates that addressed solutions to population issues provide 
a new understanding of eugenics—not as a racist pseudoscience but as the discursive 
mechanisms of ordering, regulating, and hierarchizing human bodies. Hence, my 
dissertation highlights the dynamics of birth control discourse, which ultimately led to 
the reconfiguration of population in terms of both quantity and quality, and made it a 
target of government.    
 In addition, the historical context of interwar Japan played an integral role in 
the formation of the multifaceted population discourse. The interwar period here is not 
simply a chronological notion that indicates a time between the two World Wars, but a 
distinctive time period during which Japan struggled to untangle a series of tensions—
political, economic, ideological, interregional, and international—against the backdrop 
of a worldwide economic depression. During the interwar period, there was a growing 
call among politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen, journalists, and scholars to solve so-
called shakai mondai (social problems). The notion of shakai mondai was a versatile 
code for those who characterized various symptoms of socioeconomic crises—such as 
poverty, unemployment, the urban-rural divide, class conflicts, resource shortages, and 
public health and hygiene issues—as the results of modernity, and thereby, as a 
pressing reason for reconstructing modernity. Solutions for reconstructing modernity, 
however, varied along political, ideological, and intellectual lines: from right-wing to 
left-wing intellectuals, from supporters of colonial expansion or militarism to those in 
favor of international cooperation and pacifism, and from liberal social reformers to 
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labor and socialist activists.8  
It was this historical context in which different or even conflicting agendas, 
languages, and movements shaped and reshaped the “population problem.” During the 
interwar period, discourses of the population problem, along with other problems of 
modernity, emerged against the backdrop of worsening economic conditions and rapid 
population growth in Mainland Japan (naichi). Japanese bureaucrats and intellectuals 
began to attribute the population problem to a wide array of social problems including 
poverty, unemployment, and physical, mental, and moral degeneration, and urged 
finding solutions that would reform the Japanese population. The category of 
population, however, was hardly self-evident. Who were counted as the “Japanese” 
population? Who were targeted as the main object of government by those who 
defined the population problem? The ambiguous yet productive nature of the category 
of the Japanese population typifies the interweaving of modern governmentality and 
imperialism. Various discourses on population issues—in particular, birth control, 
eugenics, and population policy—continuously redefined the population in both 
biological and political senses while the ambiguity embedded in the Japanese 
population due to complex social relations and colonial mobility in the Japanese 
                                                
8 Harry D. Harootunian sheds light on Japan’s interwar experience of modernity through the lens of 
contemporary intellectuals. Harootunian particularly focuses on the “doubling” dimension of Japan’s 
modernity, which refers to modernity—as it was invariably regarded by contemporary philosophers, 
sociologists, and critics—as constant conflicts between the spectacle of politico-economic 
transformation and the specter of historical and cultural patterns. This dissertation echoes Harootunian 
on his interpretation of modernity during the interwar period as a jarring, schizophrenic experience that 
often required the perfection of modernity in the 1920s and, later on, the overcoming of the modern. 
Birth control advocates who embraced various utopian visions—i.e., scientific progressivism, social 
reformism, and eugenics—in order to reconstruct modernity and bring it to completion typify this 
distinctive experience of the modern during the interwar period. Harry D, Harootunian, Overcome by 
Modernity: History, Culture, and Community In Interwar Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000), xvi-xvii.  
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Empire remained unquestioned.     
Since the 1990s, there has been a growing academic interest among historians 
of modern Japan in gender, sexual, and medical discourses. New approaches and 
perspectives such as women’s history and the history of medicine have added to the 
diversity and heterogeneity of previously androcentric master narratives. The 
intersection of politics and sexuality, and politics and medicine that have often been 
overlooked in the grand narratives of modern Japanese history have gradually come to 
the forefront in both English- and Japanese-language scholarship since the 1990s. 
Against this backdrop, some pioneering studies have delved into the political 
dimensions of birth control to address questions of sexuality and reproduction within 
the broader contexts of modern Japanese society.  
The history of birth control in modern Japan has been studied mainly by 
historians of gender, women, and medicine, and include Fujime Yuki (1997), Sabine 
Frühstück (2003), and Ogino Miho (2008).9 Fujime, in her comprehensive analysis of 
sex and gender systems in modern Japan, locates the prewar history of birth control 
movements within long-term conflicts between state power and individual sexual 
freedom. Although she narrowly defines power and sex in relation to the modern state 
and women’s sexuality, respectively, she rightly argues that sex has been consistently 
                                                
9 Fujime Yuki, Sei no rekishigaku: kōshō seido, dataizai taisei kara baishun bōshihō, yūsei hogohō 
taisei e (The history of sex: From the system of legal prostitution and criminalized abortion to the 
system of the law forbidding prostitution and the Eugenics Protection Law) (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 
1997); Sabine Frühstück, Colonizing Sex: Sexology and Social Control In Modern Japan (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003); Ogino Miho, Kazoku Keikaku eno Michi: Kindai Nihon no 
Seishoku o meguru seiji (The Road to Family Planning: The Politics of Reproduction in Modern Japan) 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2008). There are other scholarly works authored by non-historians on the 
issue of birth control, such as pro-birth control gynecologist Ōta Tenrei’s Nihon sanji chōsetsu 
hyakunenshi (One hundred years of birth control in Japan) (Tokyo: Shuppan Kagaku Sōgō Kenkyūjo, 
1976) and political scientist Tiana Norgren’s Abortion before Birth Control: The Politics of 
Reproduction In Postwar Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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the target of state control, regulation, and exploitation throughout modern Japan. 
Meanwhile, Sabine Frühstück’s Colonizing Sex: Sexology and Social Control In 
Modern Japan focuses on social discourses and knowledge production of sexuality. 
Frühstück broadens the notion of power to include social control of sex, and 
emphasizes the intellectuals’ roles in normalizing and regulating sexual behaviors 
such as artificial birth control. While Fujime associates birth control with the 
expression of sexual self-determinism against state power, Frühstück highlights how 
such political significations are constructed and pedagogized through sexual 
discourses. In contrast to these two researchers who address the question of control in 
the politics of birth control, Ogino Miho brings new light to Japanese citizens’ 
responses to the political and social control of individuals’ reproductive bodies. In 
Kazoku Keikaku e no Michi (The Road to Family Planning), Ogino considers birth 
control both as biopolitical technology and as individuals’ sexual practice, and 
examines the often-overlooked fissures between discourse and practice in the politics 
of reproduction. Despite different understandings of power and agency in the politics 
of birth control, however, Fujime, Frühstück, and Ogino all agree with the underlying 
premise that the history of birth control must be examined as a part of the politics of 
women’s bodies and sexuality in modern Japan. 
 This premise opens up other crucial questions regarding the target and the goal 
of the political, social, and technological control of sex and reproduction: Are 
women’s bodies and sexuality the only target of the political and social control of sex? 
Where is the boundary drawn between those whose sexual and reproductive practices 
are governed and those who are excluded from the government of sex? What is the 
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fundamental goal of various attempts to manage, control, and regulate individuals’ 
sexual and reproductive behaviors? Despite such excellent work by scholars about 
birth control in Japan, the history of birth control in modern Japan has been narrowly 
confined to the history of female sexuality. To answer the above questions, the politics 
of population—both the target and the goal of the modern government—should be an 
integral part of the history of birth control. In other words, birth control is not merely 
one of the themes of women’s history, it intersects with broader questions of 
biopolitics as well. 
 When it comes to the history of population control and population discourses 
in modern Japan, some excellent work in Japanese-language scholarship has been 
done by scholars such as Fujino Yutaka (1998), Sugita Naho (2010), and Takaoka 
Hiroyuki (2011).10 First, Fujino focuses on the close ties between fascism and 
eugenics, and argues that eugenic ideas that had been promoted mainly through social 
movements and intellectual discussions during the interwar period culminated in the 
institutionalization of eugenics under Japan’s military-fascist regime. It should be 
noted that Fujino maintains a critical distance from the conventional understanding of 
eugenics as merely negative, and as repeatedly identified with the Holocaust under the 
Nazi regime. Instead, he does not overlook the twofold—positive and negative—
nature of eugenics and clearly shows how eugenic ideas, particularly a positive 
eugenics that encourages reproduction among those with desired traits, was integrated 
                                                
10 Fujino Yutaka, Nihon fashizumu to yūsei shisō (Fascism and eugenic ideas in Japan) (Kyoto-shi: 
Kamogawa Shuppan, 1998); Sugita Naho, Yūsei yūkyo to shakai seisaku: jinkō mondai no Nihonteki 
tenkai (Eugenics, euthenics and social policy: the development of population problem in Japan) (Kyoto-
shi: Hōritsu Bunkasha, 2013); Takaoka Hiroyuki. Sōryokusen taisei to fukushi kokka: senjiki Nihon no 
shakai kaikaku kōsō (Total war system to the welfare state: Japan’s wartime plan for social reform) 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2011).  
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into Japan’s wartime population policy.11 Meanwhile, although Takaoka also traces 
the development of wartime population policy, the difference between Fujino and 
Takaoka is clear: Unlike Fujino, who characterizes wartime Japan as a fascist regime, 
Takaoka defines it as “social state” (shakai kokka). This social state, marked by the 
government’s active intervention into population control, challenges not only an easy 
association between fascism and eugenics, but also an ironic continuity between the 
wartime fascist regime and the postwar welfare state. My dissertation echoes Takaoka 
in his characterization of the wartime regime as a social state, but my focus turns to 
the interwar period during which the Japanese government and power elites had 
already begun to draw a blueprint for a comprehensive population policy. Furthermore, 
the discourse of population control and management was not necessarily monopolized 
by the government. As mentioned above, intellectuals and social activists had taken 
the initiative in population discourses since the early 1920s. Sugita’s research on 
population discourses among Japanese sociologists, eugenicists, and social policy 
experts between the 1920s and 1970s clearly demonstrates the intellectuals’ role in 
enmeshing population issues in the web of multiple social problems during the 
interwar years. While agreeing with Sugita on the importance of so-called bottom-up 
biopolitics in interwar Japan, my dissertation broadens the scope of population 
                                                
11 For the history of eugenics in prewar and wartime Japan, see Suzuki Zenji, Nihon no yūseigaku: sono 
shisō to undō no kiseki (Japanese eugenics: eugenic thought and the eugenics movement) (Tokyo: 
Sankyō Shuppan, 1983); Sumiko Otsubo et al, “Eugenics in Japan: Some Ironies of Modernity, 1883-
1945,” Science in Context 11, no. 3-4 (1998): 545-565; Yōko Matsubara, “The enactment of Japan’s 
sterilization laws in the 1940s: A prelude to postwar eugenic policy,” Historia Scientiarum 8 (1998): 
187-201; Jennifer Robertson, “Blood Talks: Eugenic Modernity and the Creation of New Japanese,” 
History and Anthropology 13, no. 3 (2002): 191-216; Sumiko Otsubo, “Between Two Worlds: 
Yamanouchi Shigeo and Eugenics in Early Twentieth-Century Japan.” Annals of Science 62, no. 2 
(2005): 205-231. 
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discourses to include social activism and medical technologies such as birth control 
movements and contraceptive devices; and moreover, I examine both the mutual 
influence and the tension between knowledge production about the population 
problem and the government’s population policies.    
My dissertation has two ultimate goals: the reappraisal of interwar Japan 
through the lenses of biopolitics and imperialism, and the dissection of the politics of 
reproduction by means of an interdisciplinary research project. Firstly, my dissertation 
aims to contribute to the reappraisal of Japan’s interwar period as a crucial stage for 
reorganizing Japanese modernity by attempting different solutions for the population 
problem. Interwar discourses surrounding the population problem demonstrate the 
entanglement of birth control, eugenics, the working-class movement, and migration 
and colonial policies. As seen above, despite such pioneering work on birth control 
and population discourses by Japanese-history scholars, some of the crucial questions 
that intersect with or intervene directly in the grand narratives of modern Japanese 
history—in particular, nation- and empire-building, capitalism, and class conflicts—
remain unexamined. Key questions by which this dissertation attempts to fill the gaps 
in the history of reproduction and sexuality in modern Japan include the following: 
How essential was sexual reproduction in nation-building, empire-building, and 
capitalist production? What were the roles of population categorization in forming and 
representing both national and imperial subjects? What were the effects of the 
interplay between scientific progressivism, social reformism, and imperialism on the 
emergence of population control policies? Put more fundamentally, why and how did 
population become a political problem in modern Japan? 
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Secondly, my dissertation attempts to contribute to a methodological dialogue 
between modern Japanese history, gender and sexuality studies, and Science and 
Technology Studies (STS). In recent years, there has been a growing interest in family 
planning, reproductive health, and demography in colonial and postcolonial East 
Asia.12 The increasing scholarly interest in population and reproduction in East Asian 
history shows how interdisciplinary efforts can be fruitful in decentering the master 
narratives of Western science and historicism, and enriching our understanding of 
population control and reproductive science as a political project of modern East 
Asian countries including Japan, Korea, China, and Taiwan. My dissertation also 
attempts to be part of a productive interdisciplinary dialogue by opening up a series of 
questions regarding birth control, contraceptive technologies, eugenics, and population 
discourses that have been marginalized in the field of modern Japanese history. In 
revisiting interwar Japan through the interwoven frames of biopolitics and 
                                                
12 East Asian Science, Technology and Society (EASTS), which itself is an outcome of interdisciplinary 
and transnational efforts, sheds light on population control as a politico-economic issue in Asia during 
the Cold War era (1950s-1970s) in a recent special issue (2016). This dissertation also pursues the goal 
of what Aya Homei and Yu-Ling Huang aimed for as articulated in their co-authored introduction of 
that special issue: an “understanding of fertility reduction being deployed under the name of population 
control within the context of nation-states in Asia.” Aya Homei et al., “Population Control in Cold War 
Asia: An Introduction.” East Asian Science, Technology and Society 10, no. 4 (2016): 344. In addition, 
pioneering works that attempt an interdisciplinary approach to birth control and family planning policy 
in modern and contemporary East Asia include: Wen-Hua Kuo, “When State and Policies Reproduce 
Each Other: Making Taiwan a Population, Control Policy, Making Population Control Policy for 
Taiwan,” in Historical Perspectives on East Asian Science, Technology, and Medicine, ed. K. L. Chan 
et al., (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2002), 121–137; Susan Greenhalgh et al., Governing 
China's Population: From Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2005); Susan Greenhalgh, “Missile Science, Population Science: The Origins of China's One-Child 
Policy,” The China Quarterly 182 (2005): 253-276; John P. DiMoia, Reconstructing Bodies: 
Biomedicine, Health, and Nation Building In South Korea Since 1945 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2013); Junjie Chen, “Globalizing, Reproducing, and Civilizing Rural Subjects: Population 
Control Policy and Constructions of Rural Identity in China,” in Reproduction, Globalization, and the 
State: New Theoretical and Ethnographic Perspectives, ed. Carol H. Browner et al., (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2011), 38–52; and Aya Homei, “The Science of Population and Birth Control in 
Post-War Japan,” in Science, Technology, and Medicine in the Modern Japanese Empire, ed. David G. 
Wittner et al., (London: Routledge, 2016), 227–243. 
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imperialism, my dissertation illuminates how the multiple discourses on population 
constituted and categorized which bodies should be reproduced, and how these 
discourses intersected with modern subjectivities—namely, gender, nation, and class.  
My dissertation is organized into 6 chapters including this introduction. The 
purpose of chapters 2, 3, and 4 is to explore the ways in which various birth-control-
movement groups—Neo-Malthusianists, Proletarian activists, and Feminists—
represented sexuality and reproduction based upon their different definitions of the 
population problem. Chapter 2 focuses on Japanese Neo-Malthusianists who actively 
addressed the population problem during the interwar years. With the rise of Neo-
Malthusianism, discussion of the population problem had been growing among 
Japanese social reformers and intellectuals since the late 1910s. The crux of the Neo-
Malthusian idea was that various social evils including poverty and unemployment 
were caused by overpopulation. The move to control individual reproduction was 
based upon the premise that uncontrolled individual sexuality was the root cause of 
humanity’s social and biological deterioration. Another key concept for Neo-
Malthusian groups was eugenics, which, they believed, could maintain both the ideal 
population size and the ideal qualities of the population. Chapter 2 dissects the 
discursive structure of the population problem through the close reading of the 
arguments of Neo-Malthusian activists, including Nihon Sanji Chōsetsu Kenkyūkai 
(the Japanese Society for the Study of Birth Control), the first birth control advocacy 
group in Japan, and Abe Isoo (1865-1949), one of the leading figures in Japan’s birth 
control movements.     
Chapter 3 traces the social and intellectual history of the proletarian birth-
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control movement in interwar Japan. Since the early 1920s in Japan, the influx of 
contraceptive technology ushered in a new way of thinking about human reproduction. 
Previously a matter of uncontrolled nature, human reproduction became an issue 
linked to controllable bodies. Rethinking reproduction on the basis of scientific 
authority gave socialist intellectuals and proletarian activists a new strategy for class 
struggle. By integrating scientific knowledge and technology regarding birth control 
into the proletarian movement, pro-birth-control class activists strove to challenge the 
capitalist representation of surplus labor and thus, ultimately, overturn the exploitation 
of workers. The history of the pro-birth-control proletarian movement is largely 
divided into three periods: the first period (1922-1924) was characterized by 
sexologist Yamamoto Senji (1889-1929)’s efforts for sexual enlightenment and the 
founding of the Sanji Seigen Kenkyūkai (the Birth Control Research Society); the 
second period (1925-1929) involved the justification of birth control based on the 
Marxist critique of capitalism; and the third period (1930-1933) brought clinic-based, 
practical actions for propagating contraception and eugenics. This chapter concludes 
that, although the movement faded away into history, the genealogy of the Japanese 
proletarian birth-control movement offers a still valid question about the complex and 
interconnected relations between human reproduction, capitalist economy, and 
reproductive science. 
The goal of Chapter 4 is to delve into the multifaceted meanings of 
motherhood in Japanese feminists’ advocacy for birth control during the interwar 
period. Feminists’ arguments for the practice of birth control mainly adopted the 
notion of voluntary motherhood to link the empowerment of women with women’s 
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free choice in reproduction. Although the political representation of motherhood was 
commonly shared by pro-birth-control feminists, there were also differences among 
feminist voices, depending on different ideological views toward the politico-
economic system. Hence, the feminist debate on birth control was hardly limited to 
women’s issues isolated from the social structure, but was embedded in the 
contemporary social context. Simultaneously, the context was reconfigured as a series 
of problems related to questions of women, reproduction, and population. Two 
prominent Japanese feminists, Yamakawa Kikue (1890-1980) and Ishimoto Shizue 
(1897-2001), illustrate this multiple, conflicting nature of the birth control debate. By 
focusing on Yamakawa’s advocacy for a “birth strike” and Ishimoto’s “eugenic 
feminism,” Chapter 4 explores the politicization of reproduction, or conversely the 
sexualization of the politico-economic system.   
Chapter 5 turns to the roles of governmental elites in the development of 
population policies during the interwar period. Compared to birth control advocacy 
groups who had been raising population issues since the late 1910s, the Japanese 
government was a latecomer to discourses about the population problem. It was not 
until the late 1920s that the Japanese government began to realize the importance of 
comprehensive governmental control of the population and to institutionalize 
population studies against the backdrop of economic depression and the rise in 
agrarian and industrial disputes. The trajectory of interwar population policies reveals 
the leading role of elites in designing and establishing a comprehensive and scientific 
approach to controlling, optimizing, and managing the Japanese population. 
Furthermore, the fact that government elites embraced imperialism as part of their 
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solution to the population problems in the metropole sheds new light on the 
governmentality of an imperial nation-state. Through the lenses of different discourses 
of population control that were developed by governmental elites in Mainland Japan, 
this chapter will delve into the complex relationship between metropolitan 
governmentality and colonial expansion. In particular, this chapter will focus on two 
interwar research organizations—Jinkō Shokuryō Mondai Chōsakai (the Population 
and Food Problems Investigation Committee, established in 1927) and Jinkō Mondai 
Kenkyūkai (the Institute for the Research of Population Problems, established in 
1933); and on two power elites—diplomat and agricultural economist Nitobe Inazō 
(1862-1933) and bureaucrat and social reformer Nagai Tōru (1878-1973).   
This dissertation concludes with some reflections on the interwar history of 
Japan. The multifaceted discourse of the population problem contributes to a fresh 
understanding of interwar Japanese society in two senses: at the micro level, different 
languages, technologies, and movements addressed the population problem while 
invariably endorsing a eugenic vision for the improvement of the population’s quality. 
At the macro level, this heterogeneous realm of the population discourse in Mainland 
Japan can be situated in the transnational discourse of problematizing populations, as 
well as in the interlinking relationship between governmentality in the metropole and 
colonial expansion. The reappraisal of interwar Japan with a focus on the 
problematization of the population is a first step toward understanding the lingering 
impacts of the interwar population discourse on the politics of population and 
reproduction under the total war mobilization regime and in postwar Japanese society. 
Such a diachronic understanding can answer more thoroughly the overarching 
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question of this dissertation: Why and how does population matter in modern Japan?   
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CHAPTER 2 
The Population Problem:  
Neo-Malthusian Reconfiguration of Sexual Reproduction 
 
Technologies of the Population Problem 
 
Birth Control, in the last analysis, is the only way for Japan to meet the 
problem presented by a growing population and a static food supply. A 
thorough investigation of the increase in population, of the possibilities 
of emigration in various directions, and of the question of importing 
food, leads to the conclusion that Japan must regulate her population, 
whether it is moral or immoral to do so [sic].13  
 
 In July 1922, the Japanese birth control advocate Baron Ishimoto Keikichi 
submitted a report titled “The Population Problem in Japan” at the Fifth International 
Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference in London. The Fifth Conference was 
groundbreaking in various ways. Delegates from Non-Western countries, namely, 
Japan and India, attended the conference for the first time. Previously, International 
Neo-Malthusian Conference had included only European and American 
representatives since the first International meeting at the turn of the twentieth century 
in Paris. In addition, the issues addressed at the Fifth Conference were much broader 
than those covered in preceding neo-Malthusian conferences. Delegates and presenters 
from different countries interwove neo-Malthusian theories with various political, 
economic, social, and eugenic concerns, and advocated birth control as a solution to 
the multiple problems presumably caused by overpopulation.14         
                                                
13 International Birth Control Conference, Report of the Fifth International Neo-Malthusian and Birth 
Control Conference, Kingsway Hall, London, July 11th to 14th, 1922 (London: W. Heinemann, 1922), 
75. 
14 The First International Neo-Malthusian Conference was held in Paris in August 1900. Under the 
leadership of a French educator Paul Robin, Neo-Malthusianists from France, England, Holland, and 
Germany gathered at the First Conference. The subsequent three conferences were held in Belgium in 
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 After the Great War, Neo-Malthusianism was undergoing marked changes by 
both extending the meaning of international to include the non-Western world, and by 
redefining population problem as a complex web of interlinked issues. Baron 
Ishimoto’s report on population growth in Japan exemplifies both aspects of this 
shifting context. In his report, Ishimoto emphasized the fact that Japanese population 
increased by 600,000 to 700,000 each year although there was little hope of increasing 
the food supply. Like many contemporary Neo-Malthusianists, Ishimoto believed that 
birth control was the most effective solution to overpopulation. Thus, Ishimoto’s 
conceptualization of population problem, as well as its solution followed the Neo-
Malthusian model. In essence, Ishimoto had translated the Neo-Malthusian discourse 
of population problem, which had been percolating in Western countries since the 
1880s, into the post-Great War Japanese society. 
 This chapter focuses on Japanese Neo-Malthusianists who actively tackled 
population problem (jinkō mondai) during the interwar years. Since the late 1910s, 
Japanese social reformers and intellectuals increasingly expressed their concerns about 
the population problem. In early twentieth Century Japan, the population problem 
mainly, but not exclusively, referred to overpopulation (kajō jinkō) which was based 
on eighteenth-century Malthusian assumptions about future population growth 
                                                                                                                                       
September 1905, in Hague in July 1910, and in Dresden in September 1911. The number of 
participating countries increased to include Belgium, Sweden, Spain, Hungary, Switzerland, and the 
United States. Particularly, the Fourth Conference in which two American attendees participated for the 
first time marked an extension of the previously, primarily European Conference, to include the United 
States. In a similar vein, the Fifth Conference extended the meaning of the word “international” by 
including delegates from Asian countries. For a brief history of the International Neo-Malthusian and 
Birth Control Conference, see Margaret Sanger, “Introduction to Proceedings of the Sixth International 
Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference” (Sep 1925), The Public Papers of Margaret Sanger: 
Web Edition, accessed May 2, 2016,	
https://www.nyu.edu/projects/sanger/webedition/app/documents/show.php?sangerDoc=213109.xml.  
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forecasted to exceed limited food resources. The main goal of this chapter is to 
analyze the discursive formation of the population problem as it was articulated in 
Japan. I am interested in how population problem discourse reconfigured sexual 
reproduction, national and international politics, and capitalism through Japanese Neo-
Malthusian birth control advocacy. Here, I deliberately use the term discourse to mark 
the population problem, as neither a real phenomenon nor as a false image, but rather 
as the dominant way of thematizing, ordering, and fashioning human life in early 
twentieth Century Japan.15     
As stated in Introduction, Foucault’s conceptualization of “biopolitics” and 
“problematization” offers a way to approach various technologies of problematizing 
human populations and the government of human life. Drawing upon Foucault’s 
interlinked concepts, this chapter characterizes the “population problem” in the 
interwar years as the biopolitical technology of power and delves into the dual 
mechanism of the population problem addressed by Japanese Neo-Malthusian 
advocates. Specifically, I focus on the population problem constructed as a 
multifaceted question of population, and birth control as a panacea for the population 
problem.  
 
Forming the Population Problem, Reforming the Population 
 
 World War I brought about political, economic, and ideological changes in 
                                                
15 The notion of discourse is used here to emphasize the structure of statements regarding population. 
The population problem neither presents a real problem, nor invents a lie about the reality. It is 
discursive in terms that it constitutes a certain problem on a specific object, namely population, while in 
practice population is materialized in relation to something else, such as the socioeconomic problems, 
reproduction, and individual sexual lives. Michel Foucault’s open-ended definition of discourse as 
“practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” illuminates these simultaneously 
intra and extralinguistic, and productive characters of discourse. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock Publications, 1972), 49. 
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Japan as well as in Europe. Between 1914 and 1918, the Japanese economy underwent 
a temporary boom due to a growing demand for Japanese products in the absence of 
European products. While this temporary increase in demand caused an increase in 
Japanese workers’ incomes, this increase in workers’ wages did not necessarily 
elevate their standard of living. The general level of prices for goods, particularly food 
prices, increased more than enough to offset any wage increases.16 Furthermore, 
wartime inflation was followed by nation-wide postwar economic hardship, 
symbolized by the rice riots of 1918. The riots, which ignited in fishing villages of 
Toyama Prefecture and rapidly spread nation-wide, illustrate the devastating effects of 
inflation, and the social and political contradictions growing in the post-World War I 
Japan.17  
  World War I also had a global effect on the overhaul of Western modernity, 
mainly anchored in European civilization, individualism, materialistic values, and 
Social Darwinism. Since the Meiji period in the mid-19th Century, Western modernity 
had been an ideal widely shared by leading Japanese politicians and intellectuals. The 
educator and writer, Fukuzawa Yūkichi’s exhortation to “leave Asia and enter Europe 
(datsu-A nyū-Ō)” illustrates the dominant Western-centrism in Meiji Japanese 
                                                
16 For the wartime economic boom and the rise in grain price after World War I, see Andrew Gordon, A 
Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 139-144; Kozo Yamamura, “The Japanese Economy, 1911-1930: Concentration, Conflicts, and 
Crises,” in	Japan In Crisis: Essays On Taishō Democracy, ed. Bernard S. Silberman et al. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1974), 299-328; Takafusa Nakamura, Economic Growth in Prewar Japan 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 144-156. 
17 The rice riots of 1918 were a series of nationwide riots against the high price of rice. As wartime 
inflation caused the price of rice almost double in many areas, the urban and the rural poor rose up 
against the rice merchants and jostled with the police. The rice riots exemplify how class conflict came 
to the fore in Japan since late 1910s and how it emerged particularly in the form of food crisis. Andrew 
Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy In Prewar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1991), 60-61; Mikiso Hane, Peasants, Rebels, Women, and Outcastes: The Underside of Modern Japan 
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 160-161.       
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thought.18 However, the so-called Great War had a great impact on the prevailing 
pursuit of Western modernity among many Japanese intellectuals. These intellectuals 
began to reconsider the values of civilization and reorient Japan to a new form of 
modernity.            
 In this post-World War I context, the population problem was raised mainly by 
social reformers and social scientists. It should be noted that there had been 
intellectual interest in population growth and reproductive control since the Meiji 
period. The Malthusian theory of population was first introduced to Japanese readers 
with the translation of An Essay on the Principle of Population in 1877.19 In 1903, 
Oguri Sadao, a politician and a businessman who once ran a pharmaceutical company, 
co-authored The Practical Theory of Social Reforms (Shakai Kairyō Jitsuron) in 
which Oguri examined the Neo-Malthusian birth control movement in Britain in the 
1870s.20 Although Malthusian theory and Neo-Malthusianism had been discussed 
since the early years of the Meiji era, the issue of population was recontextualized 
amid the ruins of the Great War. As mentioned above, in the late 1910s, worsening 
                                                
18 Leading Japanese intellectuals in the Meiji period (1868-1912) pursued “civilization and 
enlightenment (bunmei kaika)” following the Western path of modernization. Kenneth B. Pyle names 
this Western-centered modern thought “Meiji conservatism,” and enumerates the main themes of Meiji 
conservatism as a negative view of Japan’s tradition, stress on Western culture as the universal path of 
human development, commitment to utilitarian knowledge including science and technology, and a new 
vision of “self” and humanity. Fukuzawa Yūkichi (1835-1901), a prominent Meiji writer and a member 
of Meirokusha, led the formation of Meiji thought. Fukuzawa’s well-known slogan “leave Asian and 
enter Europe” typifies the idealization of Western modernity by mapping a dichotomous world. 
Kenneth B. Pyle, “Meiji Conservatism,” in Modern Japanese Thought, ed., Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi 
(U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 98-146.   
19 Ōshima Sadamasu (1845-1906), a translator of various European economists’ work and a founder of 
the Society for National Economy (Kokka Keizai-kai), translated An Essay on the Principle of 
Population (originally published in 1798) written by Thomas Robert Malthus and published it with the 
title of Marusasu Jinkōron yōryaku (A summary of Malthusian theory of population) in 1877.  
20 In the book The Practical Theory of Social Reforms, Oguri translated the concept of contraception to 
avoid having a large family into ninshin seigen (literally, pregnancy control) and discussed the necessity 
and methods of contraception. Oguri’s work was the first to use the concept of contraception in Japan. 
Ogino, Kazoku Keikaku eno Michi, 17-18.   
  25 
economic conditions and a growing skepticism toward Western modernity contributed 
to the realization that the population was the root cause of a wide array of social 
problems. Moreover, many agreed that particular efforts should be made to solve the 
population problem at a social and policy level.  
 The population problem was a complex and multifaceted question. Japanese 
social reformers and social scientists defined the population problem in varied ways 
and offered a number of different solutions. For example, those who pursued the 
reconstruction (kaizō) of Western civilization in Japan raised the population problem 
on eugenic grounds and proposed to reform Japanese society through the improvement 
of population quality.21 Meanwhile, those who emphasized the economic effects of 
population policies denounced Neo-Malthusian support for birth control and justified 
calls for increasing both the size and the quality of the Japanese population on 
national-economic grounds. These different ways of configuring the population 
problem preceded a series of 1920s debates about the population problem—debates 
which essentially evolved into an argument between Marxist versus Malthusian 
                                                
21 The term “reconstruction (Kaizō)” emerged among Japanese intellectuals who demanded the 
reconsideration of Western liberalism and the reorganization of Japanese society after World War I. 
Most prominently, a general magazine Kaizō began to be published in April 1919 under the leadership 
of the journalist, Yamamoto Sanehiko. The magazine Kaizō claimed to advocate social and economic 
reform from a socialist view against the background of the postwar economic depression, the growing 
political and class conflicts, and the worldwide rise of socialism. The Kaizō group actively introduced 
some contemporary Western reformist thoughts. On the invitation of the Kaizō group, a British 
philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) who argued for the reconstruction of economic structure and 
philosophy of life in his book Principles of Social Reconstruction (London: G. Allen & Unwin ltd, 1916) 
visited Japan in July 1922 to give a lecture on the reconstruction of civilization. After Russell, the Kaizō 
group also invited Albert Einstein, George Bernard Shaw, and Margaret Sanger who promoted the need 
for reconstruction based on pacifism, social reformism, and feminism. In light of this, the term 
reconstruction implies the worldwide resonance of the reexamination of Western modernity in the post-
World War I. Peter Duus et al., “Socialism, Liberalism, and Marxism, 1901-31,” in Modern Japanese 
Thought, 179; Seki Chūka. Zasshi kaizō No Yonjūnen (Forty years of Kaizo (Reconstruction)) (Tokyo: 
Kōwadō, 1977), 16-79. 
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approaches to population growth.22 However, these contending definitions of the 
population problem laid the ground for the succeeding population debates in terms of a 
reordering of the Japanese population: formulating the population question as a dual 
problem, namely, a problem of quantity and quality, and positioning the population 
within the complex web of social and biological relations.    
 Saito Itsuki, an officer of the Department of Home Affairs, was one of the 
leading figures who problematized the population immediately after the end of World 
War I. In 1919, Saito wrote a series of articles titled “the Study of Eugenics (Yūshu-
ron)” in the magazine Society and Relief (Shakai to kyūsai).23 In these articles, Saito 
reconsidered the dominant ideologies of Western modernity including materialism, 
laissez-faire individualism, and social Darwinism – ideas which, Saito argued, 
threatened human civilization. In opposition to these destructive modern values, Saito 
emphasized an “organically coexisting (yūkiteki kyōson)” community comprised of 
individuals, nations, and humankind to reconstruct civilization. The idea of an 
“organic coexistence” was premised on the assumption that human bodies signified 
biological commonality and a biological connection between universal communities 
and particular individuals. Saito further claimed that the reconstruction of civilization 
should be based on national, regional and individual reforms. The representation of the 
organic relationship between particular and universal bodies justified the need for 
eugenic intervention in population control. In Saito’s view, eugenics would function to 
improve individual life, which would ultimately lead to the improvement of humanity.  
                                                
22 For history of the population debate in Japan between 1920s and the mid-1930s, see Sugita Naho, 
Jinkō, kazoku, seimei to shakai seisaku: Nihon no keiken (Population, family, and life and social policy: 
Japan’s experiences) (Kyoto-shi: Hōritsu Bunkasha, 2010), 14-37.  
23 Saito Itsuki, “Yūshu-ron kenkyū,” Shakai to Kyūsai 3, no.1-3 (1919). 
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 In Saito’s schema, the significant question is what is the relation between the 
organic community and the population. Saito saw the population as the practical 
domain of organic bodies because the population problem was characterized as rife 
with socioeconomic problems. Saito’s understanding of “socioeconomic” can be 
easily inferred from his favorable appraisal of Malthusian theory. According to Saito, 
Malthus changed the focus of the population problem from the prosperity of the ruling 
class to the welfare of the people. Saito also endorsed Malthusian theory for shifting 
the emphasis on the political and commercial aspects of the population problem to 
socioeconomic concerns.24 Although Malthusian theory was proven false by the 
declining rate of child births in many European countries since the late 19th century, 
Saito highlighted the continuing validity of Malthusianism in tackling the physical and 
mental degeneration caused by World War I. Hence, Saito turned to a quality-based 
population policy instead of the existing quantity-based population policy. Saito wrote:      
 
Now the population problem is a problem of social policy. This 
problem is a matter of improving the quality of the population, and 
reducing or extinguishing the population with undesirable qualities. 
The population problem is also a matter of increasing the population of 
good qualities. The focus of the population problem, now, turns to the 
quality of the population. Whereas those who are considered desirable 
to reproduce are a superior type, those who are not welcomed by their 
neighbors are subjected to annihilation for the benefits of social 
progress and nation-building.25  
 
In light of this, Saito’s conceptualization of the “population problem” was hardly the 
simple diagnosis of excess population growth. From Saito’s point of view, the 
population problem primarily referred to the problem of quality and thus his solution 
                                                
24 Ibid., 13. 
25 Ibid., 14-5. 
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aimed at increasing “the population of good qualities.” Nevertheless, Saito’s stress on 
the qualitative aspects of the population does not simply mean a complete shift in 
focus from quantity to quality. Rather, Saito’s emphasis on quality is emblematic of a 
reordering of the population question as a dual problem, that is, a problem of quantity 
and quality. The ways in which Saito addressed this dual problem were selective and 
hierarchical. Saito emphasized a new morality of “encouraging a certain type of 
people to realize the responsibility to reproduce while controlling the reproduction of 
the other type for racial betterment.”26 For Saito, eugenics was the discursive 
technology of problematizing the population; this “discursive technology” called the 
population into question based on hereditary and social distinctions, and rationalized 
the social control of the population for the benefits of the organic community. 
 Saito’s redefinition of the population problem exemplifies how post-World 
War I discourse reconfigured the population in Japan. An emphasis on socioeconomic 
and eugenic aspects of the population was shared by most social reformers and 
scholars regardless of their different understandings of the population problem. For 
example, Takano Iwasaburō, a social statistician of Tokyo Imperial University and a 
founding member of the Ōhara Institute for Social Research (Ōhara shakai mondai 
kenkyūjo), raised the population question on economic grounds, and advocated both an 
increase in the size of the population and an improvement in population quality. In 
1918, Takano highlighted the destructive effects of World War I on the Japanese 
population size and national economy in his article “Economic views on the 
                                                
26 Ibid., 15. 
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population growth (Jinkō zōka no keizaiteki kansatsu).”27 Reflecting on the economic 
and population crisis in the post-World War I Europe, Takano called for the 
formulations of population policy along with measures aimed at boosting the national 
economy. Takano advocated a policy encouraging population growth for the benefit of 
the nation, particularly for industrial development. Here, Takano stressed that 
economic growth was both a result of population growth and an essential condition for 
increasing the population size. Thus, Takano shed light on the connection between the 
national economy and population growth.   
 Takano distanced himself from Neo-Malthusianism while advocating 
population growth. He did not overlook the fact that in the late 1920s the population of 
Mainland Japan (naichi) was exhibiting patterns of growth quite different from 
contemporary European nations. Relatively speaking, Japan experienced a high 
population growth rate compared to Europe, as well as higher birth and death rates.28 
How did Takano rationalize his support for population growth even though the 
Japanese population continued to increase? Takano pursued population growth to both 
increase the size of the population and to improve the population quality. The virtuous 
circle of population growth can be seen in Takano’s claim that, 
 
                                                
27 Takano Iwasaburō, “Jinkō zōka no keizaiteki kansatsu (Economic Views on the Population Growth),” 
Kokka gakkai zasshi (The journal of the association of political and social sciences) 32, no. 7 (1918): 
38-47. 
28 In August 1918, Takano gave two lectures under the titles of “The Population policy of Japan (honpō 
no jinkō seisaku)” and “Quantity or quality (ryō ka shitsu ka)” at the Social Policy Conference (Shakai 
seisaku gakkai) in Sapporo. In these lectures, Takano commented on the distinct pattern of Mainland 
Japanese population growth which differed from its counterparts in European countries. Takano 
reported that the population of Japan increased by 1.5% every year even though the death rate reached 
20%. Takano specifically expressed concern about the high mortality rate of children, women, and 
youths. Takano Iwasaburō, “Honpō no jinkō seisaku (The population policy of Japan),” Kokka gakkai 
zasshi 32, no. 10 (1918): 142. 
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It should be noted that the population growth refers to quality 
improvement as well as an increase in quantity. We must find ways to 
improve the health, knowledge, and morality of the population. The 
right path to do so is the fair distribution of wealth and the 
improvement of living standards. In much the same way, the economic 
progress conditions population increase. Population growth is both 
quality-wise and quantity-wise conditioned by economic progress.29   
 
 Like Saito, Takano reconfigured the population problem as including both 
quantitative and qualitative components. Despite their different approaches to 
population policy—for example, Saito called for the reduction of the Japanese 
population while Takano advocated population growth—Saito and Takano agreed 
upon the reordering of the population on eugenic grounds. Furthermore, these two 
intellectuals agreed that Japan needed an effective national policy to manage the 
population. For example, Takano’s critique of the heretofore “lack of attention to the 
qualitative dimension of the population” and his demand for “a plan for the qualitative 
improvement of the population within the broader scope of social policy including 
better livelihoods, nutritional improvement, and moral advancement” correspond well 
to Saito’s emphasis on “the quality of the population.”30 These two leading figures 
exemplify the shifting understanding of the population in the post-World War I Japan. 
Questioning the population was a way of objectifying, reordering, and controlling the 
population. The population problem was hardly a real problem; it was a discourse that 
raised a series of issues and reproduced human relations which are mediated by the 
population.   
 The emerging discourse of the population problem in the late 1910s laid the 
                                                
29 Ibid., 41-2. 
30 Takano Iwasaburō, “Ryō ka shitsu ka (Quantity or quality),” Kokka gakkai zasshi 32, no. 11 (1918): 
145. 
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ground for further discussions of the specifics of population control. In the following 
decade, social reformers and intellectuals who embraced Neo-Malthusianism and 
eugenics began discussing birth control as a way of improving the quality of the 
population, as well as a way of controlling population size. During this process, the 
population problem became interwoven with reproductive science and technology, and 
various political mechanisms of subjectification by which individuals would 
implement reproductive techniques in daily lives. In the rest of this chapter, I will 
explore how Japanese Neo-Malthusian birth control advocates addressed the Japanese 
population problem and redefined individual reproduction within the broader scope of 
population control, politico-economic relations, and racial betterment. 
 
Birth Control: A Neo-Malthusian Panacea for Overpopulation 
 
 The first birth control movement group in Japan, Nihon Sanji Chōsetsu 
Kenkyūkai (The Japanese Society for the Study of Birth Control, hereafter 
Chōsetsukai) was founded in Tokyo, in May 1922. Its members included Baron 
Ishimoto Keikichi, Baroness and feminist Ishimoto Shizue, socialist and feminist 
Yamamoto Kikue, the physicians Kaji Tokijirō and Majima Kan, Christian socialist 
and Waseda University professor Abe Isoo, and the labor activists Matsuoka 
Komakichi, and Suzuki Bunji. These founding members of Chōsetsukai concentrated 
primarily on promoting birth control in Japanese society through a magazine, titled 
“Shōkazoku (the Small Family, which was suspended after the publication of the first 
issue)” and a series of pamphlets.31 Considering that abortion was prohibited by 
                                                
31 The first and last issue of the magazine shōkazoku (published on May 13, 1922) was reprinted in Sei 
to seishoku no jinken mondai shiryō shūsei, vol. 14, 576-580. The pamphlets published by Chōsetsukai 
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criminal law and that the use of contraception went against sexual norms of the time, 
support for birth control was highly radical.32 Margaret Sanger’s visit to Japan 
between March and April, 1922, provided an opportunity to raise the radical issue of 
birth control in public. When Sanger, the founder of the American Birth Control 
League, visited Japan, she gave several lectures on the population problem and the 
need for birth control. As an American activist, Sanger’s presence in Japan had social 
ramifications.33 One month after Sanger headed for Korea and China to lecture about 
the benefits of birth control, Chōsetsukai was founded by Japanese social reformers 
and labor activists who were sympathetic to Sanger’s call to make birth control 
available in Japan. 
 It should be noted, however, that the birth control movements in Japan were 
also a product of the ongoing attention to the population problem which had been 
discussed by intellectuals since the late 1910s. Particularly, birth control activists, who 
embraced Neo-Malthusian ideas, actively focused on the “problem” of overpopulation. 
For these Japanese Neo-Malthusianists, overpopulation was the population problem, 
and also the root cause of various social ills including poverty, hereditary diseases, and 
moral degeneration. Neo-Malthusianists advocated the practice of contraception as a 
                                                                                                                                       
include Ishimoto Shizue, Sanji seigen ron o sho hōmen yori kansatsu shi te (A general observation of 
the arguments for birth control) (October 1922); Ishimoto Keikichi, Waga jinkō mondai to sanji 
chōsetsu ron (An essay on population problem and birth control) (December 1922); Matsumura Shōnen, 
Seibutsu gaku jō yori mi ta sanji chōsetsu ron (Birth control from biological perspective) (March 1923). 
The three pamphlets were reprinted in Sei to Seishoku No Jinken Mondai Shiryō Shūsei, vol. 2.	
32 In Japan, the state prohibition of abortion began right after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Both the 
practice of abortion and the sale of abortion drugs by midwives were prohibited under the proclamation 
of the Great Council of the State (Daijō-kan) in 1868. Later, an abortion law was included in the 1880 
Criminal Law, which was revised in 1907 to increase penalties against both women who underwent 
abortion and abortion providers. Ogino, Kazoku keikaku e no michi, 6; Ayako Kano, Japanese Feminist 
Debates: A Century of Contention of Sex, Love, and Labor (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 
2016), 87.     
33 For more on the social impact of Sanger’s visit, particularly on the increase in public interest in birth 
control in Japan, see Ōta, Nihon sanji chōsetsu hyakunenshi; Ogino, "Kazoku keikaku" e no michi.   
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panacea for all these intertwined problems; they saw contraception as a way of 
controlling individual sexual reproduction and ultimately, as a way of reducing 
population growth.  
 Chōsetsukai, hence, appeared at the intersection between the post-World War I 
discourse of the population problem and the growing birth control movements 
worldwide. Despite different political views among its founding members, 
Chōsetsukai formally adopted a Neo-Malthusian rationale for supporting birth 
control.34 Particularly, Ishimoto Shizue, who played a leading role in organizing the 
group, explained the pressing need for birth control in contemporary Japan, by 
emphasizing Neo-Malthusian warnings about overpopulation. The following 
prospectus shows how Chōsetsukai raised the question of overpopulation on multiple 
levels, ranging from individual human to a nation.  
   
The fact that the population in Japan has increased by more or less 
700,000 every year both causes a fierce competition for survival 
domestically, and complicates foreign relations. Moreover, even at an 
individual level, the excess of births results in the world’s highest 
mortality rate as well as various women’s illnesses. Ultimately, high 
birth rates pose significant mental and financial burdens, and prevent 
the betterment of children and women. Moreover, it is evident that late 
marriages, aimed at preventing such burdens, may result in a series of 
inhumane outcomes such as illegitimate children, infanticide, and 
abortion. It is also necessary to prevent men and women with 
hereditary defects from having children.35 
                                                
34 Not all of the founding members of Chōsetsukai supported the basic idea of overpopulation. For 
example, Yamakawa Kikue criticized Malthusian understandings of excess population and argued that 
poverty was caused by the unfair distribution of wealth under capitalism. Chōsetsukai was based on an 
unstable cooperation among activists with differing political positions. In Chapter 4, I will discuss, in 
more detail, the different views of birth control of the two feminist members of Chōsetsukai, 
Yamakawa Kikue and Ishimoto Shizue.  
35 Nihon Sanji Chōsetsu Kenkyūkai, Sanji chōsetsu kenkyūkai shui-sho (A prospectus for sanji chōsetsu 
kenkyūkai, July 1922). The prospectus is reprinted in Sei to seishoku no jinken mondai shiryō shūsei (A 
collection of documents on sexual and reproductive rights), vol. 2., ed. Ogino Miho et al. (Tōkyō: Fuji 
Shuppan, 2000), 201.   
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 As illustrated in this prospectus, Chōsetsukai provided three main reasons for 
encouraging the use of birth control measures: namely, to solve the domestic 
overpopulation problem, to protect and improve maternal health, and to produce 
healthy offspring. Chōsetsukai argued that overpopulation was particularly troubling 
because a surplus population would cause physical and mental degeneration and 
drastically reduce the standard of living. In other words, population quantity and 
quality were not mutually exclusive. Population quantity and quality were 
interdependent within the discursive construction of the population problem. In 
addition to the question of quantity and quality, Chōsetsukai also linked the population 
as a universal form of life with individual bodies. Moving beyond discourses which 
ascribed overpopulation to uncontrolled or irresponsible fertile bodies, Chōsetsukai 
also argued that individual people were the victims of the problems caused by 
overpopulation. Chōsetsukai’s discursive technology of individualization had two 
main effects—it reframed the population problem on an individual level and it 
redefined individual reproduction as an object of social control. Insofar as the 
population problem was inseparably linked with individual sexual reproduction, the 
use of birth control was a justifiable measure for limiting population growth and 
thereby raising population quality. 
Therefore, the founding members of Chōsetsukai promoted birth control as a 
panacea for all the ills caused by the population problem. These leading birth control 
activists extended the meaning of contraception, from a means of reproductive control, 
to include the technology of population control. The Neo-Malthusian theory of the 
  35 
population problem thus was based on this discursive link between sexual 
reproduction and the population. This link was repeatedly emphasized in 
Chōsetsukai’s discussions of birth control as a tool necessary for intervening 
unchecked fertility and overpopulation. However, the question of why individual 
births were necessarily related to the population size, or how the control of individual 
reproduction was linked to overall population control remained unexamined in Neo-
Malthusian discussions. This silence unveils the discursive structure of the population 
problem. Put another way, there was a naturalized realm that mediated between 
individuals and the population, as well as sexual reproduction and the quantity and 
quality of the population. That naturalized realm is Japan as a nation-state.         
 For Chōsetsukai, the population problem was enclosed by a national border, 
that is, it was a nationalized problem. Given the national border implicit in the 
definition of the population, overpopulation was premised not simply on an imbalance 
between food production and a population size, but, more fundamentally, on the 
border of the nation-state within which food production and the population was 
reified. The following argument by Baron Ishimoto, who was one of the founding 
members of Chōsetsukai, illustrates the “nationality” of the population problem.  
 
Although the Japanese staple food is rice, the current rice production is 
not enough to meet the demand of the population. As a result, millions 
of koku of rice are being imported from foreign countries every year. 
According to the census reported last year, the Japanese population 
increases every year by six to seven hundred thousand. The gist of the 
problem is how to deal with our suffering from overpopulation as the 
population continues to overflow.36 
 
                                                
36 Ishimoto Keikichi, Waga jinkō mondai to sanji chōsetsu ron (Nihon Sanji Chōsetsu Kenkyūkai, 
1922), reprinted in Sei to Seishoku No Jinken Mondai Shiryō Shūsei 2, 160-169.   
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 Baron Ishimoto employs classical Malthusian understandings of an imbalance 
in the growth rate between population and food resources to describe the population 
crisis in Japan. As seen in Baron Ishimoto’s argument, the population problem was put 
in brackets, that is, “Japan.” The national census that Ishimoto refers to above, was 
conducted for the first time in Mainland Japan in 1920.37 The population, a quantified 
and massified form of life reified through statistics, essentially takes the form of state 
knowledge. Foucault rephrases statistics as the “science of the state.”38 By tracing the 
origin of the term “statistics,” Foucault points out that the modern nation-state assigns 
politico-economic values to life, and thereby the population emerges through the 
governmental technology of the nation-state. Baron Ishimoto’s concern about 
Japanese population growth and rice production rates in Japan exemplifies the 
inseparable relationship between the population and the nation-state. In other words, 
the population does not simply refer to those who dwell within the national border, but 
a particular form of life mediated by the nation-state.  
 Moreover, the population as a national subject also materialized through 
excluding “others.” Baron Ishimoto enumerated various possible ways of tackling the 
population problem: overseas migration, food imports from foreign countries, and 
                                                
37 The national census since 1920 can be accessed online (https://www.e-
stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/GL02100104.do?tocd=00200521). Meanwhile, the first population census in the 
Japanese empire was conducted in Taiwan in 1905. This fact illuminates how the governmental 
technologies in the colonies created the knowledge of empire. As for the historical trajectory of census 
in the Japanese empire, see Irene B. Taeuber and Edwin G. Beal, “The Demographic Heritage of the 
Japanese Empire, “Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 237 (1945): 64-71. 
38 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: with Two 
Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, ed. Graham Burchell et al. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991), 99. 
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birth control.39 Critically examining the migration situation of the Japanese people 
between 1917 and 1919, and comparing rice production and consumption data for 
Mainland Japan, Baron Ishimoto concluded that overseas migration and food imports 
would not mitigate the imbalance between population growth and food production. It 
should be noted that Baron Ishimoto naturalized Mainland Japan as a single entity and 
the Japanese people as homogenous national subjects while overlooking the complex 
social relations that reproduced Japan as an imperialist nation.40 The fact that 
population growth was simply considered a natural increase measured by calculating 
birth-death ratios typifies Japanese Neo-Malthusianists’ blindness towards the impact 
of the complex social relations of an imperialist nation. In other words, in the 
representation of a homogenous nation, population mobility—particularly, the 
movement of people between Japan proper and the colonies—became invisible.41 In 
the same vein, Baron Ishimoto also used rice production data from only Mainland 
                                                
39 Ishimoto Keikichi, Waga jinkō mondai, 161-162. 
40 I borrowed the term “imperialist nation” from Naoki Sakai who characterized the nature of the 
Japanese state in the prewar period as an imperialist nation and a multiethnic nation-state. The notion of 
imperialist nation sheds new light on both the particular and the universal, or national and imperial 
forms of polity in the Japanese empire, and provides a window into the rhetoric of multiethnic empire 
utilized by Kyoto School intellectuals. While Sakai dissects this rhetorical exposition of the multiethnic 
community in the 1930s, what Sakai calls “imperial nationalism,” I focus on how the Neo-Malthusian 
intellectuals’ silence about multiethnic social relations was constantly produced and reproduced in the 
Japanese empire in the 1920s, to highlight their “indifferent” imperial nationalism. Naoki Sakai, 
Translation and Subjectivity: On Japan and Cultural Nationalism (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997), 115; Naoki Sakai, “Subject and Substratum: on Japanese Imperial Nationalism,” 
Cultural Studies 14 (2000), 462–530. 
41 According to the national census of Japan in 1920, there were 42,492 immigrants from the Japanese 
colonies and 35,563 foreigners. The total population of Mainland Japan including Hokkaidō and 
Okinawa was 55,884,932 people. The population of Japanese settlers in Korea and Taiwan was larger 
than the population of colonial people in the metropole by the early 1920s. For instance, there were 
347,850 Japanese settlers in Korea in 1920. This ongoing migration within the Japanese empire was 
completely absent from Ishimoto’s accounts. “Taishō 9 nen kokusei chōsa,” accessed July 20, 2015, 
https://www.e-
stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/GL08020101.do?_toGL08020101_&tstatCode=000001036875&requestSender=sea
rch); Chōsen sōtokufu, Chōsen sōtokufu tōkei nenpo taishō 9 nendo, vol.1 (1921): 44-5, accessed July 
20, 2015, http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/974937     
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Japan when he applied Malthusian theory to Japanese society; he neglect to consider 
the inflow of Korean and Taiwanese grains, which had helped supply the Japanese 
market since the mid-1910s.42 The population problem was thus a discourse that 
ignored politico-economic relations between Japan proper and her colonies. In effect, 
the population problem discourse obliterated the social reality of Japan as an 
imperialist nation.43    
 For Chōsetsukai, the nation-state was both a discursive intermediary between 
the population and individual bodies and a regime that could govern the population 
legitimately. Since its foundation, Chōsetsukai emphasized the role of state policy in 
addressing the population problem. The members of Chōsetsukai argued that poverty 
relief efforts were inadequate because the fundamental cause of overpopulation and its 
attended problems—for example, poverty, and physical and mental degeneration—
was unchecked human reproduction.44 Hence, Chōsetsukai supported a thorough and 
systemic way to encourage the use of birth control on an individual level. For 
example, Matsumura Shōnen, a professor in the Department of Agriculture at 
Hokkaidō Imperial University, claimed that it was inhumane to aid degenerates with 
inferior genetic traits or criminal tendencies. For Matsumura, charity work only 
aggravated counter-selection tendencies and increased the burden placed on the 
                                                
42 Yujiro Hayami et al., “Korean Rice, Taiwan Rice, and Japanese Agricultural Stagnation: An 
Economic Consequence of Colonialism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (4), Oxford 
University Press (1970): 571. 
43 As an exception, Baron Ishimoto mentioned Korean workers when addressing competition in the 
labor market. The reduction of labor market competition between Korean and Japanese workers into a 
mere quantitative problem of labor supply and wages reveals his complete lack of awareness of Japan as 
an imperialist nation. In other words, Ishimoto naturalized the Japan’s population presence inside a 
well-defined border while neglecting the historical condition of Japan as the imperialist nation. Ishimoto 
Keikichi, Waga jinkō mondai, 163. 
44 Ishimoto, Sanji seigen ron o sho hōmen yori kansatsu shi te, (Nihon Sanji Chōsetsu Kenkyūkai, 
1922), reprinted in Sei to Seishoku No Jinken Mondai Shiryō Shūsei 2, 81.  
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government and society overall.45 Instead of aid, Matsumura endorsed birth control as 
a humane and eugenically beneficial way of reducing unwanted offspring. Particularly, 
Matsumura argued that state should take an active role. In an article titled “Birth 
Control from a Biological Perspective,” Matsumura explained, 
 
Birth control is not something an individual can practice alone, because 
it is crucial to national welfare. Hence, the government needs to come 
up with a way of [promoting] the use of birth control. I believe it is 
necessary to establish a national childcare institution. … At the same 
time, the government should be vigilant and, for the benefit of the 
nation and on eugenic grounds, look into prohibiting the reproduction 
of people who have genetic diseases or disabilities, and those who are 
idiots. Once the government begins to provide childcare in an ideal way, 
it will also be able to study the issues of overpopulation and migration 
in earnest.46  
 
 
As revealed in Matsumura’s argument, the Chōsetsukai’s Neo-Malthusian 
advocates preceded the Japanese government in their calls for state intervention in 
individual’s sexual reproduction. It was only after the enactment of the National 
Eugenic Law in 1940 that the Japanese government withdrew its longstanding 
pronatalist policy of “give birth and multiply (Umeyo fuyaseyo)” and approved the 
forced sterilization of particular types of population.47 What does Chōsetsukai’s 
demand for the institutionalization of eugenic birth control mean within the broader 
                                                
45 Matsumura Shōnen, Seibutsu gaku jō yori mi ta sanji chōsetsu ron (Nihon Sanji Chōsetsu Kenkyūkai, 
1923), reprinted in Sei to Seishoku No Jinken Mondai Shiryō Shūsei 2, 179. 
46 Ibid., 183.  
47 Matsubara Yōko points out that the National Eugenic Law in 1940 pursued the goal of “population 
reinforcement” rather than the “sterilization of inferiors.” In regard to this, the state approved the 
compulsory sterilization of eugenically unfit types only to the extent that the implementation of eugenic 
policy did not contradict with the pronatalist population policy. I will delve further into the state’s 
population policy in relation to discussions of the population problem in Chapter 5. Matsubara Yōko, 
“Nihon: Sengo no yūsei hogo-hō to iu na no danshu-hō (Japan: The Sterilization Law known as the 
postwar Eugenic Protection Act),” Yūseigaku to ningen shakai: seimei kagaku no seiki wa doko e 
mukau no ka (Eugenics and human society: Where will the century of life science head to?), ed. 
Yonemoto Shōhei et al. (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2000), 180-83.    
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history of the Japanese state’s governing the population? As already stated, 
Chōsetsukai attempted to problematize the population while assuming “the 
population” existed within specific national borders, and thereby, discursively 
redefined the biological identity of the population to be within Mainland Japan. 
Therefore, individuals’ use of birth control was linked to the population size and 
quality. Furthermore, individuals were saddled with the responsibility for reforming 
his or her body “for the sake of” Japanese bodies. In light of this, Neo-Malthusian 
arguments for birth control and eugenics redefined the nation-state as a “biological 
community.” This eugenic-nationalist conceptualization of the biological community 
rationalized the link between particular and universal bodies, and stressed individuals’ 
reproductive responsibility to contribute to national and racial betterment.  
 
Morality, Economy, and Nationality of Reproduction: Abe Isoo’s Neo-
Malthusian Claim 
 
 The members of Chōsetsukai disbanded in less than one year after the group 
was founded. Although Chōsetsukai formally adopted Neo-Malthusian logic to justify 
its birth control agenda, the group was a relatively loose organization whose members 
had different ideological views on overpopulation in Japan. For the most part, 
Chōsetsukai’s members were split between Neo-Malthusian versus Marxist 
approaches. After Chōsetsukai dissolved, most of the group’s Neo-Malthusian 
members continued to be involved in the birth control movements in various ways. 
For example, Ishimoto Shizue co-founded the Japan Birth Control League (Nihon 
Sanji Chōsetsu Renmei) in 1931, and then the Women’s Birth Control League of Japan 
(Nihon Sanji Chōsetsu Fujin Domei) in 1932. She opened a birth control clinic in 
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Tokyo in 1934 to disseminate information about effective contraceptive technologies 
to the public. The physician Majima Kan also opened a birth control clinic in Tokyo in 
1923 and a consultation center in 1926 under the name of the Beloved Child and 
Woman Association (Aiji Jōsei Kyōkai) to reach out to people looking for more 
information about contraception methods—Majima also offered contraceptive devices 
at a reasonable cost.48  
 A Christian socialist and a professor of economics at Waseda University, Abe 
Isoo (1865-1949) was one of the prominent Neo-Malthusian advocates who continued 
to be involved in birth control movements during the interwar years. During his life, 
Abe was engaged in a wide range of social and political activities: he co-founded the 
Japanese Fabian Society in 1924 and the Social Masses Party (Shakai Taishū tō) in 
1926, and participated in the movement to abolish licensed prostitution and the labor 
movement.49 Various political and social movements which Abe participated in 
reveals his consistent concern with the redistribution of wealth, social reforms, and 
poor relief. Given the trajectory of political careers, Abe’s leading role in the birth 
control movements may seem irrelevant to the goal of social reform. However, Abe 
had an abiding interest in sexual and reproductive issues, as seen in his involvement in 
social movements in favor of the abolition of licensed prostitution, his support for 
                                                
48 Ishimoto Shizue and Majima Kan co-founded the Japan Birth Control League (Nihon Sanji Chōsetsu 
Renmei) in 1931, but the group soon disbanded due to conflicting interests between Ishimoto and 
Majima. The decisive reason for the conflict was the Dutch pessary invented by Majima. Ishimoto 
criticized Majima for commercializing the birth control movements and taking advantage of the group 
to advertise his Dutch pessary. Ogino, Kazoku keikaku e no michi, 55.  
49 For more on Abe’s involvement in various political and social movements, see Elise K. Tipton, “In a 
house divided: the Japanese Christian socialist Abe Isoo,” in Nation and Nationalism in Japan, ed. 
Sandra Wilson (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 81-96; Masako Gavin, “Anti-Japanese Sentiment 
and the Responses of Two Meiji Intellectuals,” East Asia 21 no. 3 (2004): 23-36; Masako Gavin, “Abe 
Isoo and Kawakami Hajime in Interwar Japan: Economic Reform or Revolution?” East Asia 28 no.1 
(2011): 57-74; Frühstück, Colonizing Sex, 103-51. 
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artificial birth control and the repeal of the anti-abortion law. From Abe’s Neo-
Malthusian perspective, the population was part of the foundation of the capitalist 
economy, domestic politics and international relations. Thus, for Abe, human 
reproduction was an important politico-economic problem.  
 As a Neo-Malthusian, Abe focused mainly on the moral, economic, and 
political justification for the use of birth control in contemporary Japan. In cooperation 
with other birth control advocates and medical practitioners, Abe co-organized birth 
control advocacy groups, published books, magazines and other materials to 
disseminate information about contraception, and gave public lectures about birth 
control and sexual reproduction. He cooperated with other birth control advocates who 
held different and sometimes conflicting ideological positions. After the dissolution of 
Chōsetsukai, Abe joined Yamamoto Senji and Koike Shirō in publishing a magazine 
Sanji Chōsetsu Hyōron (Birth Control Review, hereafter Hyōron) in 1925. Although 
both Yamamoto and Koike were opposed to the Neo-Malthusian views on the 
Japanese population problem from a Marxist perspective, the conflicting opinions in 
the Hyōron nonetheless all agreed on the pressing need of birth control.50 After the 
Hyōron, Abe took the lead in publishing another magazine Sanji Seigen Hyōron (Birth 
Limitation Review) between 1929 and 1931 and continued his campaign for birth 
                                                
50 A socialist, biologist, and labor activist Yamamoto Senji took a leading role in publishing the 
Hyōron. In many articles in this magazine, Yamamoto criticized Neo-Malthusian ideas and argued that 
poverty was caused by the unfair distribution of wealth under capitalist system, and concluded that birth 
control would not reduce the population growth. The fact that the Hyōron contained both Marxist and 
Malthusian perspectives suggests that the Hyōron facilitated an open discussion about the essence of the 
population problem among birth control advocates insofar as he or she could justify the use of birth 
control. I will examine a proletarian birth control leader, Yamamoto Senji and his involvement in 
publishing the Hyōron in Chapter 3.   
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control.51 Although the main channel for the birth control movements was changed 
repeatedly over time, Abe constantly worked to rationalize the need for birth control 
within shifting contemporary political and economic contexts. Abe justified the use of 
birth control in three main ways. Namely, birth control was a new morality, it 
provided a key solution to class conflict under capitalism, and it was necessary for the 
development of peaceful international relations. 
 Firstly, Abe assigned a moral value to birth control at an individual level. 
Against some intellectuals’ denunciation of birth control on moral grounds, Abe 
reconfigured birth control as the new morality of responsible parents.52 Here, the term 
“morality” specifically referred to the social norms of marriage and sex. According to 
Abe, the old morality of marriage focused solely on procreation, but the new morality 
should acknowledge human sexual desire in a loving relationship. Thus Abe’s new 
morality worked to normalize sexual desire by distinguishing sex from procreation. 
However, this radical understanding of sex and procreation by no means aimed at 
sexual liberation. Abe’s assertion that “leaving procreation to the nature is a big sin. A 
parent has a huge responsibility for controlling reproduction artificially and have a 
                                                
51 The original title of the magazine Sanji Seigen Hyōron was Sanji Seigen which began publishing in 
1928. The title was changed after Sanji Seigen Fukyūkai (the Birth Control Promotion Association) 
founded by Abe became a publisher. In 1931, the title was changed to Sanji Chōsetsu again, and the 
magazine eventually ceased publishing in 1933. Ogino, Kazoku keikaku e no michi, 47-48.     
52 In comparison with Western countries where Christian sexual norms were dominant, Japan was 
relatively free from religious sexual morality. However, there was still opposition to birth control on 
moral grounds among Japanese intellectuals, even among those who were sympathetic to Malthusian 
theory of population growth. For example, an educator and a professor of Waseda University, Sugiyama 
Shigeyoshi, agreed with Malthus’ view of overpopulation, but denounced birth control as “immoral.” 
Instead, Sugiyama suggested migration to neighboring colonies including Japanese colonies and the 
increase in food production. Sugiyama’s objection to birth control was premised on the existing moral 
values attached to sex and reproduction. Sugiyama Shigeyoshi, Shokuryō mondai no kaiketsu toshite 
sanji seigen no kachi (The value of birth control as a solution to food problem) (Bunmei kyōkai, 1926).        
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child only when they want one”53 suggests an obvious premise for the divorce 
between sex and procreation: selective reproduction on eugenic grounds. In other 
words, Abe’s new morality described the eugenically desirable roles of parents who 
were deemed responsible for producing and raising physically and mentally healthy 
children.    
 As seen above, Abe’s moral justification of birth control was also an attempt to 
moralize scientific knowledge. In other words, scientific knowledge and morality 
worked to redefine each other. Birth control and eugenics were incorporated into the 
realm of moral responsibility as ethical practices shifted away from “natural 
reproduction” towards the “responsible and artificial” production of desirable 
descendants. In the same vein, Abe’s emphasis on the “hygiene of sexual desire 
(seiyoku eisei)” also exemplifies this reconfiguration of morality and science. 
Criticizing bourgeois intellectuals who objected to sex education on conventional 
moral grounds, Abe stressed the need for teaching hygienic sexual desire to help men 
moderate their sexual desires and prevent syphilis among the youth.54 Here, hygiene 
specifically referred to the reproductive health of parents or potential parents, and this 
specific definition presumed that a hygienic sexual life was a condition for producing 
and fostering healthy children. Thus, in Abe’s schema, scientific reproduction—that is, 
the use of reproductive technologies like birth control, eugenics, and sexual hygiene—
and parental morality worked to mutually reinforce each other. 
 It should be noted that eugenics served as a particularly ambiguous criterion 
                                                
53 Abe Isoo et al., Sanji seigen no riron to jissai (The theory and reality of birth control) (shakai mondai 
sōsho 5, May 1925), 8. 
54 Ibid., 23-24. 
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for categorizing desirable and undesirable types of procreation. Abe assumed that 
certain types of people with genetic or social diseases needed to control reproduction. 
People considered unfit for reproduction included those who are in poverty, commit a 
crime, have a disability, or lack education according to Abe. The following statement 
reveals the ambiguous categorization of pathological types and an intermingling of 
genetic and social traits.   
 
If we approve the use of birth control to prevent bad hereditary traits, 
we should also do the same with regard to living difficulties. Needless 
to say, people with a disability or low intelligence should not enter into 
society. There are certain kinds of social diseases in addition to bad 
hereditary traits. As already stated, lack of education is a terrifying 
social disease. Insofar as the poor give births to many children, it is 
impossible for them to provide their children with enough education. … 
In this light, there is no difference between having many disabled 
children and having many ignorant and uneducated children join 
society. Furthermore, it is often the case that many uneducated people 
produce criminals. These people need to use birth control to ease their 
economic difficulties. They should give birth to children they can 
afford to educate sufficiently.55  
 
 
The ambiguous nature of eugenics hardly undermined the scientific 
credibility of desirable and undesirable traits. Eugenics was a polysemic idea 
of biological hierarchy. Abe marked the undesirable types of people based on 
this productive technology of human representation. So-called unfit types 
included people with either genetically or socially inferior traits. Differences 
between genetic and social categories were of little importance to Abe. Since 
individual bodies were the sites where these different categories intersected.56 
                                                
55 Ibid., 57-58. 
56 Similarly, another Christian socialist, Kagawa Toyohiko (1888-1960) also integrated eugenics into 
the social reform of the poor. Like Abe, Kagawa was an omnipresent figure in Japanese social and 
political movements, including the Friends of Jesus movement, social reform for the poor, the labor and 
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Eugenics did not prove whether genetic or social factors played a key role in 
determining the reproductive fitness of individuals. Instead, eugenics 
problematized individual human bodies and prescribed birth control as a 
preventive medicine. In other words, eugenics focused on preventing 
undesirable bodies. “Undesirable bodies” were not provable, but only 
preventable. 
 In addition to defining population quality on eugenic grounds, Abe also 
justified the use of birth control to reduce the population size. This is connected to 
Abe’s view that birth control could be a key solution to class conflict in capitalist 
societies. As mentioned previously, Abe considered the poor unfit to reproduce 
offspring because they lacked the economic ability to educate their children. For Abe, 
the problem of poverty was not merely an individual difficulty, but, more importantly, 
a general problem of the proletarian class. Neo-Malthusian understandings of the 
poverty of the proletariat were completely dependent on the theory of overpopulation. 
Like other Japanese Neo-Malthusianists, Abe associated poverty with rates of human 
reproduction which exceeded the available resources. However, Abe was distinctive in 
his particular focus on labor issues—like unemployment, low wages, and exploitative 
labor conditions—which plagued Japan’s system of capitalism. In essence, Abe’s 
understanding of labor issues was that “the population problem lies at the core of the 
                                                                                                                                       
peasant union movements, social relief work, and the consumer cooperative union movement. Kagawa 
lived in a slum in Shinkawa, Kobe for five years, beginning in 1909, with the aim of evangelizing the 
poor as well as reforming them. His experiences in the Kobe slums were later vividly recollected in a 
series of his novels and essays, including A Study of the Psychology of the Poor (hinmin shinri no 
kenkyū, 1915) and a trilogy of autobiographical novels Crossing the Deathline (shisen o koete, 1920-24), 
in which Kagawa defined the poor as a physically, mentally, and morally degenerate type of man. He 
not only scientifically observed impoverished people, but also used the goals of racial reform to justify 
public intervention into their lives. With regard to Kagawa Toyohiko’s lifelong career, see Waichiro 
Yonezawa, Kagawa Toyohiko (Tokyo: Nichigai Asoshiētsu, 1992). 
  47 
labor problems.”57 The following statement clearly shows how Abe reduced various 
labor issues to fit inside the overarching population problem by using the language of 
Neo-Malthusianism. 
 
Although workers are humans with freedom and independence, they 
must sell their labor power which they possess in order to make a living. 
… Furthermore, as far as labor is a commodity (urimono), it will 
inevitably obey the so called principle of supply and demand in 
economics. As the number of workers grows, the labor power will 
increase accordingly. [Then,] the value of the labor power, that is, 
wages will necessarily fall. Therefore, if the population of workers 
were not limited, it would not be conceivable to expect the wage 
increase. As matters stand today, the workers at all times outnumber 
what the capitalists demand.58   
 
While Abe adopted the Marxist vocabulary of capitalism and class conflict, his 
solution to economic inequality did not attempt to demystify the logic of the free 
market. Abe’s critique of capitalism failed to challenge the accumulation of surplus 
labor and the inevitably precarious position of the workers, which Marx identifies as a 
fundamental principle of capitalism.59 According to Marx, insofar as an excess 
population of workers, or a “reserve army” is required for capitalist accumulation, 
regardless of the market demands for labor, the natural law of wages along with the 
                                                
57 Abe Isoo, Seikatsu mondai kara mita sanji chōsetsu (Birth control from a livelihood perspective) 
(Tokyodō, 1931), 126. According to the preface, Seikatsu mondai kara mita sanji chōsetsu was the 
second edition of Sanji seigen ron (the theory of birth control) written by Abe in 1922. When the first 
edition was published, around 7,000 copies were sold. Although the first edition was lost after the Great 
Kantō earthquake of 1923, Abe published the second edition in 1931 after revising the sections on the 
population problem in rural areas and the labor problem. Abe also updated information on colonial 
policy in the second edition. 
58 Ibid., 125. 
59 Marx points out the intrinsic characteristics of capitalist accumulation and argues that “it is capitalist 
accumulation itself that constantly produces, and produces indeed in direct relation with its own energy 
and extent, a relatively redundant working population, i.e. a population which is superfluous to capital’s 
average requirements for its own valorization, and is therefore a surplus population.” Karl Marx, 
Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes trans. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: 
Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 1976), 782. 
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ratio of the working population is nothing more than an economic fiction.60 In light of 
this, Abe’s inquiry into the labor problem developed within a dogmatic framework of 
economics which assumed a fixed amount of capital and a mathematical formula of 
supply and demand. This blind obedience to the laws of capitalist economy is what 
Georg Lukács calls “reification,” the naturalization of commodified human relations 
into “objective laws” of social formation in capitalism.61 In Abe’s reified views, 
capitalist social relations which quantify human labor as well as mechanisms which 
determine the value of labor power remained unquestioned. It is as if low wages are 
necessary by-products of a surplus supply of labor. Thus, Abe’s solution did not 
challenge the assumed laws of capitalism. Rather, Abe rationalized the unevenness 
between workers and capitalists by disciplining workers’ bodies.62 
Furthermore, Abe’s legitimization of capitalist natural law proceeded to a 
claim in favor of birth control as an alternative to improving the social and economic 
status of the working class. Abe assumed that “the system of the reserve army 
naturally arises out of overpopulation”63 in his reformist claim. In other words, since 
the excessive reproduction of the working class was the root cause of the surplus labor 
                                                
60 Ibid., 790-1. 
61 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics (Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 1971), 94. 
62 Abe’s reifed idea of capitalism resonates with other contemporary socialists who approached the 
problems accompanying rapid industrialization during the 1920-30s through social reforms. For 
instance, Kawakami Hajime, a leading advocate of Marxism during this period, initially deemed 
Marxism a science for redistributing limited amounts of wealth. Kawakami promoted the ethical aspects 
of Marxist thought as a solution to social problems, without denouncing the capitalist economy itself. 
However, Kawakami’s earlier position of advocating moral reforms was later drastically altered, and he 
became an advocate of radical Marxism. Kawakami disagreed with Abe’s promotion of birth control on 
the basis of New-Malthusianism. During the interwar era, Kawakami emphasized an approach for 
fundamentally transforming the structure of the capitalist system. Masako Gavin, “Poverty and Its 
Possible Cures: Abe Isoo and Kawakami Hajime,” East Asia 24, no. 1 (2007): 28-31; Gail Bernstein, 
“Kawakami Hajime: A Japanese Marxist in Search of the Way,” in Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taisho 
Democracy, ed. Harry D. Harootunian, et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 88-89. 
63 Abe, Seikatsu mondai kara mita sanji chōsetsu, 133-134. 
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population, birth control would solve the difficulties of the working class. Abe’s 
presentation of birth control as a “self-help” solution served to naturalize the 
reconfiguration of class conflict as an individual reproductive problem. Furthermore, 
Abe’s “birth-control” solution transformed individual workers into autonomous 
subjects who should improve their status through their own efforts (jirikiteki).64 This 
discursive link between reproductive control and individual autonomy exemplifies 
Foucault’s “technologies of the self.” Dissecting the mechanisms of modern 
knowledge, Foucault highlights “technologies of the self” which “permit individuals to 
effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on 
their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and ways of being, so as to transform 
themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or 
immortality.”65 Abe’s justification of birth control was not simply an attempt to solve 
the labor problem. More fundamentally, Abe was suggesting a way of constructing a 
self who could problematize its own body, identify itself with the population, control 
sexuality and reproduction.   
Lastly, Abe also justified birth control in terms of its impact on international 
relations. After World War I, there was considerable intellectual reflection among 
                                                
64 Abe’s emphasis on individual autonomy in solving living difficulties can also be found in his 
discussion of the need for birth control for the relief of the poor class (hinmin kaikyū). According to 
Abe’s definition, the poor class consisted of people who earned less than the minimum cost of living. 
Abe neglected to examine conceptual relation between the poor class and the working class. Abe argued 
that social work (shakai jigyō), which had been ameliorating living difficulties of the poor class, was 
merely a makeshift measure. Instead, Abe called for two thoroughgoing solutions: namely, national 
welfare to institutionally guarantee a minimum income for the poor, and birth control by which 
individual poor people could help themselves. In comparison with income guarantees, which he 
considered as the reliance upon others (tarikiteki), Abe viewed birth control as an effective measure by 
one’s own efforts (jirikiteki). Ibid., 109-110. 
65 Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” In Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel 
Foucault, ed. Luther H. Martin et al., (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 18.  
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Neo-Malthusian advocates on the connection between population and international 
affairs. For example, when Margaret Sanger visited Japan in March 1922, the first 
lecture she gave was about “war and population.” This lecture, in which Sanger 
highlighted the Great War as an outlet for the overflowing population in Germany, 
epitomized Neo-Malthusian views on the causal link between population growth and 
international conflicts.66 Abe’s understanding of overpopulation, within the context of 
international affairs, followed this Neo-Malthusian idea. Abe expressed his concern 
that “Japan currently suffers from overpopulation. Many knotty issues in international 
relations will arise as the population overflow continues.”67 The “knotty issues” 
which Abe referred to included international conflicts over migration, which could 
eventually lead to war. The following statement explicitly shows how Abe associated 
overpopulation with military expansionism. 
 
The Japanese population increases by six to seven hundred thousand 
each year. Although we always explain to the world that the Japanese 
people are, by no means, a warlike race, the Western countries have 
anxieties about the population growth in Japan. How can we get rid of 
the population surplus? If we find outlets for the surplus population, 
where are these outlets? Manchuria, Mongolia, or Siberia? Wherever 
the outlet is, the Western countries will gaze at that region insofar as 
Japan tries to expand her territory under an aggressive policy. … Is 
                                                
66 For example, Margeret Sanger paid particular attention to the prewar situation in Germany where 
there was no outlet for the growing population except for the war. Sanger then switched her attention to 
the contemporary population issue in Japan that paralleled prewar Germany. By defining the population 
of Japan as “a problem,” Sanger asserted that the rational, as well as the humanitarian, solution for 
overpopulation in the contemporary Japan had to be liberating motherhood from being breeding 
machines rather than resorting to migration or war. For Sanger, “free motherhood” referred to the use of 
birth control upon which “international brotherhood and international emancipation” depended. Sanger, 
“War and Population,” 10.   
67 Abe Isoo, “Nani ga sorehodo fudōtoku ka (What is so immoral?),” Fujin kōron 8 (1920). Abe 
contributed this article to Fujin kōron as part of the special issue “Wagakuni no genjō ni terashite mita 
hinin kahi ron (The debate over contraception in light of Japan’s current situation).” The contributors, 
including Misumi Suzuko, Abe Isoo, Fujikawa Yū, Yoshida Kumaji, Nagai Hisomu, Namae Takayuki, 
Ichikawa Genzō, and Miyata Shū, debated the political, social, economic, and medical effects of 
contraception from different points of views. Fujin kōron 8 (1920): 38-59.    
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there any other way of abandoning Japan’s territorial ambition for 
Manchuria, Mongol, and Siberia other than taking measures to control 
the population size?68   
 
As seen above, Abe believed that overpopulation caused expansionism due to 
the need for enough land for the surplus population. Against military expansion into 
neighboring countries, Abe argued that birth control would function to maintain 
international peace. Birth control was thus intermingled with pacifism. According to 
Abe, birth control provided a peaceful solution to overpopulation in contrast to 
military invasion. 
It should be noted that Abe’s pacifist view was based on Japan’s national 
economic interests rather than an underlying objection to militarism or colonialism. 
Despite Abe’s worries about military expansionism, Japan invaded Manchuria in 
September 1931, and eventually established a puppet state, Manchukuo, in February 
1932. Abe responded with skepticism to the acute situation in Manchuria and Inner 
Mongolia. Abe’s skeptical stance, however, was based in his calculation of Japan’s 
national interest rather than anti-militarism. In Abe’s view, Japan’s territorial 
expansion into Manchuria would fail to alleviate Japan’s population surplus just as 
Japan’s colonization of Korea, Taiwan, and Karafuto had failed before. Abe believed 
that the low numbers of Japanese resettling in the colonies was due to labor market 
competition between native and Japanese workers.69Abe reduced wage discrimination 
                                                
68 Abe Isoo et al., Sanji seigen no riron to jissai, 103-104.  
69 As to the wage gap, Abe maintains that “[in Korea and Taiwan] since Koreans and Chinese work for 
a low wage, Japanese cannot compete with them. Even if Japanese do work, the wage they earn is lower 
than the wage they earn in Japan. This is also the case with Manchuria. If Japanese workers were paid 
as much as they are in the U.S., millions of people would move into Manchuria. Unless the income in 
Manchuria reaches half of the income level in Mainland Japan, Japanese migration to Manchuria is 
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between the colonized and the colonizer to the simple dynamics of low-wage 
competition in labor market. Abe’s silence on colonial social relations resembled other 
Neo-Malthusianists’ imperial nationalism. Abe’s pacifism on economic grounds was 
deeply implicated in this unconscious imperial nationalism.    
Moreover, Abe’s concern for peaceful international relations was focused on 
Japan’s relations with the Western powers, particularly, the United States. In other 
words, the “international world” Abe referred to was limited to the world governed by 
international laws. The system of international laws was a western, hegemonic system 
which produced and legitimized state sovereignties. Naoki Sakai and Jon Solomon 
explain that the nation-State system was a product of international laws that originated 
in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), by which the world was initially divided into the 
West as “one governed by international laws,” and the Rest as “one exposed to the 
discretion of colonial powers.” International laws were concerned more with the 
division of international spaces in the name of “civilizational difference” than in the 
sovereignty of nation-states from the outset. Abe’s understanding of “inter/national” 
relations depended precisely on this world, reproduced by international laws in which 
only Western countries with state sovereignty counted as nation-states. On the 
contrary, the Japanese colonies were completely excluded in Abe’s account.70 Thus, 
Abe internalized this schema of divided space that was produced by international laws. 
Furthermore, this schema served to reify national sovereignty.       
A growing conflict between Japan and the U.S. over the issue of Japanese 
                                                                                                                                       
hopeless.” “Fukeiki taisaku to jinkō mondai (A solution to economic depression and population 
problem)” Purity 9 (1932), 2. 
70 Naoki Sakai et al, “Introduction: addressing the multitude of foreigners, echoing Foucault,” Traces 4: 
Translation, Biopolitics, Colonial Difference (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006), 23. 
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migration to the U.S. was Abe’s urgent concern. The Immigration Act of 1924 
effectively denied Issei (the first generation of Japanese immigrants in the U.S.)’s 
eligibility for U.S. citizenship and completely excluded all Asian immigrants.71 
Immediately after the enactment of the 1924 Immigration Act, Abe wrote about the 
exclusion of Japanese (hainichi) in his defense of the Immigration Act.72 Abe 
explained that territorial sovereignty lay at the core of the exclusion of Japanese 
immigrants in the U.S. In his view, land ownership and absolute property rights were 
legally guaranteed to individuals by the state. Moreover, every state had territorial 
sovereignty. Abe believed it was legitimate to ban Asian immigration to protect U.S 
territorial sovereignty as well as to protect U.S citizens’ land ownership. Furthermore, 
Abe disavowed the claim that the U.S. discriminated against Asian immigrants on a 
racial basis. Abe considered the criticism that the 1924 Act was racist inadequate 
because immigration issues were within the domain of legal judgment rather than 
humanitarian appeals.  
Abe’s active defense of the Japanese Exclusion Act was not simply the 
recognition of the U.S. territorial sovereignty, but the confirmation of a reciprocal 
exclusivity between Japan and the U.S. Abe expanded his belief of the incompatibility 
                                                
71 The Immigration Act of 1924 declared the exclusion of nearly all non-European immigrants 
including Mexicans, Japanese, Chinese, and Filipinos. Given the fact that Chinese immigration was 
already suspended by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the Immigration of Act of 1924 effectively 
completed the exclusion of Asian immigrants, and particularly terminated Japanese immigration. As a 
result, Issei were classified as “permanent aliens” until this race-based immigration policy was repealed 
by the McCarran Walter Act of 1952. For the Immigration Act of 1924 and its treatment of Japanese 
immigrants, see Mae M. Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A 
Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924,” The Journal of American History 86, no. 1 (1999): 67-
92; Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (United States: Duke University 
Press, 1996), 1-36.  
72 Abe Isoo, “Hainichi to shakai no hansei (The reflection of the exclusion of Japanese and society),” 
Purity 6 (1924). 
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of the two nations to include incompatible relations between the Japanese and the U.S. 
population. Abe’s concern with the growing Japanese immigrant population living on 
the Pacific Coast clearly reveals his underlying assumption of the incompatibility of 
“inter/national” relations. Drawing on his Neo-Malthusian assumptions, Abe 
considered that Japanese immigrants’ high fertility rate was the main cause of anti-
Japanese sentiments in the Pacific Coast region.73 Here, it should be noted that Abe 
identified Japanese immigrant offspring with the Japanese population, despite the fact 
that American-born Japanese were naturalized as U.S. citizens.74 Put another way, 
Abe assumed the immigrants’ bodies embodied “Japan-ness,” which was incompatible 
with “American-ness.” In respect of this “Japan-ness” of the immigrants, Abe 
maintained that: 
 
It is expected that Japanese immigrants and their future offspring in 
Hawaii will cause critical problems unless they are completely 
assimilated as Americans. … Although the American people are in 
favor of local self-government by nature, there is some fear that the 
Japanese people may overwhelm the Americans in politics if they are 
all entitled to vote. It is still possible to limit Japanese power to some 
extent under the supervision of the central government, but the state 
government cannot continue intervening in the local government. Once 
the Hawaii-born Japanese are completely assimilated as Americans, it 
                                                
73 Abe paid particular attention to the fertility of Japanese immigrants in California and Hawaii states 
which had high Japanese immigrant population. According to Abe, the birth rate of the U.S. was 30 
births per 1,000 people while that of the Japanese immigrant population in Hawaii reached around 50 
births per 1,000 people every year. His concern with Japanese immigrants’ high fertility was based on 
his Neo-Malthusian presumption that the population problem of the Japanese immigrant community 
would threaten Japan-U.S. relations due to the increasing encroachment on U.S. territory. Abe Isoo et 
al., Sanji seigen no riron to jissai, 104-106.   
74 Prior to 1924, Nisei, or the second generation of Japanese immigrants were automatically granted 
dual citizenship according to the principle of Jus sanguinis (right of blood) in Japan and that of Jus soli 
(right of birthplace) in the U.S. However, the Japanese-American Association on the Pacific Coast and 
in Hawaii proposed to revise the citizenship law in Japan to prevent Nisei from automatically retaining 
Japanese citizenship. As a result, the number of Nisei holding dual citizenship declined over time. In the 
early 1940s, around 30 percent of Nisei retained Japanese citizenship. Carey McWilliams, “Dual 
Citizenship,” Far Eastern Survey 11, no. 23 (1942): 231-3; and Yuji Ichioka, The Issei: The World of 
the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885-1924 (New York: Free Press, 1988), 196-99. 
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will be relatively easy to establish local self-government. However, as 
long as the Japanese immigrants preserve their characters, they will 
certainly cause political troubles in Hawaii.75  
 
Assimilation presupposes incompatibility. Behind Abe’s skeptical view on the 
assimilation of Japanese immigrants lay a naturalized assumption that essential 
differences between national lines were inscribed on individual bodies. Abe was not 
interested in whether the difference between the Japanese and the American 
population was characterized as physical, cultural, or political. Abe assumed that 
national difference was a transcendent and encompassing reality. Insofar as each 
nation was responsible for its own population, migration due to the failure of a nation 
to support its own surplus population was a national shame.76 From the beginning, 
Abe advocated birth control over overseas migration because of his presumed 
incompatibility between different nation-states. What Abe termed “peaceful 
international relations” required well-defined national borders and national 
populations which embodied national homogeneity. 
 Abe’s different ways of justifying birth control reveal how his Neo-Malthusian 
views were enmeshed with eugenics, social reformism, and the schema of the 
“national and international” world.77 As another World War broke out, this complex 
discourse on the population problem—a discourse which began to arise after World 
War I—gradually strengthen its emphasis of negative eugenics and imperial 
                                                
75 Abe Isoo et al., Sanji seigen no riron to jissai, 105-106.   
76 Ibid., 107. 
77 For the “schema,” I draw upon Naoki Sakai’s term the “schema of co-figuration” to highlight how 
the modern image of national sovereignty and that of the international world reinforce each other, and 
furthermore how this schematic understanding conditions a national homogeneity as well as a 
fundamental incompatibility between different nations. Naoki Sakai, “Translation,” Theory, Culture & 
Society 23, no. 2-3 (2006): 71-78.  
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nationalism while denying the theory of overpopulation. Abe advocated for 
compulsory sterilization of genetically undesirable populations and early marriage to 
stimulate population growth.78 However, Abe’s shifting argument should not be 
viewed merely as self-negation. It was rather the realignment of the population 
problem, which constantly inscribed a biological hierarchy and national borders on 
human reproduction.   
 
Mapping Reproduction, Bordering Population  
 
 This chapter attempted to dissect the discursive structure of the population 
problem in the interwar years through a close reading of Neo-Malthusian debates 
raised by the birth control movement group, Nihon Sanji Chōsetsu Kenkyūkai, and 
Abe Isoo, the leading ideologue of the birth control movements. After the end of 
                                                
78 Abe had a longstanding interest in eugenic sterilization in the U.S. When he visited the U.S. in 1929, 
Abe met the philanthropist and eugenicist Ezra Seymour Gosney who founded the Human Betterment 
Foundation (HBF) in California in 1928 to promote eugenic sterilization among the pulbic. Inspired by 
Gosney’s promotion of sterilization on eugenic grounds, Abe translated Sterilization for Human 
Betterment (New York: Macmillan, 1929) co-authored by Gosney and Paul B. Popenoe and published it 
under the title “Funin kekkon to ningen kaizō (Sterile Marriages and Human Betterment)” (Tokyo, 
Shunyōdō, 1930). In addition to the public promotion of eugenic sterilization, the compulsory 
sterilization of the unfit including patients with mental problems or leprosy was of particular interest to 
Abe. Abe believed that compulsory sterilization was a humanitarian and preventive way of promoting 
racial betterment. Abe’s vision for compulsory sterilization was later realized through the enactment of 
the National Eugenic Law (kokumin yūsei-hō) in 1940. For more on Gosney’s movement for eugenic 
sterilization in the U.S. in interwar years, see Wendy Kline, Building a Better Race: Gender, Sexuality, 
and Eugenics from the Turn of the Century to the Baby Boom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2001), 61-94. Abe’s favorable comments on eugenic sterilization in light of Gosney’s movement in 
California can be found in various articles including Abe Isoo, “Sanji seigen no yūseigakuteki kenkai 
(birth control on eugenic grounds)” Sanji seigen hyōron 4, no. 6 (1931): 2-5; “Jinko mondai no ryōteki 
hōmen to shitsuteki hōmen (the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of population problem),” Jinko 
mondai 2, no. 4 (1938): 48-60. Meanwhile, as the war began, Abe retreated from his earlier position of 
promoting birth control and passively supported the pronatlist population policy on the ground that the 
population quality was more crucial than the population size. For Abe’s shifting view on overpopulation, 
see Frühstück, Colonizing Sex, 147-148; Hayashi Yōko, “Abe Isoo ni okeru ‘heiwa’ ron to danshu-ron: 
dansei-sei no mondai no kakawari wo kijikuni (On the notion of “peace” and sterilization in Isoo Abe: 
concerning the problem of manliness),” Gender shi gaku (Gender studies) 2009 (5): 35-49; Abe 
Tsunehisa, “Abe Isoo to fujin mondai (Abe Isoo and women’s issues),” in Abe Isoo no kenkyū (The 
Study of Abe Isoo), Nakamura Naoyoshi ed. (Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyūjo, 
1990), 178. 
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World War I, Japan underwent a transition due to sudden economic fluctuations and 
ideological reflections on Western modernity. In this context, Japanese social 
reformers and social scientists called the population into question and problematized 
the quality and quantity of the population within the broader politico-economic 
structure. The population problem, which emerged as a buzzword in the late 1910s, 
reveals a discursive technology of life by which both individual and universal human 
lives can become the object of scientific knowledge, social reform, and politico-
economic policy. Neo-Malthusian birth control advocates actively addressed the 
population problem between the late 1910s and the early 1930s; They focused mainly 
on the issue of overpopulation and contraception. In the course of justifying the use of 
birth control, these Neo-Malthusianists discussed various issues and posed questions 
about national and international politics, poverty and class struggles under capitalism, 
and racial quality on eugenic grounds. They saw a clear causal link between 
overpopulation and a series of political, economic, and medical problems, and thus 
birth control became a panacea for these presumably interrelated problems.  
 The Neo-Malthusian discourse of the population problem sheds new light on 
the relationship between the nation-state and the population. For many Neo-
Malthusianists, the nation-state functioned as a naturalized, organic realm which 
mediated between individual bodies and the Japanese population—a homogenous, 
biological community which was incompatible with different nation-states. This 
nation-centered understanding of the population obliterated the social reality of Japan 
as an imperialist nation, and excluded colonial others from biological “Japanese-ness.” 
Individual bodies and human reproduction became sites where this discursive 
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technology of bordering the population operated. Hence, reproduction became marked 
by the nation-state.  
Seen in a broader history of modern Japan, Neo-Malthusian intellectuals laid 
the ground for wartime population policies. It was not until the late 1930s that 
governmental intervention in sexual reproduction was implemented at a policy level. 
The Japanese government had officially suppressed birth control movements in Japan 
while pursuing a pronatalist population policy. The goal of Neo-Malthusian birth 
control advocates to legalize birth control on reformist and eugenic grounds was 
eventually realized when both the Law on the protection of Mothers and Children 
(boshi hogō-hō) and the National Eugenic Law (kokumin yūsei-hō) were promulgated 
in 1937 and in 1940, respectively. Wartime population policy reinforced the biological 
link between the population and the nation-state by legalizing eugenic reproduction 
and disciplining individual bodies for the sake of the Japanese imperial nation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Birth Control and Eugenics for the Proletarian Class 
 
Proletarius under capitalism: the capitalist representation of human reproduction 
 
The Roman proletariat lived at the expense of society, while modern 
society lives at the expense of the proletariat.79 
 
 The etymology of “proletariat” unfolds the different modes of life between the 
ancient Roman Proletarius up to the proletarian class of a modern capitalist society. 
The latter, in spite of its invariable indication of the lower class, has changed its 
primary mode from human reproduction to commodity production. Borrowing the 
words of a Genevan political economist Jean Charles Léonard de Sismondi, Karl Marx 
noted that the Roman Proletarius referred to “the lowest class of the community… 
regarded as contributing nothing to the state but offspring.”80 In the mid-nineteenth 
century capitalist world, Marx and Friedrich Engels witnessed the modern proletariat 
who were no longer the propertyless class, but workers who were deprived of the 
means of production, and sold their labor-power which was used in the production of 
commodities.81  
Does this semantic change of the proletariat suggest that reproducing offspring 
is no longer a significant activity for the modern proletariat? The different mode of life 
                                                
79 Karl Marx, Preface to the second edition (1869) of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: 
With Explanatory Notes (New York: International Publishers, 1963), 8.  
80 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., vol. 12 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 606. 
81 Marx and Engels hardly define what the proletarian class is as an inborn, transcendental class. Rather, 
they outline how the proletariat has been generated out of the bourgeois capitalist system, and in what 
way the capitalist mode of production has structured labor and life. In Manifesto of the Communist 
Party (1848), Marx and Engels describes the proletariat as “the class of modern workers who live only 
so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labor increases capital. These 
workers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity like any other article of commerce and 
equally exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuation of the market.” Karl Marx, 
Marx: Later Political Writings, ed., and trans. Terrell Carver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 7. 
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between the Roman Proletarius and the modern Proletariat suggests a different 
understanding of human reproduction. In the capitalist society, the proletariat which 
once used to represent fertility is merely reduced to the means of creating surplus 
value for the capitalist. From the capitalist’s view, the maintenance and human 
reproduction of the proletariat is necessary only to the extent that the proletariat 
continues to work, producing new value beyond their exchange-value of labor power, 
namely wage. The individual workers’ consumption to satisfy one’s need beyond the 
necessary minimum for their subsistence is simply represented as “unproductive.” 
Viewed in this light, the human reproduction of the proletariat lies on this 
“representational” distinction between productive and unproductive. 
 However, “representation” as signification is inevitably linked with that as a 
political representative. In other words, when it comes to the reproduction of the 
modern proletariat, critical questions to be raised would be “what kind of social 
relationships are involved with this specific representation of reproduction, and in 
what sense is human reproduction bound up with productivity?”82 According to Marx, 
                                                
82 In regard to this, Marx describes the entanglement of signification and political representative in 
representing the “productive or unproductive” consumption of the workers on the one hand, and the 
effect of the representation on the other as follows. “[Both] the capitalist and his ideologist, the political 
economist, consider only that part [the necessary minimum] of the worker’s individual consumption to 
be productive which is required for the perpetuation of the working class, and which therefore must take 
place in order that the capitalist may have labor-power to consume. What the worker consumes over 
and above that minimum for his own pleasure is seen as unproductive consumption … In reality, the 
individual consumption of the worker is unproductive even from his own point of view, for it simply 
reproduces the needy individual; it is productive to the capitalist and to the state, since it is the 
production of a force which produces wealth for other people.” As Marx points out, there is a certain 
gap between the representation of workers’ productivity and its reality. Further, the gap is hardly a void 
space, but indicates a power relationship which operates between the capitalist and the state on one side, 
and the proletariat on the other. Specifically, what facilitates this power relationship is the constant 
conversion of workers’ individual consumption into productive one by limiting the value of labor-
power to the necessary minimum for their subsistence, and labeling it as “productive.” Here, the 
“necessary minimum” is independent of the workers’ individual need or desire. However, it is a 
substantial mechanism of the constant, voluntary inflow of the workers into the labor market, and 
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the relative surplus labor is a “necessary product of accumulation” on a capitalist basis 
as well as a “condition of existence of the capitalist mode of production,” which 
constantly forms a “disposable industrial reserve army.”83 Insofar as the fertility of 
the proletariat supplies human resources for the capitalist mode of production, the 
system can continue exploiting this reserve army. Hence, the human reproduction of 
the proletariat, even if it occurs outside the process of production, is already within the 
capitalist system, and functions as a crucial lever in the accumulation of capital. Here, 
another contrast between the Roman slave and the modern wage-laborer keenly 
reflects the life of the proletariat as it is structured by capitalist social relations: “The 
Roman slave was held by chains; the wage-laborer is bound to his owner by invisible 
threads.”84 
The history of the proletarian birth control movement in Japan between the 
1920s and the mid 1930s shows the representation of human reproduction of the 
proletariat under capitalism. Since the early 1920s in Japan, the influx of contraceptive 
technology ushered in a new way of thinking about human reproduction: Previously a 
matter of uncontrolled nature, human reproduction became an issue linked to 
controllable bodies. How did this radical change in the ways of representing 
reproduction impact socioeconomic conditions of Interwar Japanese society? 
Rethinking reproduction on the basis of scientific authority gave socialist intellectuals 
and proletarian activists a new strategy of class struggle. By integrating scientific 
knowledge and technology regarding birth control into the proletarian movement, pro-
                                                                                                                                       
eventually the constant production and reproduction of surplus value for the capitalist. Marx, Capital, 
718-719.  
83 Ibid., 784. 
84 Ibid., 719. 
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birth control class activists strove to challenge the capitalist representation of surplus 
labor and thus, ultimately, overturn the exploitation of workers. For the activists, 
controlled human reproduction did not merely mean controlling the number of births; 
activists also sought to increase the life quality of the proletarian class. Another 
scientific tool the proletarian movement mobilized in its attempts to refashion 
reproduction was eugenics, a comprehensive mixture of scientific ideas and methods 
for the purpose of studying genetic and environmental influences on human quality. 
The newly coined term “proletarian eugenics (musansha yūseigaku),” and the 
operation of “eugenic consultation center (yūsei sōdansho)” by proletarian parties in 
the early 1930s exemplify the convergence of the class movement and eugenics.  
Both birth control and eugenics refashioned the ways in which the proletarian 
movement thought about reproduction. Reproduction was no longer a means of 
capitalist exploitation, but a defensive weapon to be wielded for the class struggle. 
Thus, the proletarian movement reshaped the practice of birth control and eugenics as 
a science for the proletarian class. The class movement and science came to redefine 
each other in the process of utilizing the scientific technology of controlling 
reproduction for the class struggle. Moreover, the conjunction between the proletarian 
movement, birth control, and eugenics during the interwar period blurred a series of 
distinctions between politics and science, superstructure and base, and class and sex.  
While being attentive to these blurred categories, this chapter traces the social 
and intellectual history of the proletarian birth control movement in interwar Japan. 
The history of pro-birth control proletarian movement is largely divided into three 
periods: the first period (1922-1924) was characterized by the sexologist Yamamoto 
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Senji’s efforts for sexual enlightenment and the foundation of the Birth Control 
Research Society (Sanji Seigen Kenkyūkai, hereafter Seigenkai); the second period 
(1925-1929) involves the justification of birth control based on the Marxist critique of 
capitalism; and the third period (1930-1933) brought clinic-based, practical actions for 
propagating contraception and eugenics. While exploring the shifting forms of the 
proletarian birth control movement, I repeatedly raise the following questions: How 
did science function as a critique of capitalism and a means of the working class 
revolution? How did birth control and eugenics redefine reproduction and sex, and 
how did this redefinition impact the class movement?     
 
The birth of the proletarian birth control movement 
 
 A budding biologist and sexologist Yamamoto Senji85 published a pamphlet 
titled the Critique of Ms. Sanger’s Family Limitation (hereafter the Critique) in May 
1922. The pamphlet was a Japanese translation of Family Limitation written by 
Margaret Sanger in 1914. Despite his intention to introduce rather than criticize 
                                                
85 Yamamoto Senji (1889-1929) was a biologist, sexologist, labor activist, and politician in Japan in the 
early twentieth century. Originally born in Kyoto, Yamamoto grew up surrounded by the Protestantism 
of Kyoto Congregational Church and immersed himself in horticulture in his teenage years. His earlier 
belief in religion and interest in horticulture waned gradually during his stay in Vancouver, Canada 
where he learned about Darwin’s evolution theory and Unitarian Universalism. The liberal nature of the 
Unitarian Church specifically attracted Yamamoto in terms of reconciling his religious beliefs and his 
interest in scientific truth. Five years in Canada (since 1907) led Yamamoto turn to biology, and 
eventually in 1917, he entered Tokyo Imperial University to study Zoology. His scholarly career as a 
biologist and sexologist began when he became a lecturer in Dōshisha and Kyoto Imperial University in 
1920, and underwent a dramatic change over the next decade. After participating in the birth control 
movement since 1922, he actively engaged in various fields including public and university lectures on 
sexology, birth control movement, journal publishing, working class education, and the proletarian 
party activity until he was stabbed to death by the right-wing in March 1929. This chapter specifically 
traces Yamamoto’s last decade in which he strove to bridge the academy and society, science and 
politics, and sexual and class issues. Sasaki Toshiji’s two-volume biography Yamamoto Senji (Kyoto: 
Chōbunsha, 1974) provides a thick description of Yamamoto’s personal life along with historical 
background. Sabine Frühstück also gives a detailed account of Yamamoto’s scholarly activities, 
highlighting his work on sexology. See Frühstück, Colonizing Sex, 83-100.       
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Sanger’s birth control movement into Japan, Yamamoto advertently included a 
“critique” in the title to avoid censorship. The arbitrary character of Japanese 
censorship laws during the Taishō period (1912-1926) simultaneously restricted the 
freedom of press and left the door open for evading for censorship laws under the 
pretext of academic purpose.86 Yamamoto clearly understood the arbitrariness of the 
censorship laws. Although the publication and distribution of a pamphlet on the 
subject of sex was considered a violation of “manners and morals (fūzoku)” under the 
Publication Law of 1893, the Home Ministry administration showed relative leniency 
to academic work. Using this loophole, Yamamoto published the first edition of the 
Critique and distributed two thousand copies to medical professionals and university 
professors.  
 The Critique marked a watershed event for Yamamoto’s manifold ventures as 
a scientist-cum-political activist for the next decade up until his death in 1929. Despite 
the various governmental restrictions that impeded the open discussion of sexual 
matters in the press, Yamamoto was able to raise questions around “sexual 
enlightenment (seiteki keimōshugi)” through his publication of the Critique. The 
phrase “sexual enlightenment” sums up Yamamoto’s peculiar understanding of sex. 
                                                
86 There were mainly two laws concerning administrative control of the press during the prewar period: 
the Publication Law (Shuppan-hō) of 1893 and the Newspaper Law (Shinbunshi-hō) of 1909. The 
former was targeted at general publication including books, pamphlets, and leaflets whereas the latter 
covered general newspapers and periodical publication. In the rise of radical thought and publications 
peddling radical socialism since the late 1910s, liberal government and bureaucrats of the Home 
Ministry utilized the censorship laws primarily to suppress “dangerous thought.” Although neither 
censorship laws stipulated an obvious definition of dangerous thought, the arbitrary standard of the 
violation of “public order (anne chitsujo)” and “morals and manners” legitimized the administrative 
suppress of radical political thought and obscenity.  The intensified control of the press during the 
Taishō period typifies the duplicity of Taishō democracy in terms of the governmental regulation of 
radical ideas under the veneer of liberalism. As for censorship in Japan during the Taishō period, see 
Richard H. Mitchell, Censorship in imperial Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 172-253; 
Gregory James Kasza, The state and the mass media in Japan, 1918-1945 (University of California 
Press, 1988), 28-53. 
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Yamamoto conceptualized sex as a general biological phenomena of human subject, 
and as a knowable, controllable object of science.  
This twofold understanding of sex was already present in Yamamoto’s studies 
of sexology from the beginning of his scholarly career. Immediately after graduating 
from the department of science of Tokyo Imperial University in 1920, Yamamoto 
began to teach an introductory natural science course under the title “the biology of 
human life (jinsei seibutsugaku)” at Dōshisha University, Kyoto. In his lectures, 
Yamamoto brought a new light to biology, proclaiming that “the biology of human 
life” should provide “knowledge closely bound to our view of life and practical life.”87 
Among the varied phenomena of daily life, Yamamoto regarded sex as a central 
element of human biology. In unique approach to human reproduction, Yamamoto 
argued against the conventional and medical understandings of sex as pathological or 
abnormal, and described sex as a “critical function to be experienced by normal 
individuals day and night for the preservation of the human species.”88  
Given his emphasis on sex in human biology, it was not surprising that 
Yamamoto became deeply engaged in sexology and sex education. For him, sex was 
not only a common activity of the human species, but more importantly a natural 
phenomenon that should be studied, appropriately controlled, and explicated 
                                                
87 In April, 1921, Yamamoto collected and published the contents of his lecture “the biology of human 
life” at Doshisha University for the purpose of textbook use. This textbook included the purpose of the 
lecture, Yamamoto’s personal opinion on sex education, a bibliography on the biology of human life, 
and a course outline. The opinion on sex education and course outline particularly allow us to glimpse 
of sexology as the central theme of Yamamoto’s studies of biology. Yamamoto used this sexology-
centered biology textbook also in his lectures at Shinano Free University (Jiyū daigaku) and the Osaka 
and Kyoto Labor School (Rōdō gakko). See, Yamamoto Senji, “Jinsei seibutsugaku shōin (The 
introduction of the biology of human life),” in Yamamoto Senji zenshū (The complete works of 
Yamamoto Senji), ed. Toshiji Sasaki et al., vol. 1 (Tokyo: Chōbunsha, 1979), 47-140. 	
88 Ibid., 54. 
  66 
scientifically. Thus, Yamamoto sharply criticized the prevailing attitude of “sexual 
obscurantism (seiteki inpeishugi)” among intellectuals—a stand that, Yamamoto 
argued, hindered the general public from obtaining a scientific understanding of 
intimate sexual matters, and made it more difficult for the public to practice self-
control in a rational way. Yamamoto’s claim of “sexual enlightenment” was a 
counteraction to “sexual obscurantism,” the general intellectuals’ unwilling attitude 
toward the spread of sex knowledge. Yamamoto particularly criticized the educated 
class (chishiki kaikyū) for monopolizing scientific knowledge while blocking general 
public’s access to necessary knowledge.89 Hence, Yamamoto emphasized sex 
education in his lectures on human biology, and explained that the purpose of sex 
education was “to show individuals the human aspects of the problems they face, and 
to provide people with enough scientific knowledge to prevent them from 
encountering an unexpected danger and to publicize the difficulties of controlling 
blind instinct in a rational self-controlled manner, and by doing so, to help people 
foster self-awareness, self-respect, and self-control.”90 In Yamamoto’s view, sex 
education was an effective medium for educating ordinary people about their own 
lives as sexual beings. Needless to say, his lecture “the biology of human life,” was 
one of his initial efforts to awaken young students from sexual ignorance. 
 Yamamoto strove to expand his earlier efforts aimed at teaching his students 
about sexual enlightenment to “the masses (minshū).” The turning point came with his 
involvement in encouraging the use of birth control through the Critique in 1922. 
                                                
89 See Yamamoto’s article “Seiteki inpeishugi no tameni okiru heigai no ichirei (An example of 
harmful effect from sexual obscurantism),” Nihon to Nihonjin (Japan and Japanese), September 1922. 
The article is reprinted in Yamamoto Senji zenshū, vol. 3, 99-113.   
90 Yamamoto, “Jinsei seibutsugaku shōin,” 59-60.	
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When Sanger visited Japan on the invitation of the Kaizō publishing company in 
March and April, Yamamoto interviewed Sanger and translated Sanger’s lecture at 
Kyoto-city Medical Association.91 In agreement with her radical demand for the 
distribution of scientific knowledge about contraception among working-class women, 
Yamamoto translated Sanger’s pamphlet, Family Limitation, to encourage social 
discussion of the pressing issue of birth control, which was attracting more attention 
after Sanger’s visit. Family Limitation presented mostly technical information about 
available contraceptives including coitus interruptus, douches, condoms, pessaries, 
sponges, and vaginal suppositories. Since the concept of contraception was not well 
known and home hygiene was underdeveloped in Japan at the time, Yamamoto wrote 
and included a lengthy comment alongside the contraceptive devices Sanger listed in 
her original text. Yamamoto’s additional commentary was divided into two parts: the 
social and scientific legitimacy of contraception, and the increasing need for educating 
the masses about proper contraceptive methods. To emphasize the legitimacy of birth 
control, Yamamoto maintained that: 
 
The overproduction of living species may lead to the self-destruction of 
the species. We, as the lord of creation capable of reason, discretion, 
and foresight, can prevent degeneration and self-destruction—social, 
national, familial—if our ideals are fulfilled: by selecting good sperm 
under favorable conditions if possible, and then, satisfying human 
instinct for the preservation of our species, or the eternal life of human 
beings.92  
 
According to Yamamoto, the time was already ripe for “selecting good sperm.” 
Contraception, the only safe, scientific way of birth control, was not only a means for 
                                                
91 Yamamoto Senji, “Sanga joshi kazoku seigen-hō hihan (The critique of Ms. Sanger’s Family 
Limitation),” in Yamamoto Senji zenshū, vol. 3, 26.  
92 Ibid., 56. 
  68 
preventing the reckless production of children, but also for improving hereditary 
factors and environmental conditions for the masses. In view of this, it seems clear 
that Yamamoto found a new reason for encouraging sexual enlightenment through 
birth control. Birth control could provide the masses with an alternative way of 
preventing an unwanted pregnancy, and moreover, birth control was a proper 
technology easily used in daily life.  
The “sexual enlightenment” of the masses was an attempt to constitute a self-
knowing subject, particularly a subject who was aware of one’s own sexual being. The 
underlying assumption of enlightenment was that the masses would understand 
themselves as sexual beings and autonomously control their fertility. However, there 
was still some vagueness in the concept of “the masses.” Educating the masses about 
sexology and birth control could hardly be a sufficient way to foster self-awareness 
and self-control in their sexual lives. In reality, enlightenment and self-constitution 
was entangled with material conditions. A chasm developed between those who had 
access to sexual education and those who did not. Moreover, not everyone could 
afford the necessary contraceptive devices. Thus, “the masses” Yamamoto intended to 
“sexually enlighten” would remain a vague and abstract group if Yamamoto did not 
take material conditions into account. 
 Although governmental barriers hindered the circulation of information about 
birth control among the general public, Yamamoto’s pamphlet the Critique ended up 
reaching the outside of intellectual circles. This was neither accidental, nor entirely 
intentional. A printing house worker, who printed Yamamoto’s pamphlet at the 
workshop, told Mitamura Shirō, a Bolshevist and one of the leading members of the 
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Japan Federation of Labor (Nihon rōdō kumiai sōdōmei, abbreviated to Sōdōmei) in 
Osaka about the Critique.93 Inspired by Yamamoto’s pamphlet, Mitamura suggested 
Yamamoto work to promote birth control among the working class. The collaboration 
between Shirō, a labor union leader and Yamamoto, a sexologist, resulted in the 
publication of a popular edition of the Critique in December 1922.94 Two thousand 
copies of popular edition with a top secret stamp on it were circulated among Kansai 
area workers. Thus, Yamamoto’s pamphlet facilitated a growing consensus about the 
pressing need for birth control particularly among working-class families.  
In January 1923, this growing consensus bore fruit: Seigenkai, the first leftist 
birth control group in Japan, was founded in Osaka. The membership of Seigenkai 
reflects the group’s creation through collaborative efforts of labor activists and 
scientists. In addition to Yamamoto and Mitamura, the members of the Osaka affiliate 
of the Japan Federation of Labour (Nihon Rōdō Sōdōmei, hereafter Sōdōmei) 
including Noda Ritsuta, Noda Kimiko (Noda’s wife), Ōya Shōzo, and Kuzumi Fusako, 
and a physician and Yamamoto’s cousin, Yasuda Tokutarō participated in organizing 
Seigenkai. Within a month, several branches of Seigenkai were established in Nagoya, 
Kyoto, Kobe, Okayama, and other areas within Kansai.95  
 Seigenkai’s main channel for propagating birth control was a public lecture. As 
opposed to printed materials which could potentially violate censorship laws, a public 
lecture was a legitimate and relatively efficient way to educate a popular audience 
                                                
93 Sasaki Toshiji, Yamamoto Senji, vol.1, 303. 
94 Yamamoto Senji, “A personal letter to Margaret Sanger,” April 1923. In this letter, Yamamoto gave 
a detailed update on the process of the birth control group organization and the general situation of birth 
control movement in Japan. This letter is reprinted in Yamamoto Senji zenshū, vol. 7, 145-155. 
95 Ibid., 146.	
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about birth control technologies. No sooner was Seigenkai founded than the group 
held its first public lecture at the YMCA Hall in Kobe. A second lecture was held at 
the Osaka Grand Municipal Hall. These two public lectures, which attracted 400 and 
1,000 people respectively, also drew considerable media attention.96 The Osaka Asahi 
Newspaper carried a series of articles which cast a positive light on the labor union’s 
involvement in the birth control movement and its well-attended lectures.97 
Meanwhile, the Osaka Mainichi Newspaper, another major newspaper in Kansai, 
responded to Seigenkai’s activity with a critical editorial on contraception.98 These 
two contrasting responses reflected a broader debate among contemporary intellectuals 
over how to solve social problems and class conflicts. While the Asahi articles 
represented a socialist stance which favored birth control as a way to alleviate the 
sufferings of lower class families, the Mainichi spoke for a pronatalist group that 
supported either the buildup of national strength or parental morality. This controversy 
on the media eventually had a promotional effect for Seigenkai’s birth control 
movement.99 Considering the pressure of censorship, it is not surprising that 
                                                
96 In addition, several public lectures led by Yamamoto continued in between February and April. 
Under the pretext of sex education, Yamamoto gave lectures on the use of contraceptive devices mainly 
to school teachers and college students in Matsue, Tottori, Kyoto, and Kochi. Ibid., 151-152. 
97 The Osaka Asahi Shimbun (Newspaper), the former Asahi Shimbun, was one of the major 
newspapers in Kansai region and known as its left-leaning opinions. The Shimbun was attentive to the 
ongoing birth control movement in Kansai region led by the Labor Union leaders, favorably reporting 
Seigenkai’s argument and its propagation activity. The published articles include “Sanji seigen no jissai 
undō: Kansai no rōdō kumiai ni jukushita kiun, ko no shussan o osoreru hisanna jujitsu (The actual 
movement of birth control: the time is ripe for Kansai Labor Union, a miserable fact about people who 
fear of giving birth),” January 5, 1923; “Rōdō dantai no sanji seigen: jissai mondai ni totsunyu senden 
kōen ni dai ippo o (Labor Union’s birth control movement: entered into actual problems with a first step 
to a propaganda lecture),” January 7, 1923; and editorial, “Sanji seigen no jissai undo (The actual 
movement of birth control),” January 10, 1923.    
98 Editorial, “Sanji seigen no senden (the propaganda for birth control),” The Osaka Mainichi Shimbun, 
March 13, 1923. 
99 Later, Yamamoto recalled that the Osaka Mainichi Shimbun’s attacks on birth control proved “an 
efficient advertisement” for the group. Yamamoto, “A personal letter to Margaret Sanger,” 146.	 	
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Seigenkai reacted favorably to the newspapers becoming an indirect outlet to 
propagate their ideas.  
 Then, what were the main ideas Seigenkai were propagating? The 
collaboration between labor activists and scientists did not lead to a simple reiteration 
of Yamamoto’s argument for sexual enlightenment. The fact that Seigenkai specified 
the proletarian class as its intended audience, as opposed to “the masses,” 
Yamamoto’s previous abstract audience, suggests that birth control was discussed in 
an altered context. Put another way, birth control as a part of the sexual enlightenment 
for the masses was replaced with birth control for the proletarian class. Seigenkai’s 
effort to reframe birth control was primarily centered on the critique of class divisions 
in the capitalist mode of production. In this reframing of reproduction, the proletarian 
class was expected to be a self-conscious agent who would practice contraception to 
tackle the structural contradiction of capitalism.  
 In May 1923, Noda Kimiko, one of the founders of Seigenkai, published a 
pamphlet “Sanji seigen kenkyū (The study of birth control).”100 This pamphlet 
summarizes the ways in which Seigenkai incorporated birth control into the proletarian 
movement based on the Marxist critique of capitalism. First and foremost, Sengenkai 
distinguished its support of birth control from Neo-Malthusian theories. Sengenkai 
denounced the theoretical basis of Neo-Malthusianism, namely Malthus’ principle of 
population, for its failure to grasp the underlying cause of poverty. In opposition to 
Neo-Malthusianism that attributed the root cause of poverty to excess population 
outgrowing food supplies, Noda attributed the root cause of poverty to the economic 
                                                
100 Noda Kimiko, Sanji seigen kenkyū (The study of birth control) (Sanji Seigen Kenkyūkai, 1923). The 
pamphlet is reprinted in Sei to seishoku no jinken mondai, vol. 2, 202-213. 
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structure of capitalism. Noda noted that “the capitalist system based on private 
ownership of the means of production conditions unfair ways of production and 
distribution.”101 According to this view, as long as the bourgeois class—including the 
landed class—monopolized the means of production and produced profitable 
commodities by exploiting proletarian labor force, simply putting a brake on 
population growth would not eradicate poverty. For Seigenkai, the Malthusian 
advocates who represented overpopulation as an absolute fact, as well as a social evil, 
were in collusion with the capitalists. Protected by Malthusian theories, capitalists 
continued to generate the exploitable labor force, what Marx calls “industrial reserve 
army,” whose poverty, hunger, and misery enriched the capitalist class.102      
 Nevertheless, Seigenkai members attempted to encourage the proletarian class 
to practice contraception, as they phrased it “scientific artificial birth control 
(kagakuteki jinkō sanji seigen hō)” in favor of it. Thus, birth control became a 
defensive solution for various problems, such as poverty, illness, and the high infant 
mortality rate of the proletarian class. In the pamphlet, Noda argues that: 
 
It is most necessary and appropriate to control too many pregnancies to 
help relieve the proletariat from poverty and reduce their burden, 
because for the proletariat, poverty is the problem at hand. Even though 
poverty is the product of capitalism, there is no need to put up with its 
faulty system.103    
  
In contrast to the Neo-Malthusian position that birth control was the ultimate solution 
                                                
101 Ibid., 10.	
102 Marx, Capital, 793. Marx highlights the relative surplus population that forms a disposable 
industrial army under the capitalist mode of production. According to him, the surplus laboring 
population is independent of absolute surplus population, but is affected by the expansion of capital that 
continuously sets free exploitable population. Here the “industrial reserve army” is an unsettled, 
precarious category because this despotic work of capitalism which constantly shifts the boundaries of 
employment, half-employment, and unemployment for the self-expansion of capital. 
103 Noda, Sanji seigen kenkyū, 16.	 	
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to poverty, Seigenkai members viewed birth control as a necessary, if incomplete, 
defense against capitalism. Insofar as the capitalist system prevailed, birth control 
could function as an individual defense against poverty. Moreover, birth control could 
help defend the proletariat class in general by preventing those burdened with too 
many children from dropping out of the class war.104 This argument for defending the 
lower classes, worked to counter the concerns of socialists who worried that 
contraception would weaken proletarian class consciousness. Those who were against 
the use of contraception among the proletarian class identified birth control with 
bourgeois class interests. By countering the argument that birth control was bourgeois, 
Seigenkai gave a new class identity to birth control; birth control became the means of 
self-defense for the proletariat.       
 Viewed in this light, Seigenkai’s slogan for “birth control for the proletarian 
class” raised a series of broader questions about the capitalist system, the illusion of 
overpopulation, and socialists’ rigid economic determinism. Simply put, birth control 
was a class issue for Seigenkai. Their new understanding of reproduction as a 
controllable biological phenomenon facilitated a critique of the capitalist structure that 
exploited an ever-increasing proletarian labor force. Seigenkai’s stance also altered the 
representation of human reproduction from being an economic burden to being a 
defense strategy for the proletarian class. Thus, what began as “sexual enlightenment 
for the masses” developed into a defensive weapon wielded for the proletarian class.   
                                                
104 Yamamoto Senji also mentioned the importance of birth control in the class movement. He 
criticized the messianic stance of some labor activists in their pursuit of the revolution while neglecting 
immediate problems encountered by the proletariat, metaphorically speaking “what those who are 
suffering really need is rather a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.” Yamamoto Senji, “Sanji 
chōsetsu hyōron kara sei to shakai e (From the Birth Control Review to Sex and Society) 1,” Sei to 
shakai (Sex and society) 9 (1925): 13.  
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Theorizing birth control: eugenics for the proletariat, proletarianizing science 
 
The reframing of birth control in the name of class in the early 1920s was the 
beginning step of proletarian birth control in Japan. Although the proletarian birth 
control movement continued to utilize birth control as a means for criticizing 
capitalism, there were still various ideological, theoretical and moral controversies 
over the legitimacy of birth control. Different perspectives were raised from Neo-
Malthusianism, anti-birth control socialism, pronatalist nationalism, and anti-birth 
control moralist or religious perspectives. Since the mid-1920s, proletarian birth 
control advocates worked to theorize their perspectives toward birth control while they 
tackled a number of other controversies which erupted both inside and outside 
working class organizations. The proletarian birth control movement never crystalized 
into a final unchanging form; it was always in the making and shifted as it responded 
to different political and ideological terrains. As I explain below, the proletarian birth 
control movement reveals the intertwined relationship between science and politics as 
well as the complex connections between sex and class. 
 In February 1925, Seigenkai published the first issue of Sanji Seigen Hyōron 
(hereafter Hyōron), a monthly magazine for birth control research and propaganda.105 
Since its founding, Seigenkai organized one-time or short-term lectures to encourage 
working class people to use contraception. The group also recruited members 
                                                
105 Sanji Seigen Hyōron was published between February 1925 and May 1926, a total of 14 issues. The 
chief editor was Yamamoto, and contributing writers included Yamamoto himself, Yasuda Tokutarō, a 
Neo-Malthusian, Fabian socialist Abe Isoo, a medical doctor who managed People’s Hospital (Heimin 
byōin) in Tokyo, Kaji Tokijirō, the president of Sōdōmei Suzuki Bunji, a medical doctor who also ran 
People’s Hospital in Osaka, Katō Tokiya, a commissioned (shokutaku) medical doctor of Tokyo 
Municipal Social Affairs Bureau (Shakaikyoku) Majima Kan, and a eugenicist and social work theorist 
Unno Yukinori. The title of the magazine changed to Sei to shakai (Sex and society) from the ninth 
issue, October 1925. The whole issues were reprinted in 1983 (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1983).  
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throughout the Japanese empire and in the beginning of 1925, Seigenkai had 5,000 
members.106 To improve communication with these members, Yamamoto took the 
leading role in publishing a monthly magazine that dealt with issues around birth 
control ranging from academic discussions on birth control to informative contents on 
contraceptive methods and sexual matters in general. As the title of the magazine 
suggests, the Hyōron was largely influenced by the Birth Control Review published 
and edited by Sanger since 1917. Yamamoto, a committed subscriber of the Birth 
Control Review, attempted to imitate its comprehensive character—topical, scholarly, 
and popular—while creating an original tone and content which spoke to the 
legitimacy of birth control on “proletarian” grounds. 
 In their efforts to legitimize birth control, the editors of the Hyōron emphasized 
the themes of science and class. In a series of articles, the Hyōron proffered plausible 
answers to its fundamental question “why is birth control necessary?” Many 
contributing authors used the language of science and class consciousness to argue 
against persistent social conventions. Science was a new value that displaced 
arguments for parental responsibility and the laws of nature. The proletarian laborer, 
who had suffered under capitalist exploitation, became the new subject who should 
practice birth control. Thus, the theorization of birth control as seen in the Hyōron 
centered on questions of reframing reproduction through birth control in order to 
ensure the scientific reproduction of the proletarian class. 
 It should be noted that “science” does not merely refer to a modern discipline 
or the objective knowledge of nature. As Foucault’s term “modern episteme” denotes, 
                                                
106 Kanda Ryūichi (The Birth Control Research Society in Osaka), “Osaka no sanji seigen undo (The 
birth control movement in Osaka),” Sanji seigen hyōron 1 (February 1925): 26-27. 
  76 
modern knowledge, either social or natural science, is bound up with a certain 
episteme which serves as the “positive ground of knowledge” and constitutes “man’s 
particular mode of being and the possibility of knowing him empirically.”107 The 
notions “science” or “scientific (kagakuteki)” were frequently used in the birth control 
debates of the 1920s, and were inexorably linked with specific historical, 
epistemological conditions of knowledge. On one hand, science signified the regime 
of biological truth, that is a systemic process of establishing the truth about human 
bodies. In this regime of scientific truth, the human being was simultaneously a truth-
knower and a to-be-known object. On the other, science signified its effect, or the goal 
of human progress by discovering, conquering, and controlling the object of 
knowledge. Therefore, “scientific birth control,” as a shared vision of the Hyōron, 
pointed to the progress of human bodies based on the objective knowledge of 
reproduction.  
 Viewed in this light, it is no surprise that many authors of the Hyōron chose 
eugenics (yūseigaku) as one of the significant principles of scientific birth control. As 
Diane Paul keenly observes, eugenics has been “a protean concept” which has been 
easily bonded with humanitarian politics, or its goal for biological progress.108 The 
bond between socialism and eugenics was strengthened internationally in the name of 
“human progress” during the interwar period. Socialists—including Marxian socialists, 
Fabianists, and Bolshevists—viewed eugenics, not as the pure science of genetic 
                                                
107 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1973), 420-421. 
108 Diane B. Paul, Controlling Human Heredity: 1865 to the Present (Amherst: Humanity Books, 1998), 
19.  
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determinism, but as a practical science for improving the quality of human stock.109  
Japanese socialists were not an exception in this international wave of interest 
in eugenics among the socialist groups. Yamamoto, the chief editor of the Hyōron, 
was a representative figure who stressed the eugenic value of the birth control practice. 
Yamamoto believed that birth control led to human physical improvement ever since 
he began to engage in the birth control movement. His comment on “self-awareness 
based eugenics (Jikaku no ueni taterarubeki yūseigaku)” found in the Critique 
pamphlet illuminates his peculiar understanding of eugenics. Yamamoto claimed: 
 
In terms of euthenics and eugenics, their goals cannot be achieved 
without social well-being built on people’s self-awareness based 
knowledge and their sense of responsibility in addition to the legal 
means for natural selection of the inferiors (i.e. castration or 
ovariotomy of congenital criminals and mental patients). … Hence, 
people’s own discretion is essential to improve their physical 
constitution. Without it, however good the government is, excellent the 
laws are, or wise and diligent the authorities are, the goal for physical 
improvement is unachievable.110      
 
Yamamoto uses the concept of eugenics in two senses: euthenics and eugenics. 
Euthenics, as Yamamoto translated it into gense kaizengaku (the study of improving 
this life), was concerned with the social and environmental conditions that could 
impact a person’s physical and mental health. Eugenics, or raise kaizengaku (the study 
of improving next life), on the other hand, was associated with genetic conditions and 
hereditary traits. These two terms show Yamamoto’s complex understanding of 
                                                
109 As to the historical relationship between leftism and eugenics, see Diane B. Paul, “Eugenics and the 
Left,” Journal of the History of Ideas 45 (1984): 567–590; Mark B. Adams, “The Politics of Human 
Heredity in the USSR, 1920–1940,” Genome 31 (1989): 879–84; Alberto Spektorowski, “The Eugenic 
Temptation in Socialism: Sweden, Germany, and the Soviet Union,” Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 46 (2004): 84–106.	 	
110 Yamamoto, “Sanga joshi kazoku seigen-hō hihan,” 73.  
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hereditary factors, and acknowledge both the environmental and the genetic influences 
on human development. However, this indeterminable nature of eugenics spurred 
Yamamoto on to pursue scientific research on the quality of human traits rather than 
question the validity of eugenic science. Instead of the “nature or nurture” debate, 
Yamamoto’s focus was on the question of how to enlighten people regarding scientific 
ways to improve their own physical and mental quality. In this sense, Yamamoto’s 
“self-awareness based eugenics” was grounded in scientific enlightenment. This 
reveals the irony of “self-awareness,” which had to be built on given knowledge, or 
more specifically, a given ordering of the knowledge object. In the same vein, 
eugenics presumed knowledge of one’s own body based on a hierarchical ordering of 
human traits and characteristics.    
 During the interwar years, there was an international consensus among birth 
control advocates that contraception use would result in race betterment. The Hyōron 
functioned as a vehicle for introducing the eugenic value of birth control—an 
argument used by birth control advocates in Europe and America—to Japanese 
audiences.111 For example, Yamamoto wrote on the Society for Constructive Birth 
Control and Racial Progress (C.B.C) founded by Marie Stopes in 1921, with Japanese 
                                                
111 Historically, eugenics has had double-sided character, positive and negative eugenics. While the 
former has been concerned with ideas or movements to increase the population with “good” genes, the 
latter has related to those discouraging the population with “bad” genes from producing offspring. A 
British statistician, Francis Galton defined eugenics as “the science of improving stock, which is by no 
means confined to questions of judicious mating, but which, especially in the case of man, takes 
cognizance of all influences that tend in however remote a degree to give to the more suitable races or 
strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable than they otherwise would 
have had.” This definition clearly reveals the inherent ambiguity of eugenics. Francis Galton, Inquiries 
Into Human Faculty and Its Development (London: Macmillan and co., 1883), 24-25. 
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translation of the Society’s leaflets.112 Marie Stopes was a British birth control activist 
who encouraged people to practice contraception from the viewpoint of “positive 
eugenics.” The C.B.C, as its name implies, upheld birth control for wise parenthood to 
protect the child’s and mother’s health, and ultimately, for racial progress while 
denouncing the Neo-Malthusian claim that contraception was mainly aimed at 
controlling the population size.113 The dissociation of birth control from Neo-
Malthusian arguments about population control marked the difference between the 
British constructive birth control movement from its Neo-Malthusian counterpart. 
Agreeing with Stopes’ view of constructive birth control, Yamamoto questioned the 
effectiveness of birth control to decrease the total population.114 
 A British eugenicist and sexologist, Havelock Ellis was another influential 
source for the Hyōron’s reframing of birth control on the basis of positive eugenics. 
To the Japanese proletarian birth control activists, it was more appealing to place 
greater emphasis on the quality of the population. The eugenics-based claim for 
“quality over quantity” strengthened the legitimacy of birth control, and distanced 
                                                
112 Yamamoto wrote a series of articles introducing the Society for Constructive Birth Control and 
Racial Progress with his translation of the Society’s advertisement leaflets. These articles titled 
“Kensetsu teki sanji chōsetsu to wa donna mono ka (What is “constructive birth control)” were 
published in Sanji seigen hyōron 1 (Feb 1925): 3-6, and 2 (Mar 1925): 12-16.  
113 Since launching the C.B.C., Stopes continuously emphasized differences between Neo-
Malthusianism and constructive birth control movement despite her membership of the Malthusian 
League, a British organization founded in 1877. In a monthly newsletter Birth Control News published 
by Stopes herself, she made a remark that the primary goal of the C.B.C was “to bring home to all the 
fundamental nature of the reforms involved in conscious and constructive control of conception and the 
illumination of sex life as a basis of racial progress.” Also, she added that this goal clearly differed from 
that of the Malthusian League, that is, “to spread a knowledge of the law of population.” Marie Stopes, 
“Differences between the Malthusian League and the C.B.C.: What are they?” Birth Control News (July 
1922): 4. 
114 In one of his articles on the C.B.C, Yamamoto recounted an anecdote about his private 
correspondence with Stopes. According to this anecdote, it was Stopes who made him to dissociate 
birth control and Neo-Malthusianism. He acknowledged that he had heretofore failed to distinguish 
birth control from Neo-Malthusianism without verifying the actual effectiveness of contraception on 
limiting population. Ibid., 16. 
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birth control advocacy from the Neo-Malthusian position which was considered 
bourgeois ideology. Ellis was sympathetic to birth control on the grounds that 
conception control could contribute to an increase in the quality of citizens, and thus, 
the advancement of the nation. The following passage taken from Ellis’s writings 
exemplifies his belief that birth control was as a scientific means for national progress: 
 
The demand of national efficiency thus corresponds with the demand of 
developing humanitarianism, which, having begun by attempting to 
ameliorate the conditions of life, has gradually begun to realize that it is 
necessary to go deeper and to ameliorate life itself. … [The] more 
searching analysis of evil environmental conditions only serves to show 
that in large parts they are based in the human organism itself and were 
not only pre-natal, but pre-conceptional, being involved in the quality 
of the parental or ancestral organisms.115 
 
Ellis’ reframing of reproduction was deeply intertwined with nationalism, 
humanitarianism, and scientific progress. Ellis deemed that birth control would 
radically replace natural selection, once considered irreversible human condition, with 
artificial selection for a better human life, and a more advanced nation. In other words, 
the predictability and manipulability of reproduction would become new human 
condition in which human and national progress is expressed only in a biological form. 
As opposed to Neo-Malthusianism that centers on the political economic calculations 
of the population size, this biological viewpoint focused on the enrichment of the 
quality of life, by improving either the genetic or the environmental conditions of life. 
The biological representation of human progress, or conversely, the humanitarian, 
                                                
115 Havelock Ellis, Studies in the Psychology of Sex, vol. 6, (Philadelphia: F. A. Davis, 1910), accessed 
February 20, 2016, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13615/13615-8.txt. The chapter 7 of the book, titled 
“the procreation of science” was translated and serially published in the Hyōron from no. 7 to no. 13. 
Ellis’ writing was the most frequently translated in the Hyōron. His essays introduced in the Hyōron 
include “The Objects of Marriage” (1920) “Children and Parents” (1922) in no.4, “The Love-Rights of 
Women” (1918) in no. 5, and “The play-function of sex” (1921) in no. 6.   
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nationalist representation of science, sums up the main thrust of positive eugenics.  
 The voices of these British birth control advocates on eugenic grounds were 
echoed by the Japanese proletarian birth control activists.116 For them, translating 
Western eugenic views were an important part of theorizing birth control. In the re-
contextualizing process or translation, eugenics and scientific procreation became 
indispensable and legitimate factors in the arguments of proletarian advocates. 
Through the Hyōron, Japanese advocates explicitly articulated how essential birth 
control was for creating eugenic value, or improving the race,117 and how justifiable 
artificial selection was in creating the biological, medical, and sanitary conditions 
needed for healthy mothers and children.118 Thus, contraception embodied a utopian 
view of human progress based on scientific development. Here, the underlying 
assumption that reproduction, as a part of nature should be dominated by science, put 
humanity in a paradoxical position. Humans belonged to nature and thus were an 
object of science on one hand, but, on the other hand, humans were a knowing subject 
who should control nature. However, this paradox remained unexamined while the 
idea of progress—the blending of scientific advancement and humanitarian reform—
constantly justified scientific interventions into reproduction. Yamamoto compared 
                                                
116 Another eugenic-based birth control advocates translated and introduced through the Hyōron 
include a Russian Bolshevist Alexandra Kollontai (no.1; no.3), an Irish critic and a member of Fabian 
Society, Bernard Shaw (no. 2), a Dutch medical practitioner Johannes Rutgers (no. 6), and Margaret 
Sanger (no. 7).   
117 For example, a socialist politician Koike Shirō explicitly criticized the blind spots of Malthusian 
theory, the unfair control of the means of production and the unequal distribution of products. 
Nevertheless, Koike stressed the pressing need for birth control for three reasons: first, from the eugenic 
viewpoint; second, a temporary solution to poverty; third, for mother’s health and rights protection. 
Koike’s emphasis on biological and environmental quality of human life is in accord with Ellis’ claim 
for positive eugenics. Koike Shirō, “Jidai ni genwaku sare taru marusasu (Malthus, blinded by his time),” 
Sei to shakai 14 (May 1926): 18-24. 
118 Yamamoto Senji, “Sanji chōsetsu wa tenri ni somuku ka (Does birth control go against the law of 
nature?)” Sei to shakai 13 (March 1926): 18-23.  
  82 
birth control to radio communication and modern technologies of transportation, on 
the grounds that “those are all based on the knowledge of nature, and a human 
privilege to obey and partly control nature.” Thus, a paradox resides in the idea of 
progress.119 
 Meanwhile, there was another crucial factor in establishing the legitimacy of 
birth control in addition to eugenics and scientific procreation: class. As already 
discussed above, when proletarian birth control advocates were first organizing 
Seigenkai, they proclaimed that birth control was the proletariat’s “self-defense” 
against the exploitative system of capitalism. This Marxist perspective remained 
unchanged in subsequent processes of theorizing. In response to Seigenkai’s initial 
critique of the Malthusian theory of population, some labor activists participated in the 
discussion of birth control from a class-based viewpoint. Tanizaki Zentarō, a Kyoto-
based labor activist, actively criticized Neo-Malthusians who failed to see the illusory 
nature of overpopulation while representing the interest of bourgeois class. In 
opposition to Neo-Malthusianism, Tanizaki attempted to shift the association of birth 
control with bourgeois ideology to that of proletarian praxis. Insofar as the capitalist 
economic system continued, the proletariat would keep suffering from poverty, 
exploitation, and unemployment. Tanizaki stressed the exclusive use of birth control 
by the proletariat for a temporary self-defense on the premise that capitalism was a 
historically specific economic form. Tanizaki’s class-based logic created a double 
                                                
119 Ibid., 23. Yamamoto’s remark on birth control as one of the modern technologies also can be found 
in “Rajio to sanji chōsetsu (radio and birth control),” in Yamamoto Senji zenshū, vol. 3, 557–568. In this 
article, he opposed to those who considered	contraception the violation of the course of nature, and 
maintained that contraceptive technology was a kind of modern preventive medicine which would bring 
happiness and stability to the masses.     
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standard in sexual ethics. Whereas the use of contraception by the bourgeois class was 
considered to be sexual licentiousness, the same practice by the proletarian class was a 
justifiable solution to economic problems.120 This double-standard suggests that 
Tanizaki reaffirmed sexual ethics by limiting the purpose of sex to reproduction. Thus, 
the practice of birth control was only permitted when aimed at the liberation of the 
proletariat.               
 In a larger context, Tanizaki was reiterating the major argument of proletarian 
leaders who considered the proletarian class “desexualized.” The majority of these 
leaders limited the discussion of birth control in economic and material issues, and 
excluded sexual concerns. An individual’s sexual needs were not entirely ignored, but 
rather resigned to a hidden, private realm. In this way, socialist birth control advocates 
could embrace birth control as a part of the class movement without contaminating the 
proletariat class with “immoral” sex. The fact that both the Japan Farmer’s Union 
(Nihon Nōmin Kumiai) and Sōdōmei turned down concrete proposals aimed at 
spreading birth control among the working class in 1925, exemplifies the general 
desexualization of the proletarian class.121 Interestingly, Kuzumi Fusako, a delegate 
of Sōdōmei and a founding member of Seigenkai, played a key role in the labor 
union’s rejection of birth control campaigns. After making this decision, Kuzumi 
explained why labor union delegates, including herself, objected to the proposal. She 
clarified that “the campaigns of Sōdōmei aim at improving working conditions and 
                                                
120 Tanizaki Zentarō, “Musan kaikyū to sanji chōsetsu (The proletarian class and birth control),” Sanji 
Chōsetsu Hyōron 5 (June 1925): 41-45.	
121 In the 4th General Meeting of the Japan Famers Union in February 1925, the proposal for the 
“promotion of birth control (sanji seigen shōrei-an)” was not adopted. One month later, in the National 
Meeting of the Japan General Federation of Labor also rejected the proposal for birth control submitted 
by Inoue Suejirō from Kobe Association.    
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abolishing the wage system. In other words, Sōdōmei is an organization for the 
economic battle of the proletariat. And, birth control is simply a means of self-defense. 
Considering the numerous activities the labor union is currently committed to, we can 
hardly afford to campaign for birth control at a concrete organizational level.”122 Her 
remarks clearly illustrate how activities addressing sex and reproduction remained 
outside the boundaries of the economic base. This discursive desexualization of the 
working class exposed a contradiction: that is, sexual activity was necessary for the 
reproduction of proletariat, but the proletariat as a whole was largely desexualizaed.  
 Nevertheless, a few proponents of the proletarian birth control movement 
adopted different approaches to questions about “sex and class.”123 Especially 
Yamamoto, who once expanded the boundaries of his birth control concerns to include 
the enlightenment of the proletarian class, gradually came to recognize the 
socioeconomic dimensions of sex. Yamamoto’s shifting understanding of sex in 
relation to a specific socioeconomic condition is seen in his move to rename the 
Hyōron as “Sei to Shakai (Sex and society).” 
In an article explaining this editorial decision, Yamamoto maintained that “sexual 
relations in our human society are not merely a biological phenomenon; sex involves 
grave issues present in the basis of social systems.” Yamamoto associated this 
recognition of the socioeconomic aspects of human sex with “a revolution in modes of 
thought (Umwälzung der Denkweise).” Here, revolution does not simply refer to a 
                                                
122 Kuzumi Fusako, “Naniyueni wareware wa hantaishitaka: Sōdōmei taikai ni teishutsu sareshi BC an 
(Why did we object to the proposal for BC campaign submitted to the National Meeting of Sōdōmei?),” 
Sanji Chōsetsu Hyōron 4 (1925): 53.	 	 	 	
123 As a representative example, Yamakawa Kikue raised a criticizing voice within the proletarian birth 
control group. Her critique of the negligence of sex in economic determinism from a Marxist feminist 
viewpoint will be discussed in Chapter 4.    
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change in the content of thought, but a more fundamental change in the dominant 
bourgeois mode of classifying sex as obscene, private, and pathological. In 
Yamamoto’s view, the revolution of sex had to begin with a revolution in the 
bourgeois representation of sex. As his pursuit of “proletarian sexology” implies, sex, 
for Yamamoto, was a key part of the working class movement insofar as bourgeois 
ruling ideology monopolized the truth of sex while concealing the historical and 
socioeconomic structure of sex.124  
  The Sei to shakai was discontinued in May 1926 due to financial difficulties 
and a rapid change in the proletarian movement. In the final issue of the magazine, 
Yamamoto wrote about his future plans which included developing his sexological 
research into “Socialerotik (shakaiteki aiyokugaku).”125 Although the era of theorizing 
birth control was about to end with the gradual dissolution of Seigenkai, Yamamoto 
maintained his convictions about the close link between class and sex in capitalist 
social relations. Applying Marx’s understanding of the base and superstructure to the 
social aspects of sex, Yamamoto noted that the world of erotic love also followed the 
principles of historical materialism. In the same vein, sexual institutions, customs and 
                                                
124 Yamamoto Senji, “Sanji chōsetsu hyōron kara sei to shakai 3,” Sei to shakai 11 (January 1926): 2-
13. Yamamoto’s critique of sexual obscurantism in accordance with bourgeois ruling ideology 
contradicts with Michel Foucault’s account of “the theory of repression.” Foucault points out that the 
discourse of sex has multiplied in the space of power since the eighteenth century, instead of being 
silenced. According to Foucault, not only the knowledge of sex, but also the theory of repressing sex are 
the effects of multiple discursive deployment of sex. Therefore, Yamamoto’s account of ideological 
aspect of sex and Foucault’s analysis of the discursive formation of sex sharply differed from each other 
on the underlying view on a knowledge-power relation: while the former views sex as a singular, a 
strategic means of the ruling class, the latter sees the modern mode of sex as multiple effects formed by 
the interplays of diverse subjects who pursue the truth of sex.  As to a question about the modern 
repression of sex, see Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality vol.1, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1990), 8; 128.	 	
125 Yamamoto Senji, “Watakushi goto ni san shūkan ni nozon de aisatsu to shōrai no keikaku (A few 
things about me: the last words on the discontinuation of the magazine and my future plans),” Sei to 
shakai 14 (May 1926): 102-111. 
  86 
consciousness fostered in a capitalist society would ultimately end in a moment of 
“self-dissolution” as capital worked for its own dissolution.126 Thus, the goal of 
Socialerotik was to trace this shifting materialist structure of sex. Needless to say, 
birth control was a key technology that could disrupt the material conditions of 
reproduction, and furthermore, revolutionize sexual consciousness.   
 Seen in this light, the theorization of birth control in the mid-1920s centered on 
the reframing of human reproduction and the constitution of the subject. Birth control 
technologies and eugenics redefined human reproduction a knowable and controllable 
object of science. Contraception, as a scientific means of improving the life quality of 
the population, became the new tactics of the proletarian movement. Proletarian birth 
control advocates positioned the working class as the self-conscious subjects of birth 
control. In these advocates’ view, scientific procreation was ultimately linked to the 
liberation of the proletariat. In this light, the proletarian birth control movement was a 
critique of the bourgeois-capitalist representation of overpopulation and furthermore, 
an attempt to reframe the proletarian class as biological subjects. However, there was 
an indeterminable nature in this newly defined “proletariat.” The blending of the class 
movement and birth control propaganda cast a series of critical questions about the 
ambiguity of the proletariat between a knowing subject and a known object, a 
biological being and a socioeconomic being, and sex and class.  
 
The praxis of birth control: towards the socialization of reproduction 
                                                
126 Ibid.; In this article, Yamamoto emphasized the self-dissolution of capitalist sexual ideology as that 
of capitalist economy. His understanding of the materialist structure of sex was based on Marx’s 
historical materialism, which can be summarized as “capital works for its own dissolution as the 
dominant form of production.” Karl Marx, Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 411.  	
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Since the mid 1920s, the continued lack of agreement among proletarian 
organizations became a major impediment to effects to encourage individual working 
class people to practice birth control. The proletariat movement underwent repeated 
instances of consolidation and dissolution due to both internal factionalism and the 
state’s suppression of radical thought. A major split in the proletariat movement 
occurred in 1925 between its socialist and communist subgroups, when Sōdōmei 
expelled the communists and a breakaway communist faction founded the Japan Labor 
Unions Council (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Hyōgikai). In the following year, there was the 
second split between right-wing socialism and centrist socialism when the latter group 
separately formed the Japan Labor Union League (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Dōmei). Each 
labor federation developed into different proletarian parties with different ideological 
lines.127 The majority of the leading members of Seigenkai were involved with the 
labor union movement, and then later the political party activities ahead of the first 
general election of 1928. As a result, the group gradually disbanded, and eventually, 
the magazine Sei to Shakai was discontinued.128  
In addition, growing government oppression undermined the proletarian birth 
control movement. The Peace Preservation Law, promulgated in 1925, reinforced the 
                                                
127 In 1926, three different political parties were founded after the General Election Law whose purpose 
was to extend male suffrage to male citizens (over the age of 25). These parties include the Social 
Democratic Party (Shakai Minshūtō, right-wing), the Japan Labor-Farmer Party (Nihon Rōdō Nōmintō, 
centrist), and the Labor-Farmer Party (Rōdō Nōmintō, leftist). For an account of the leftist movement in 
prewar and wartime Japan, see Stephen S. Large, Organized Workers and Socialist Politics in Interwar 
Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy. 
128 Yamamoto also devoted himself to the labor movement and the political party activity. He was 
involved in the Labor-Farmer Party shortly after the decision to discontinue the Sei to shakai was made 
in 1926, and elected as a member of the House of Representatives in Japan’s first general election of 
1928. As to Yamamoto’s political activities in the late 1920s, see Toshiji, Yamamoto Senji, vol. 2, 121-
382. 
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state’s repression of socialists, communists, and other radical groups, and eventually 
led to the March 15 Incident of 1928. In this incident, more than fifteen hundred 
communists and suspected sympathizers were arrested, and several proletarian 
organizations were dissolved under the Peace Preservation Law which legitimized the 
state control of political thoughts.129  
In spite of the government’s control of social radicals, the worldwide Great 
Depression and its devastating impact on Japan’s national economy ignited a series of 
proletariat protests between 1929 and 1932. In rural Japan, disputes over tenancy 
rights between tenant farmers and landlords increased as the price of agricultural 
products plummeted. In cities, the unemployment rate exceeded 20 percent of the 
industrial work force and the labor union movement reached a peak in 1931 in 
proportional terms.130 These economic crises generated multiple, conflicting 
ideological responses: right-wing or reactionary grass root groups appeared, “Japanists” 
or national socialists converted from leftism, and leftist groups came under the 
constant threat of ideological suppression.131 It should be noted that these groups, 
surprisingly, had much in common in terms of their critique of the government’s 
failure to solve the economic crisis, however, the solutions proposed by the competing 
                                                
129 On 10 April, Home Minister ordered the dissolution of the Hyōgikai, the Labor-Farmer Party, the 
Japan Famer's Union, and the All-Japan Proletarian Youth League for violating kokutai (national 
polity). Ironically, the General Election Law was passed in 1925 and the first general election in Japan 
was held in 1928. A series of political events in 1925 and 1928 reveals that Taishō democracy and its 
liberal legacy in the 1920s stood in a complex balance between repression and liberal reform. Sheldon 
M. Garon, The State and Labor in Modern Japan (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1987), 130-
136.    
130 As to the Shōwa Depression between 1929 and 1932, see Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy, 
237-69; Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014); 181-201; Nishida Yoshiaki, “Dimensions of change in twentieth-
century rural Japan” in Farmers and Village Life in Twentieth-Century Japan, ed. Ann Waswo et 
al.(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 7-37.	
131 Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan, 255-261.  
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political groups differed considerably. Reactionary, rightist groups attempted to solve 
the crisis through military expansion into Manchuria while the leftist groups anchored 
their hopes in a future proletarian revolution.132 The murder of Yamamoto by a right-
wing activist reflects the intensified ideological conflicts of the late 1920s.133       
In such a situation, the proletarian birth control movement resurfaced in two 
different forms. In Osaka, several birth control clinics opened in the early 1930s to 
provide free or inexpensive counsel about birth control, child and maternal health, and 
sexual diseases for the poor and the working class. Meanwhile, in the Tokyo area, the 
Proletariat Birth Control League (Musansha Sanji Seigen Dōmei, or Pro-BC) was 
founded by a proletarian group in June 1930 to denounce a commodified birth control 
campaign and meet the growing demand for birth control among the proletariat. These 
two new developments in the birth control movement focused on popularizing 
practical contraceptive measures for the working-class people rather than engaging in 
more intellectual debates about the meaning of population growth and the legitimacy 
of birth control. As a result, since the early 1930s, the birth control movement 
unfolded in consultation centers, exhibitions, and voluntary groups.        
A quintessential example showing the transition from the intellectual debate to 
praxis in the proletarian birth control movement is the Eugenic Consultation Center, 
established in Sumiyoshi district, Osaka, in April 1930. One month prior to its 
establishment, proletarian activists involved in the Labor Union, the Farmers’ Union, 
                                                
132 Sandra Wilson, The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931-33 (London: Routledge, 2002), 
114-119. 
133 Yamamoto was stabbed to death by a right-wing activist on the same day he made a speech against 
the retrogressive revision of the Peace Preservation Law on March 1929. The purpose of the revision 
was to ratify the emergency ordinance stipulating the introduction of death penalty and widen the 
definition of political dissidents. Sasaki, Yamamoto Senji vol.2, 340-359; Sheldon, The State and Labor 
in Modern Japan, 152-156.	
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and other proletarian parties, cooperated with medical practitioners and midwives to 
organize a new birth control advocacy group dubbed the “Japan Birth Control 
Association (Nihon Sanji Seigen Kyōkai).”134 The activists announced the three key 
goals of their newly formed association, which included 1) raising the quality of 
children on eugenic grounds, 2) the prevention of infant death, and the protection of 
children’s right to life, and 3) saving mothers from the “hell of fecundity (tasan 
jikoku).135 The expressed goals of the Japan Birth Control Association resembled birth 
control arguments made previously. However, now, science was directly connected 
with practical social work. Hence, the Association set up the Eugenic Consultation 
Center in pursuit of popularizing birth control among individual proletarians. 
The Eugenic Consultation Center, as a new venture for the proletarian birth 
control movement, also became a space for reshaping the meaning of eugenics. As 
stated earlier, eugenics had been rationalized as a humanitarian science for human 
progress by previous birth control activists in the 1920s. In contrast, in the new venue, 
where a modern midwife Shibahara Urako was in charge of counselling work, 
eugenics became a matter of individualized counselling and thus addressed individual 
bodies and families rather than universal, ideological goals. More than 3,000 people 
visited the Center in the first four months since its opening, asking for counsel on 
                                                
134 Nihon sanji seigen kyōkai, “Yūsei sōdanho annai: nihon sanji seigen kyōkai sanjyo kaiin no susume 
(The guidebook for eugenic consultation: recommendation regarding the patron membership of the 
Japan Birth Control Association),” in Nihon josei undō shiryō shūsei, vol. 7, 640-643. Originally 
published in March 1930. 
135 “The hell of fertility” was a buzzword in the period of Shōwa Depression. This term, literally 
meaning of a painful life caused by producing many children, suggests the common representation of 
fertility as symbolic of a wretched life. In reality, however, fertility was considered an actual problem 
among the lower class people who suffered from poverty and unemployment. As Fujime Yuki points 
out, while there was a growing demand for birth control in both cities and rural areas, infanticide was 
also frequently reported in the newspaper between 1930 and 1932. Fujime, Sei no rekishigaku, 260-263.	
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contraceptive methods. Their reasons for consultation on birth control included having 
many children, poverty, infirm health of mothers, and possessing an inferior genetic 
inheritance.136 It should be noted that there was a difference in the understanding of 
eugenics between the intellectual birth control activists and the general public who 
were in need of birth control. For the intellectuals, eugenics was associated with a 
future-oriented goals—mainly the health of population, and the coming proletarian 
revolution. In contrast, the general public searching for answers to their everyday 
questions about sex and married life; they turned to eugenics to answer questions 
about spouse selection, to help ameliorate low income and childrearing duties, and to 
improve their physical and mental health. Each specific counselling encounter 
redefined eugenics as a way to improve one’s living conditions and health.   
In addition to the reshaping of eugenics, the operation of consultation center 
also marked a shift in the proletarian birth control movement in terms of “gendering” 
birth control. As the demand for counselling and the perceived effectiveness of the 
consultation center increased, two more consultation centers opened in Osaka by 1932. 
In November 1930, the “Eugenic Child Consultation Center (Yūseji sōdansho)” was 
set up by the Proletariat Women’s League (Musan fujin dōmei) and another Eugenic 
Consultation Center, funded by Eugenics Society (Yūsei kyōkai), opened in July 
1932.137 Such consultation centers were increasingly female-dominated realms. This 
                                                
136 According to investigation results published by the Social Bureau of Osaka city, the total number of 
people who visited the Center reached approximately 6,600 for the first 11 months since opening in 
1930. Those who came to the Center were mostly from the married, working-class population, 
including retailers, salaried workers, manual workers, craftsmen, and unemployed people. Osaka shi 
shakai bu rōdōka (Labor Affairs Section of the Social Bureau of Osaka City), “Hon shi ni oke ru yūsei 
sōdan sho nikansuru shiryō (Documents on the eugenic consultation Center in Osaka city),” Shakaibu 
hōkoku (Social Bureau Report) 184 (Osaka: Social Bureau of Osaka City, 1934). 
137 Ibid., 10-23.	 	 	 	
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female-specific character contrasted markedly with the previous birth control 
movement which was, for the most part, led by male intellectuals and activists. At the 
new consultation centers, professional midwives or female doctors provided cost-free 
or inexpensive counselling services to women and sold contraceptive devices at a 
reasonable price. Women, overwhelmingly, sought out the services provided by the 
eugenic consultation centers. According to an investigation conducted by the Social 
Bureau of Osaka city, 21,711 people visited one of the consultation centers between 
April 1930 and December 1932. Women accounted for more than 93 percent of the 
total number of visitors.138  
Despite the substantial demand for the birth control services they provided, the 
consultation centers were closed one after another by 1934. Growing governmental 
restrictions justified by the Harmful Contraceptive Devices Control Regulation of 
1930 as well as internal divisions among the proletarian parties in 1932 shortened the 
life of the otherwise thriving birth control centers.139 Shibahara, who played a key 
role in two consultation centers in Osaka, was arrested for performing abortions in 
June 1933. Another consultation center, that was funded by the Proletariat Women’s 
                                                
138 The fee for consultation was less than fifty sen (one hundred sen equals to one yen) at all the 
consultation centers. According to the investigation of the Social Bureau of Osaka City in 1932, 89 
percent of workers in general industry made 10 to 50 yen per month. Ibid., 13-5; Osaka shi shakai bu 
rōdōka, “Osaka shi shitsugyōsha seikatsu jōtai chōsa (Investigation of the living condition of 
unemployed population in Osaka City)” Shakaibu hōkoku 169 (Osaka: Social Bureau of Osaka City, 
1933).  
139 In Japan since the Meiji period, abortion was illegalized under the Abortion Law (Datai zai) in 1880, 
and severely punished by the Criminal Abortion Law in 1907. Since the early 1930s, birth control 
activists formed the Alliance for Reform of the Anti-Abortion Law (Datai Hō Kaisei Kiseikai) to 
legalize abortions on eugenic grounds, the laws remained unchanged by 1948, when the Eugenic 
Protection Law of 1948 was issued. Meanwhile, the Harmful Contraceptive Devices Control Regulation 
(Yūgai hinin yō kigu torishimari kisoku) was issued by the Home Ministry in 1930 to prohibit the sales 
and distribution of intracervical and interuterine devices. As to the whole text of the laws, see Norgren, 
Abortion before Birth Control, 139; Jitsuyō iji hōki: Sankō hōrei mokuji oyobi bibōran tsuki (The laws 
of practical medicine: lists of referential legislation and legal memorandums) (Tokyo: Kokuseidō 
Shoten, 1939), 144-145.	 	 	 	
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League, virtually halted all of its services in 1933 as the proletarian parties split 
because of different views on Japan’s military expansion. As the consultation centers 
gradually reframed eugenics and birth control as an individualized practice, these 
centers became increasingly tied down to the state’s regulation of reproduction and 
subject to the shifting winds of proletariat ideology. 
Meanwhile, in 1931, another kind of proletarian birth control movement was 
launched in Tokyo. Several proletarian organizations—including the Labor Union, the 
Farmers’ Union, the Consumers Union, and a group of physicians and midwives 
working for the proletariat—joined forces to establish the Pro-BC in June 1931. The 
Pro-BC inherited the ideological vision of the preceding 1920s birth control movement, 
and thus maintained a firm emphasis on helping the proletarian class. This emphasis 
differed from the less class-consciousness eugenic consultation centers in Osaka. In 
vehement opposition to the commercialization of birth control which had been 
growing since the late 1920s, the Pro-BC issued the following manifesto: “We 
adamantly reject the existing reactionary, profit-seeking, and deceptive business of 
birth control. We advocate birth control to support Liberation Front (kaihō sensen). 
We hope for sexual reform on the basis of scientific birth control.”140 In October, the 
Pro-BC joined the Japan Proletarian Cultural League (Nihon Puroretaria Bunka 
Renmei, or KOP), a newly founded proletarian alliance for cultural and scientific 
                                                
140 Particularly, the Japan Birth Control League (Nihon Sanji Chōsetsu Renmei), founded in January 
1931, was a specific target of its criticism for profiting from the sale of Dutch pessaries invented by 
Majima Kan, one of the leading members of the League. Musansha Sanji Seigen Dōmei, “Musansha 
Sanji Seigen Dōmei Sengen: Kōryō kiyaku (the PRO-BC: codes and agreements),” in Nihon josei undō 
shiryō shūsei 7, 686-688. Originally published in June 6, 1931. 
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movements.141 The move shows that the Pro-BC regarded the proletarian revolution 
as its ultimate goal and viewed birth control as a scientific medium which could help 
facilitate the revolution and be a “defensive means for class struggle.”  
In an effort to replace commercialized birth control, the Pro-BC pursued a 
different strategy of propagating birth control practices from its Osaka counterparts. 
Notably, the organization of the Pro-BC resembled that of the Soviet Union’s 
Communist Party specifically in terms of its democratic centralism. An organic link 
between a central organization and local units called “circles (ban)” characterized the 
democratic centralist structure of the Pro-BC.142 The Pro-BC was largely divided into 
a central committee and a standing committee, and the latter was again divided into 
three departments, namely, the propagation, the technology, and the financial 
departments.143 The organization focused on the propagation of birth control through 
and among Pro-BC’s local circles. Although the Pro-BC also engaged in other existing 
ways of popularizing the practice of contraception among the masses, (for example, 
the Pro-BC published a popular edition of the “Pro-BC News,” sponsored a birth 
control exhibition, and operated birth control consultation centers) its main strategy 
was to organize the “circles” among factory workers and farmers. 
                                                
141 A Japanese writer Matsuda Tokiko wrote a novel based on Yamada Kotoko’s activities for the Pro-
BC. Yamada was also involved in KOP as an editor of the magazine for the Proletarian women 
Hataraku Fujin (Working women). As to a brief history of the Pro-BC and its affiliation to KOP, see 
Matsuda Tokiko, Joseisen (Women’s lines) (Tokyo: Akebi Shobō, 1995), 339-349.	 	
142 Kurahara Korehito, a socialist critic who led the All-Japan Proletarian Arts League (Zen Nihon 
Musansha Geijitsu Renmei, or NAP) in 1928 and then KOP movement since 1931, began to use “circles” 
first in Japan. Referencing the proletariat cultural movement of the Soviet Union, or the Proletkult, 
Kurahara used circles to denote support organs for spreading cultural or scientific activities, or class 
aesthetics under the supervision of the central proletarian organization. As to the origin of “circles” in 
Japan, see Simon Andrew Avenell, Making Japanese Citizens: Civil Society and the Mythology of the 
Shimin in Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 44-46.  
143 The chairman of the central committee was Nakane Kōnosuke from the Tokyo Transport Worker’s 
Union and a vice-chairman was the midwife Kobayashi Miyo. 
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In their fight for the socialization of birth control, the Pro-BC used the 
organizational model of Soviet Russia. In post-revolution Russia, abortion and 
contraception was legalized on the grounds that reproduction and childcare was a 
social matter, and the state needed to protect motherhood and infancy to ensure 
healthier future generations.144 The Pro-BC was sympathetic to a number of Russia’s 
state policies including state-subsidized maternity hospitals, nurseries, and sex 
education, as well as the legalization of birth control and artificial abortions.145 
Acknowledging the differences in socioeconomic system between Soviet Russia and 
Japan, the Pro-BC members reframed the socialization of reproduction from the post-
revolution state policy to match the Japanese context, which required the means of 
class war to achieve a proletariat revolution. Channeling birth Control propaganda 
through organizing circles was thought to be a primary step in shifting the burden of 
reproductive functions from individual families onto the social realm. The Pro-BC, 
however, failed to present a plan detailing the state’s role in human reproduction and 
childcare in Japan. For them, the watchword “class-based birth control (kaikyūteki 
sanji seigen)” was effective only to the extent that workers, farmers, and other 
                                                
144 Olga Issoupova, “From duty to pleasure? Motherhood in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia,” in Gender, 
State, and Society in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia, ed. Sarah Ashwin (London: Routledge, 2000), 30-
54. 
145 The Pro-BC introduced the state policies of Soviet Russia regarding motherhood, reproduction, and 
childcare several times through its periodical Sanji seigen undō (The birth control movement) and the 
popular edition of Pro BC News. For example, a poet and a founder of Japana Prolet-Esperantista Unio 
(JPEU) Akita Ujaku, wrote an article on state-run maternity hospitals and a state support for birth 
control in Russia based on his own experience of travelling to Moscow and Leningrad (the old name of 
St. Petersburg). In Pro BC News, the Pro-BC also reported that the reason for legalizing abortions in 
Russia was to warn about the risks of performing abortion procedures and to provide the scientific	
methods of abortions under the state provision. Writing articles on Soviet Russia was a strategic vehicle 
for the Pro-BC to advocate the socialization of reproduction in Japan. Akita Ujaku, “Sovēto dōmei ni 
okeru sanji seigen sono ta nitsuite (Birth Control and the Others in Soviet Union),” Sanji seigen undō 1 
(September 1931): 3-5; “Sanji seigen ga jiyū demo Sovēto dōmei wa jinkō ga zōka,” Pro BC News 
(Popular edition) 1 (July 1933): 2.       
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proletarian groups were able to devote themselves to the ongoing class war instead of 
depleting their energies in raising children in impoverished conditions.146 With this 
defensive understanding of birth control, the Pro-BC inadvertently pursued a strategy 
that reinforced the distinction between public and private spheres, instead of heralding 
the socialization of reproduction. 
Like the eugenic consultation center movement in Osaka, the Pro-BC was also 
short-lived. Despite its constant efforts to expand and foster local units and branches, 
the Pro-BC faced challenges in convincing workers and farmers to voluntarily 
organize and participate in birth control circles.147 Furthermore, after the Manchurian 
Incident in September 1931, the shifting political situation became a major barrier to 
maintaining the proletarian organizations. Increasing state suppression of left-wing 
groups reached a peak in 1933, when a central figure in the proletarian movement, 
Kobayashi Takiji was tortured to death by Special Higher Police. Widespread 
suppression also sparked a dissension within the proletarian movement and this 
ultimately led to the dissolution of the KOP and its affiliated organizations in April 
1934.148 As a result, the Pro-BC campaign was abandoned and the proletarian 
revolution did not materialize. With the dissolution of the Pro-BC in 1934, the 
Japanese proletarian birth control movement was also put to an end.   
 
                                                
146 “1923 nendo Pro-BC tōsō hōshin sōan (A draft for the struggle policy of the Pro-BC in 1923),” in 
Nihon josei undō shiryō shūsei, vol. 7, 692-697. Originally published in January 1932. 
147 According to a report published in the Pro BC News in 1932, several circles were established in 
factories in Tokyo area, and the Pro-BC was planning to further expand the movement into different 
Prefecture including Mie, Niigata, Ibaraki, Nagano, Dottori, and Hokkaido, though it is unconfirmed the 
plan was actually fulfilled so far. Given the growing state repression against the Proletariat movement 
and continuing imprisonment of leading members of the Pro-BC since the early 1932, it is a grim 
possibility that the latter plan was carried out. Pro BC News 11 (April 1932).       
148 Wilson, The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 105-109; Matsuda, Joseisen, 346-347. 
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An unfinished revolution: rethinking class, reproduction, and science 
 
 This chapter has explored the genealogy of the proletariat birth control 
movement during the interwar years in Japan. The movement which began with the 
birth of Seigenkai in the early 1920s eventually ended in the mid-1930s without 
having facilitated a proletarian revolution. The intensifying state control of leftism and 
ideological conflicts within the proletarian organizations during the mid 1930s greatly 
hindered the movement. Moreover, the call for using birth control as a way to catalyze 
the proletarian revolution faded into history. 
However, the proletariat birth control movement in Japan cannot simply be 
reduced to an unfinished revolution. The trajectory of the movement provokes a series 
of critical questions about the socioeconomic representation of reproduction and 
sexuality under capitalism. Birth control and eugenic ideas radically changed the 
status of human reproduction from that of uncontrolled nature into the domain of 
controllable biological phenomena. The reproductive technologies adopted by 
proletarian activists exposed parts of the exploitative economic system of capitalism 
under which the production of the proletarian population brought benefit primarily to 
the capitalists. Furthermore, proletarian birth control activists appropriated the 
meaning of human reproduction for the benefit of the proletarian class in the process 
of revaluing reproduction as a defensive means of class survival and revolution. Put 
another way, the proletarian birth control movement problematized capitalist 
representations of reproduction, and reframed reproduction with a revolutionary 
science. Although the revolution ultimately failed, the genealogy of the Japanese 
proletarian birth control movement casts a still valid question about the complex and 
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interconnected relationships between human reproduction, capitalist economy, and 
reproductive science. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Voluntary Motherhood: Feminist Struggles for Birth Control 
 
Feminism, Ideology, Reproduction   
The Ōhara Institute for Social Research (Ōhara shakai mondai kenkyūjo, 
established in 1919), an institute for the study of social and labor issues, had published 
the Labor Yearbook of Japan (Nihon rōdō nenkan) since 1920.149 In the 1922 
yearbook, a new “population problem” section was added to the Institute’s growing 
list of social problems requiring research. This new population section summarized 
data from the first national census of Japan conducted in 1920, and the key points of a 
recent debate on birth control in Japan. According to the report, during the previous 
year, Japanese intellectuals and social activists had become increasingly interested in 
artificial birth control as a method of tackling a wide variety of pressing social issues 
including poverty, employment, migration, eugenics, and maternal health. The report 
reflected the controversial nature of recent debates over birth control and its purposes 
at the time. In addition to articulating the views of those against birth control, the 
Yearbook chose two women—Yamakawa Kikue (1890-1980) and Ishimoto Shizue 
(1897-2001, later changed her name to Katō Shizue after marrying a labor activist 
Katō Kanju in 1944)—to represent birth control advocates. 
Although Yamakawa and Ishimoto shared common ground as pioneering 
feminist voices for birth control, there were significant differences between them. 
Yamakawa in contrast to Ishimoto refuted neo-Malthusian theory that assumed 
                                                
149 Ōhara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūjo, “Sanji seigen mondai (The problem of birth control),” Nihon rōdō 
nenkan (Labor Yearbook of Japan) (Tokyo: Rōdō Junpōsha, 1922): 344-345. 
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population growth was the source of many social problems. Drawing on a Marxist 
critique of capitalism, Yamakawa argued for a “birth strike (shussan sutoraiki)” as a 
way of protesting capitalist exploitation and alleviating the economic burdens of the 
working class. Meanwhile, Ishimoto, having returned from the United States where 
she learned about the birth control movement, outlined three significant reasons why 
birth control was necessary. These reasons included a Malthusian concern with 
overpopulation in contemporary Japan, the improvement of the national standard of 
living, and the liberation of women from their subordinate social status and domestic 
work. These gaps between Yamakawa’s and Ishimoto’s views mirrored the ideological 
chasm between Malthusianism and Marxism. Furthermore, these ideological 
differences constantly reappeared in the subsequent debates over birth control between 
neo-Malthusian reformists and socialists in Japan.        
It should be noted that, notwithstanding their ideological differences, both 
Yamakawa and Ishimoto explicitly advocated women’s liberation. While Yamakawa 
supported women’s rights to reproductive choice as an underlying condition for 
women’s liberation, Ishimoto argued for freeing women from the burdens of domestic 
work. The feminist goal of expanding women’s freedom is present in the arguments of 
both feminists in spite of their different approaches to liberation. Their shared feminist 
perspective, however, unlike the ongoing conflict between neo-Malthusian and 
Marxist positions, faded away in subsequent debates on birth control in Japan. In the 
end, the issue of women’s liberation remained only a minor concern among pro-birth 
control advocates in Japan.  
This chapter focuses on the Japanese feminist critics who advocated for birth 
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control during the interwar period by focusing on two leading pro-birth control 
feminists, Yamakawa and Ishimoto. Although they intermittently cooperated with 
each other in the promotion of birth control, Russian famine relief efforts, and 
women’s suffrage movement in the early and mid 1920s, their collaboration did not 
necessarily imply agreement on their ultimate goals.150 In fact, Yamakawa and 
Ishimoto were on the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, namely, socialism and 
liberalism. Although both Yamakawa and Ishimoto borrowed the term “voluntary 
motherhood” from Sanger, they exemplify the heterogeneity of feminist goals in their 
different ways of arguing for birth-control in Japan. This chapter will illuminate how 
Japanese feminists differed in their views of motherhood even though these diverging 
views ironically converged into an advocacy of birth control. The ideological division 
here will not be considered a fundamental point useful for demarcating Yamakawa 
and Ishimoto. Rather, this chapter will shed light on the complexity and heterogeneity 
of the feminists’ birth control advocacy in Japan, and thus contribute to a broader 
understanding of the politicization of reproduction, or conversely the sexualization of 
a politico-economic system world-wide. 
 
                                                
150 There were several interactions between Yamakawa and Ishimoto in terms of organizational 
feminist activities in the early to mid 1920s. The amendment of Article 5 of the Public Peace Police 
Law (Chian keisatsu hō) that had prevented women from attending political meetings or joining 
political organizations was a watershed for women’s movement in Japan. Against the backdrop of the 
increase in feminist organization and women’s participation in political movement, varied feminist 
voices cutting across ideological lines emerged to support birth control, Russian famine relief, disaster 
relief after the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923, and women’s suffrage. Yamakawa and Ishimoto also 
participated in these women’s movements, regardless of their different social visions. For the primary 
sources regarding Japanese feminist movement in the 1920s, particularly the period from when the New 
Women’s Association (Shin fujin kyōkai, founded in 1919) made an organizational effort to amend the 
Article 5 up to when the women’s suffrage movement was organized, see Suzuki. Nihon josei undō 
shiryō shūsei, vol. 1, 412-781.  
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The Multiple Definitions of Voluntary Motherhood 
 Margaret Sanger began publishing a monthly magazine titled Birth Control 
Review in February 1917 to popularize the ideas and techniques of birth control. On its 
cover page, Sanger dedicated Birth Control Review to “the principle of intelligent and 
voluntary motherhood.” The term “voluntary motherhood” remained a slogan until the 
magazine later modified its main goal to emphasize the concrete action plan of 
“agitation, education, organization, legislation” in 1922.151 Unlike the term birth 
control, “voluntary motherhood” was not directly coined by Sanger, but Sanger 
frequently employed this term and likened “involuntary motherhood” to slavery from 
which she argued American women should be liberated. While the term, “voluntary 
motherhood,” itself was inherited from women’s suffrage groups and Free Love 
groups in the late nineteenth century, Sanger redirected public attention from a 
concern with the sexual morality of “self-control” to a focus on artificial contraception 
for women’s liberation.152 In the book Woman and New Race published in 1920, 
Sanger highlighted the central goal of woman’s freedom in her birth control 
movement; this freedom could be condensed in the term “voluntary womanhood.” 
Sanger explains:   
 
Voluntary motherhood implies a new morality—a vigorous, 
constructive, liberated morality. That morality will, first of all, prevent 
                                                
151 There were some minor changes in the subtitle to “Dedicated to the Cause of Voluntary Motherhood” 
in the issue of April 1918 and to “Dedicated to Voluntary Motherhood” in the issue of April 1919. After 
the American Birth Control League (ABCL) was formed in November 1921, Birth Control Review 
became the official organ of the ABCL. The modification of subtitle in the issue of January 1922 
formed a part of the reorganization of American birth control movement.  
152 For the different context and connotation of voluntary motherhood between the late nineteenth-
century feminism and the early twentieth-century feminism in the United States, see Linda Gordon, 
“Voluntary Motherhood: The Beginnings of Feminist Birth Control Ideas in the United States,” 
Feminist Studies 1, no. 3/4 (1973): 5-22. 
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the submergence of womanhood into motherhood. It will set its face 
against the conversion of women into mechanical maternity and toward 
the creation of a new race.153  
 
Voluntary motherhood as a new morality fundamentally denoted women’s 
ownership of their own body and their control of reproduction. The lack of 
reproductive freedom had been openly denounced by Sanger not only as the central 
reason for women’s servitude, but also as the root cause of various socioeconomic 
problems such as poverty, unemployment, emigration, and maternal and infantile 
mortality.154 While labor activists and socialists struggled to solve these social 
problems as well,155 Sanger believed that most leftists failed to fully address the 
malfunctions of capitalism. For Sanger, such leftist political movements overlooked 
the fact that poverty was produced by the fecundity of the working class, rather than 
external economic structures.156 Insofar as she stood on the neo-Malthusian 
assumption that overpopulation was the root cause of poverty, it was logical for 
Sanger to prescribe birth control as the preventive medication.       
Sanger’s pursuit of voluntary motherhood exemplifies the distinctive way in 
which Sanger linked neo-Malthusian thought with women’s sexual liberation. For 
                                                
153 Margaret Sanger, Woman and the New Race (New York: Brentano, 1920), 226. 
154 Margaret Sanger, “Voluntary Motherhood,” public speech at the National Birth Control League, 
1917, Library of Congress Microfilm, LCM 131:104, accessed December 1, 2015, 
https://www.nyu.edu/projects/sanger/webedition/app/documents/show.php?sangerDoc=143450.xml. 
155 Sanger was originally involved in working class movement based on her radical leftism, but her 
initial radicalism and hostility towards capitalism turned into the middle-class based Neo-
Malthusianism and the British sex radicalism since her visit to European countries between 1914 and 
1915. A British sexologist Havelock Ellis was particularly influential for her in terms of diminishing 
radicalism and reframing birth control as an ideal form of love. Linda Gordon, Woman's Body, Woman's 
Right: Birth Control In America. (New York: Penguin, 1990), 217-227. 
156 Sanger, “Voluntary Motherhood”; It was not only orthodox Marxists, but also Marx himself whom 
Sanger criticized. In her book the Pivot of Civilization published in 1922, Sanger also denounces Marx 
for shifting the real cause of poverty to the capitalist system without acknowledging the fact that “the 
deeper unity of the proletariat and the capitalist” supported by “the uncontrolled breeding among the 
laboring classes.” Margaret Sanger, The Pivot of Civilization (New York: Brentano, 1922), 138-139. 
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Sanger, birth control was a new medium which allowed a woman to consciously 
choose whether she would be mother or not. Motherhood was neither a woman’s 
predestined vocation, nor something that could be decided by the State, the church or 
the family system. By emphasizing a woman’s ownership of her own body and the 
self-determination of motherhood, Sanger attempted to position women as the 
conscious agents of birth control.  
While the neo-Malthusian theories justified the urgent need for birth control, 
eugenics was another pillar of Sanger’s pro-birth control argument. Sanger linked the 
issue of overpopulation with the eugenic goal of race improvement. Following her 
definition of the “population problem,” Sanger argued that overpopulation was the 
root cause of socioeconomic problems and improvement of the human race was the 
expected effect of birth control . How is it possible to improve the quality of race by 
checking the growth of the population? The gaps between quantity and quality created 
a political space for Sanger’s feminist argument, which highlighted the eugenic effects 
of voluntary motherhood. Sanger argued that “[if] we are to make racial progress, [the] 
development of womanhood must precede motherhood in every individual woman.”157 
In other words, if women could consciously choose whether they would give birth or 
not, the reproduction of racial inferiors would be efficiently prevented. Controlling 
birth through contraception implied not only the modification of reproduction from 
uncontrolled nature to manipulable life, but also the empowerment of women through 
reproductive autonomy. 
In view of this, feminism was at the center of Sanger’s advocacy for birth 
                                                
157 Sanger, Woman and the New Race, 229. 
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control. Her argument for women’s freedom was hardly compromised by her 
advocacy for neo-Malthusianism or for eugenics. Rather, women’s freedom was 
reconfigured in service of the quantity and quality of population through the concept 
of voluntary motherhood. The biological representation of women’s freedom allowed 
Sanger to transform the womb from being the birthplace of poverty into being the 
birthplace of a new race. In this regard, voluntary motherhood fused radical feminism 
and eugenics by redefining the former in a biological way and the latter as women’s 
reproductive issues.  
 During the same period when Sanger raised the banner of voluntary 
motherhood, a few Japanese feminists were carefully observing the growth of the birth 
control movement in the United States. Yamakawa, an increasingly prominent 
socialist feminist critic at that time, was a keen observer of the worldwide rise of 
contemporary social movements. Between 1920 and 1921, Yamakawa employed 
Sanger’s “voluntary motherhood” slogan to repeatedly emphasize the need for birth 
control. It was not the technology of birth control itself that interested Yamakawa, but 
rather the issue of women’s sexual autonomy embedded in the concept of voluntary 
motherhood. Yamakawa revisited voluntary motherhood through her own critique of 
the double burden placed on working class women. The translation of voluntary 
motherhood was not simply the repetition of Sanger’s discourse, but the introduction 
of new questions about sex and class.    
Another Japanese feminist, Ishimoto Shizue, was influenced by Sanger’s birth 
control movement, which she observed at relatively close range. Ishimoto spent one 
year in New York with her husband, the baron Ishimoto Keikichi, between 1919 and 
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1920, taking a secretarial course in the Ballard School of the Young Women’s 
Christian Association (YWCA). During her stay in New York, she met Sanger in 
person once through Agnes Smedley, an American activist who was involved with 
Birth Control Review at that time.158 After returning to Japan in September 1920, 
Ishimoto worked to introduce birth control to Japanese society.159 Sanger’s voluntary 
motherhood slogan triggered Ishimoto’s sympathy for birth control and neo-
Malthusianism, although Ishimoto redefined the slogan based on family-oriented 
values and nationalism. Like in Yamakawa’s case, Sanger’s voluntary motherhood 
served as a spark which facilitated Ishimoto’s framing of motherhood.  
Yamakawa and Ishimoto were feminist pioneers of birth control movement 
which was predominately supported by men who led the communist and socialist 
movements in Japan. Yamakawa and Ishimoto’s initial advocacy for birth control led 
to the first birth control organization in Japan, “Nihon Sanji Chōsetsu Kenkyūkai (The 
Japanese Society for the Study of Birth Control, hereafter Chōsetsukai).”160 
Chōsetsukai was founded under the leadership of Ishimoto in Tokyo, in May 1922. Its 
members included a physician Kaji Tokijirō, a socialist and baron Ishimoto Keikichi, a 
socialist and professor of Waseda University Abe Isoo, a labor activist Suzuki Bunji, 
                                                
158 Agnes Smedley (1892-1950) was an American activist, feminist, and writer who was involved in a 
range of radical political movements including the Indian nationalist movement, the Communist 
revolution in China and so forth. During the years between 1919 and 1920, Smedley worked for Birth 
Control Review as an associate editor. Ruth Price, The Lives of Agnes Smedley (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 51-68.  
159 For detailed accounts of her stay in New York and its impacts on her career as a birth control 
advocate, see Ishimoto’s autobiography, Facing Two Ways: The Story of My Life (New York: Farrar & 
Rinehart, 1935), her memoir A Fight for Womenʾs Happiness: Pioneering the Family Planning 
Movement In Japan (Tokyo: Japanese Organization for International Cooperation in Family Planning, 
1984), and the biography authored by Helen M. Hopper, Katô Shidzue: A Japanese Feminist (New 
York: Pearson Longman, 2004).  
160 For the details of Chōsetsukai, see Chapter 2.  
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and Yamakawa. The group published a magazine titled Small Family (shōkazoku, 
which was suspended after the publication of the first issue) and a series of pamphlets 
promoting birth control. This first birth control organization, however, was short-
lived. As shown in Chapter 2, conflicts of interest and ideological disagreements 
among the members led to the dissolution of the group before any coordinated 
activities promoting birth control could be carried out.  
There were considerable differences between Ishimoto’s and Yamakawa’s 
visions of the role Chōsetsukai should play. Although Ishimoto and Yamakawa 
worked together to create an organization promoting birth control, this does not mean 
that they agreed on the overall purpose of birth control practice. Different 
understandings of voluntary motherhood epitomize the chasm between Yamakawa’s 
and Ishimoto’s views. How were Yamakawa’s and Ishimoto’s definitions of voluntary 
motherhood different from each other? How did these differences reconfigure the 
contemporary social context of birth control in Japan? Or conversely, what were the 
larger socioeconomic structures which created such differences between feminist 
voices supporting the birth control movement? The following two sections will be 
dedicated to exploring the different ways in which the reconfiguring of motherhood 
played a role in Yamakawa’s and Ishimoto’s positons. I will particularly focus on 
Yamakawa’s advocacy for birth strike and Ishimoto’s eugenic feminism.  
 
Birth Strike: Yamakawa Kikue’s Socialist Critique of Sex and Class 
Yamakawa Kikue was a theorist rather than an activist in the public debate on 
birth control during the interwar period. A series of her public writings (mainly 
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published between 1920 and 1921) reveal the fact that she endeavored to promote 
“self-awareness” among women rather than explaining the specific techniques of birth 
control.161 Considering the growing public interest in birth control after Sanger’s visit 
to Japan in Spring of 1922, Yamakawa’s attention to birth control in the very 
beginning of 1920s may appear premature. In fact, Yamakawa had maintained an 
interest in the liberation of women in conjunction with that of the working class since 
her early critiques of women’s problem in 1910s.162 For Yamakawa, birth control was 
one of the practical and scientific means for realizing women’s freedom from the 
shackles of a patriarchal family system, and also for alleviating the reproductive 
burdens of the proletarian class. Her pursuit of the emancipation of women, especially 
working class women was consistent with her promotion of birth control. What was 
                                                
161 Yamakawa authored several articles on the birth control issue during the period between 1920 and 
1921, which included Yamakawa, “Tasan shugi no noroi (The curse of pronatalism),” Taikan, no. 10 
(1920); “Josei no hangyaku: Seishin teki oyobi busshitsu teki hōmen yori mitaru sanji seigen mondai 
(Women’s rebel: birth control problem in light of spiritual and material aspects),” Kaihō, no. 1 (1921); 
“Sanji seigen mondai (The problem of birth control),” Onna no Sekai, no. 1 (1921); “Sanji chōsetsu ron 
to shakai shugi, (The discussion of birth control and socialism)” Shakai Shugi Kenkyū (The Study of 
socialism), no. 6 (1921). All the articles above mentioned were reprinted in the complete works of 
Yamakawa’s critiques with the title of Josei no hangyaku (Women’s rebel), ed. Suzuki Yūko, vol. 2 of 
Yamakawa Kikue shū (The complete works of Yamakawa Kikue) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2011).    
162 The motherhood protection debate (bosei hogo ronsō) between 1918 and 1919 exemplifies 
Yamakawa’s materialist view on women’s question. Sparked by Yosano Akiko’s critique of women’s 
dependency on men and the government in the magazine Fujin Kōron (Women’s Review), four female 
critiques including Yamakawa, Yosano, Hiratsuka Raichō, and Yamada Waka had a heated discussion 
on the issue of motherhood protection from each different viewpoint. Two prominent Japanese 
feminists in the Taishō period, Yosano and Hiratsuka were in opposition to each other. While Yosano 
argued for women’s economic independence in pursuit of the equal rights for both sexes, Hiratsuka 
refuted Yosano’s argument in advocacy for motherhood as women’s inborn vocation. Meanwhile, there 
was another opposite pole of the debate between Yamakawa and Yamada. Yamada, a conservative 
feminist with a family-oriented perspective, strongly supported the idea of motherhood protection 
whilst Yamakawa critically equated Yamada’s family-oriented feminism with the neo-ideology of 
“good wife and wise mother (ryōsai kenbo).” The debate continued for over a year, during which these 
main debaters exchanged criticism and theoretically articulated the women’s issues within complex 
social institutions including individual political rights, family system, and the nation-state. The primary 
sources on the debate of the protection of motherhood are accessible in the collection Shiryō Bosei 
Hogo Ronsō (Documents on the motherhood protection debate), compiled by Kōuchi Nobuko (Tokyo: 
Domesu Shuppan, 1984). Also, on the conflicting arguments of the debate, see Vera C. Mackie, 
Feminism In Modern Japan: Citizenship, Embodiment, and Sexuality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 55-58.  
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inconsistent was only the fact that Yamakawa came to embrace new vocabulary as 
well as technology in solving the problems of sex and class, that is, contraception.   
 Yamakawa’s attempt to theorize birth control began with her reconsideration 
of motherhood in relation to Sanger’s idea of “voluntary motherhood.” By quoting 
Sanger in her book Women and the New Race, Yamakawa introduced ninniteki bosei, 
a Japanese translation of voluntary motherhood, in order to highlight an individual 
mother’s self-conscious choice to give birth.  
 
Millions of women are asserting their right to voluntary motherhood. 
They are determined to decide for themselves whether they shall 
become mothers, under what conditions and when. This is the 
fundamental revolt referred to. It is for woman the key to the temple of 
liberty.163  
 
 It was apparent that the concept of voluntary motherhood entailed a feminist 
voice for individual autonomy, particularly women’s autonomy over their own bodies 
and reproduction. Agreeing with Sanger’s perspective on women’s reproductive 
agency as a way of revolt, Yamakawa embraced the concept of voluntary motherhood 
in order to assert women’s freedom of reproductive choice.  
However, there were gaps in their understanding sociohistorical conditions 
which justified the need for voluntary motherhood. As stated in the previous section, 
Sanger embraced eugenics in order to justify the biological benefits of women’s 
autonomous choice over the body. For Sanger whose ideological basis on neo-
Malthusianism and eugenics became conspicuous by the beginning of 1920s, 
                                                
163 Sanger, Woman and the New Race, 5; Yamakawa translated the most parts of the first chapter 
“Woman’s Error and Her Debt” including the quote above into Japanese in her article “Tasan shugi no 
noroi,” reprinted in Josei no hangyaku, 198-205.     
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voluntary motherhood was the “new morality” which would “set its face against the 
conversion of women into mechanical maternity and toward the creation of a new 
race.”164 The concept of voluntary motherhood implied the causal link between 
mother’s freedom and their potential to improve racial quality. In other words, it was 
not genderless, individual freedom, but feminine, racialized freedom that Sanger 
pursued through the birth control movement.   
Meanwhile, Yamakawa reassigned the concept of voluntary motherhood to a 
means of revolt against enforced sexual morality, the inhumane exploitation, and 
oppression under the capitalist system.165 Her defiance against patriarchy and 
capitalism was rather a reaction to reality, in particular, the subjugated status of 
women and the proletarian class within the contemporary social relations, than a 
promise for the eugenic, utopian future of humanity as Sanger did. Although 
Yamakawa also envisioned an ideal society in which all human free will would be 
respected, she paid more attention to voluntary motherhood as a means of revolt than 
the ultimate goal. From her viewpoint, birth control was related to the project of 
transforming women’s bodies into a political subjectivity. Therefore, it was crucial for 
her to resist against the reduction of women’s sexuality and reproduction merely to an 
expression of womanhood or to an instrument for race betterment. With the notion of 
voluntary motherhood, Yamakawa reframed women’s bodies into the political subject, 
and further reframed political struggles into sexual, corporeal forms.     
                                                
164 For the transition of Sanger’s thoughts from radical socialism to Neo-Malthusian, middle-class 
based reformism due to the state repression, personal struggle from poor health and financial issues, see 
Joan M. Jensen, “The Evolution of Margaret Sanger's "Family Limitation" Pamphlet, 1914-1921,” Signs 
6, no. 3, spring (1981): 548-567; Patricia Walsh Coates, Margaret Sanger and the Origin of the Birth 
Control Movement, 1910-1930: The Concept of Women's Sexual Autonomy. (Lewiston N.Y.: Edwin 
Mellen Press, 2008), 181-212. 
165 Yamakawa, “Sanji chōsetsu ron to shakai shugi,” 282-286. 
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Yamakawa’s theorization of birth control as the means of revolt was in fact 
associated with her sharp criticism on two major solutions to the “population problem”: 
Neo-Malthusianism and socialism. Regardless of the different definitions of the 
“population problem” and the conflicting solutions, the two theories ran in parallel in 
terms of the representation of reproduction with the presumed formula of economic 
equilibrium between population and resources. Whereas Neo-Malthusianists 
considered the equilibrium to be acquired by reducing population growth, socialists 
supported either the equal distribution of wealth or an increase in wealth. A discussion 
of reproduction as the bodily experience of women and as an object of patriarchal 
exploitation was absent in both kinds of economic determinism. Yamakawa positioned 
herself as the double critic of Neo-Malthusianism and socialism. Her role was to 
remind both groups of the fact that birth control had to be a permanent goal even after 
overpopulation or poverty was resolved. In her view, women’s autonomous decision 
to give birth or not was a necessary part of the proletarian revolution.  
Firstly, Yamakawa basically agreed with the Marxist denunciation of the 
Malthusian theory of overpopulation. Many contemporary Neo-Malthusianists or 
social reformists endeavored to solve the overpopulation problem through controlling 
birth on the presumption that various social problems, particularly poverty, were 
caused by rapid population growth which outstripped the limited resources. 
Yamakawa’s criticism centered on this mechanistic presumption by pointing out that 
“[n]owadays, it is the unfair distribution of products rather than low productivity 
relative to population growth that prevents the reduction of poverty encountered in 
some societies.” It was, hence, natural for Yamakawa to conclude that the fundamental 
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solution to social problems should be focused on “the change in the system of 
production and distribution instead of that in overpopulation.”166   
 Yamakawa’s critique of the Neo-Malthusian causal link between 
overpopulation and social problems was mainly supported by two reasons: Namely, 
the socialist optimism of technology and human progress, and Marx’s understanding 
of overpopulation as the necessary condition for exploitation. First, Yamakawa 
borrowed the arguments of European socialist giants including Karl Marx, Peter 
Kropotkin, and August Bebel who offered the bright pictures of human progress based 
on technological development and growing food resources.167 Drawing on Bebel’s 
accounts of production and reproduction under capitalism, Yamakawa argued the idea 
that the theory of a surplus population could outstrip food resources was mistaken 
because of a superabundance of yet untapped resources. 
 
If all these tasks of civilization were to be undertaken at the same time, 
we would not have too many people, but too few. Humanity must still 
multiply considerably to do justice to all the tasks that are awaiting it. 
The soil is far from being cultivated as it might be, and almost three-
quarters of the surface of the earth are still uncultivated, because 
there are not enough people to undertake its cultivation. The 
relative excess of population that today is continually produced by the 
capitalistic system to the detriment of the working class and of society 
will prove a blessing on a higher level of civilization (highlighted by 
Bebel).168   
                                                
166 Yamakawa, “Tasan shugi no noroi,” 201.    
167 Yamakawa, “Sanji chōsetsu ron to shakai shugi.” 271-282. This chapter is particularly devoted to 
quoting European socialists’ thoughts on the population problem including Marx’s Capital I, 
Kropotkin’s Fields, Factories and Workshops: or Industry Combined with Agriculture and Brain Work 
with Manual Work, and Bebel’s Women under Socialism. It should be noted that Yamakawa’s brief 
reference on Marx’s critique of Malthus might be misleading because the main point Marx made in his 
analysis of overpopulation was not the optimism of human evolution, but the nature of relative surplus 
population as the necessary condition for the capitalist mode of production. For Marx’s critique of 
relative surplus population, see Marx, Capital, 781-870. 
168 August Bebel, Woman Under Socialism (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), 494. Also, quoted in 
Yamakwa “Sanji chōsetsu ron to shakai shugi,” 281-282.  
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According to Bebel’s logic, the growth of a surplus population was inevitable 
for the higher level of human progress regardless of its detrimental effect on 
proletarian people. However, Yamakawa attempted to stress the point that a “relative 
excess of population” that was being “produced by the capitalistic system.” The 
“relative excess of population” here referred to the excess of laboring population in 
relation to capitalist production, in contrast with the notion of absolute surplus 
population relative to limited resources in Malthusianism. Yamakawa pointed out that 
“the relative surplus population is the nature of a capitalist society, and therefore, is 
generated and increased by capitalism and at the same time becomes a necessary 
condition for the existence of capitalism.”169 Her critique of the surplus laboring 
population both as the product and the condition for capitalist accumulation was 
closely linked to what Marx called “the despotism of capitals” in his analysis of the 
capitalist mode of production and its creation of the industrial reserve army.170 Insofar 
as the capitalist mode of production necessitated the surplus laboring population for 
the expansion of capital, the exploitation of laborers would continue independently of 
the size of population.  
In view of this, the notion of the relative surplus population was a direct 
refutation of both the Malthusian theory of overpopulation and the Neo-Malthusian 
                                                
169 Yamakwa “Sanji chōsetsu ron to shakai shugi,” 282. 
170 Marx, Capital, 793. With the notion of the despotism of capitals, Marx highlights the relative 
surplus population that forms a disposable industrial army under the capitalist mode of production. 
According to him, the surplus laboring population is independent of absolute surplus population, but is 
affected by the expansion of capital that continuously sets free exploitable population. The industrial 
reserve army is not the fixed category of unemployed population, but bears a precarious contingency 
precisely because this despotic work of capitalism which constantly shifts the boundaries of 
employment, half-employment, and unemployment for the self-expansion of capital. 
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solution for social ills. From Yamakawa’s view, the overpopulation problem posed by 
the Neo-Malthusian groups was merely a displacement of the nature of capitalist 
exploitation into the so-called “natural law” of absolute overpopulation. Interestingly, 
Sanger whose slogans for birth control and voluntary motherhood influenced on 
Yamakawa’s sympathy of birth control was one of the leading Neo-Malthusianists of 
her day. Sanger asserted that the misery of the proletariat originated in their sexuality 
and furthermore, their sexuality served capitalism as its accomplice.171 Whereas 
Sanger problematized overpopulation as an immediate reality the working class 
mothers themselves created, Yamakawa grasped the ideological tactics of the 
population problem, which inverted the causation of poverty.       
 Yamakawa reframed birth control as a means of protest against the capitalist 
system. She advocated birth control, specifically for the proletarian class as a weapon 
against exploitation and oppression, and for proletarian women as a way of fighting 
the instrumentalization of women as breeding machines. Birth control as a method of 
protesting, namely a “birth strike” clearly reveals that Yamakawa placed reproduction 
as central to capitalist exploitation, and thus, a powerful instrument for undermining 
                                                
171 Sanger, The Pivot of Civilization, 146-9. In Chapter 7 titled “is Revolution the Remedy?” 
specifically focuses on Sanger’s criticism of Marxian Socialism over the origin of poverty under 
capitalism. In opposition to the Marxian interpretation of surplus population as the structural cause of 
poverty under capitalism, Sanger asserted that the poverty of the proletarian class was caused by 
themselves, that is, their uncontrolled sexuality. Her argument regarding the sexuality of the proletariat 
as the accomplice to capitalism was based on a French neo-Malthusianist Gabriel Giroud (or G. Hardy, 
the pseudonym of Giroud). Giroud was one of the first generation of sex radicals in France and acted as 
the French representative of the International Birth Control conferences during the interwar period. In 
arguing against the anti-birth control French socialists, Giroud advocated for the workers’ practice of 
birth control as the means of socialist movement. As for Gabriel Giroud and the French birth control 
movement since the beginning of the twentieth century, see Angus McLaren, Sexuality and Social 
Order: The Debate Over the Fertility of Women and Workers in France, 1770-1920 (New York: 
Holmes & Meier, 1983), 110-121.     
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the capitalist system.172      
 Yamakawa’s idea of using birth control as a “birth strike” was, however, 
controversial among many Japanese socialists of the time. As she disagreed with the 
perspective of Neo-Malthusianists, Yamakawa was also a heretic to the contemporary 
socialists regardless of whether they supported birth control or not.173 The conflict 
between the contemporary Japanese socialists and Yamakawa fundamentally focused 
on the recognition of women as individual subjects and as the proletarian class. For 
Yamakawa, women’s bodies and reproduction had to lie simultaneously inside and 
outside the domain of the class struggle because women were not only workers who 
pursued social equality and liberty, but also individuals who had the rights and 
freedom of choice. Reproduction could not be an exception and thus had to be 
respected as the realm of individual rights. Meanwhile, most socialists subsumed 
women’s reproductive rights into political goals of the proletarian class. In this case, 
not only was the individual subjectivity of women denied, but also their reproductive 
                                                
172 Yamakawa noted “birth strike (shussan sutoraiki)” as a protest against the inhumane exploitation 
and oppression of capitalism. Yamakawa “Sanji chōsetsu ron to shakai shugi,” 283. The notion of birth 
strike first appeared in a Swiss anarchist, Fritz Brupbacher’s brochure titled “Blessed with children: and 
no end to it?” (München G. Birk & Co, 1904) in Germany in the early 1900s, and drew public attention 
in 1913 when two German social democrats, Alfred Bernstein and Julius Moses debated over the birth 
strike in and for the socialist movement. As for the origin and social debate of the birth strike in the 
European discourse, see Robert Jütte, Contraception: a history, Vicky Russell trans. (Cambridge: Polity, 
2008), 167-171. 
173 One of the exceptional figures was Sakai Toshihiko (1871-1933), an early socialist pioneer in Japan 
and a critique of gender role. Being sympathetic to August Bebel, Edward Carpenter, and Friedrich 
Engels who saw the gender division of labor within the socio-economic structure, Sakai advocated for 
the reproductive self-determination of women while criticizing both neo-Malthusianism and 
pronatalism in terms of their serving for bourgeois class. For Sakai’s representative argument for the 
women’s rights to abortion, see Sakai Toshihiko, “Umu jiyū to uma nu jiyū (The Freedom of giving 
birth and not giving birth),” reprinted in Shiryō sei to ai o meguru ronsō (Documents: Debates on Sex 
and Love), ed. Orii Miyako (Tokyo: Domesu Shuppan, 1991), 185-188. Originally published in Sekaijin 
(Cosmopolitan) 2 (1916). In addition, for the socialist debate of sexuality in Japan, see Ishikawa Shoji, 
“Shakai shugisha ni okeru 'sei' to seiji: nihon no 1920-30 nendai o chūshin toshite (The Gender Role of 
Women in the Japanese Socialist Movement during the 1920s and 30s),” Nenpō seiji gaku (The Annuals 
of Japanese Political Science Association) 54 (2003): 161-77.     
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bodies remained undefined until they were thoroughly subsumed under the 
proletarian’s body. The locus of reproduction was neither individuals nor class, but 
sex, as were women. Yamakawa must have been aware of this disavowal of women’s 
individual freedom for the ultimate goal of socialism, given her sharp question “what 
will happen if society provides welfare for people in the future so that birth control is 
no longer needed for economic reasons?”174 Defining women’s place at the 
intersection between individual rights and class interests was deeply problematic in the 
socialist debate of birth control.  
  Conflicting definitions of women and reproduction can be found in the debate 
between Yamakawa and Ishikawa Sanshirō, who was originally a Christian socialist 
turned anarchist during his exile in Europe between 1913 and 1920.175 The debate was 
focused on the rights and wrongs of contraception, which revealed their opposing 
views largely on two issues: firstly, whether birth control served bourgeois ideology or 
women, particularly proletarian women; secondly, whether birth control would be 
needed once poverty was solved by the proletarian revolution. 
In regards to the first question, Ishikawa saw contraception as merely “the 
pleasure (dōraku) of bourgeois intellectuals” or a “tricky philosophy born out of 
                                                
174 Yamakawa, “Tasan shugi no noroi.” 202.    
175 The debate on the rights and wrongs of contraception occurred between Yamakawa and Ishikawa, 
sparked by Ishikawa’s essay titled “Shakai shugi sha kara mi ta fujin kyūsai: ippuippu seido wa shizen 
de jiyū de junketsu de aru (A socialist view on the relief of women: monogamy as nature, freedom, and 
purity)” (Onna no sekai (women’s world), February 1921). Yamakawa responded to this essay by 
writing “Ishikawa Sanshirō to hinin ron (Ishikawa Sanshirō and the discussion on contraception)” 
(Onna no sekai, March 1921). After then, they exchanged criticism again by writing essays in the same 
journal, which include Ishikawa, “Hinin ron ni tsuite: Yamakawa kikue joshi ni mōsu (On the 
discussion of contrapception: a message to madam Yamakawa)” (Onna no sekai, April 1921) and 
Yamakawa, “Hinin zehi nitsuite futatabi ishikawa sanshirō ni atau (A follow-up message to Mr. 
Ishikawa on the pros and cons of contraception)” (Onna no sekai, June 1921).  
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modern decadence.”176 This objection resonated with his antipathy towards all social 
and relief works whose humanitarianism invariably buttressed capitalist and 
commercialist interests. Yamakawa, on the contrary, criticized Ishikawa’s own 
bourgeois mentality in equating contraception merely with “the pleasure” whilst 
overlooking women’s burden. From her view, “women, particularly proletarian 
women who are working mothers” bore the burdens of childbirth, parenting, and 
education which ought not to be ridiculed by an androcentric indifference to women’s 
labor.177    
Given her blurry characterization of women and proletarian women connected 
by an adverb “particularly,” it should be noted that Yamakawa’s stance on women 
appears to be ambivalent. The ambivalence lies between sex and class. Her critique of 
women’s domestic labor suggests her view that women’s exploitation was mainly 
defined by their sex, and class could only intensify or mitigate women’s sexualized 
labor. It can be said that Yamakawa was keenly aware of how sex and class 
overdetermined women’s experience, and thus how difficult “particularly” the 
proletarian women’s experiences were. Her understanding of the intersection of sex 
and class contrasts with Ishikawa who overlooked the question of sex altogether. From 
Yamakawa’s view, Ishikawa was ultimately complicit in the subjection of women 
because androcentrism common to both bourgeois intellectuals and socialist activists 
excluded sex from socioeconomic domains. The bourgeois and socialist circles were 
ultimately complicit in sexualizing domestic work and thereby domesticizing women. 
The second crucial issue of contraception revealed the contradictory views 
                                                
176 Ishikawa, “Shakai shugi sha kara mi ta fujin kyūsai,” 34. 
177 Yamakawa, “Ishikawa Sanshirō to hininron,” 244. 
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between Yamakawa and Ishikawa on the place of women between nature and society. 
In opposition to Ishikawa’s vision of a socialist state in which the economic burden of 
childbirth and child rearing would just simply disappear, Yamakawa asserted that 
women’s rights to reproductive choice, namely voluntary motherhood, had to be 
protected even in a socialist state. Thus, Yamakawa answers her previous question 
“what will happen if the society provides welfare for people in the future so that birth 
control is no longer needed for economic reasons?” with the following explanation. 
 
In short, [in an ideal society], people should be able to choose whether 
to give birth or not at their free will, just like they do when deciding 
marriage. There would be no fundamental difference from the present 
society if the ideal society denies human free will. I have no doubt that 
the difficulties in getting married for economic reasons would be 
solved in the future. However, that cannot be directly linked to the 
conclusion that women will no longer need reproductive choice. In the 
same manner, the uselessness of contraception for economic reasons 
should be distinguished from the issue of birth control as women’s 
rights to decide on motherhood.178   
 
Thus, Yamakawa put emphasis on voluntary motherhood by representing 
women’s reproduction within the domain of individual rights. Her insistence on 
reproduction as an individual right suggests that Yamakawa’s understanding of sex 
was already politicized in the language of individual will. On the contrary, Ishikawa 
and many contemporary socialists, who argued against contraception, left reproduction 
in the realm of nature, that is to say, the depoliticized sexuality of women. From their 
economic-centered view, motherhood which was assumed to be in the realm of nature 
would improve in a socialist state founded on economic equality and technological 
advance. Thus, the question of the proper place of women’s bodies either nature or 
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culture—in the realm of depoliticized sexuality or the domain of politics—was crucial 
in the socialist debate on the rights and wrongs of contraception. While anti-birth 
control socialists depoliticized reproduction by naturalizing it as a women’s sexual 
function, Yamakawa strove to politicize reproduction by placing it into the language 
of modern political rights. 
It was this new political terrain of reproduction upon which Yamakawa agreed 
with Sanger’s birth control movement. Neither Sanger nor Yamakawa had authority to 
define the notion of voluntary motherhood. Rather, their arguments for voluntary 
motherhood were structured by different tactics and by specific social contexts. In 
addition, such acts of asserting the right to voluntary motherhood simultaneously 
created the different meanings of voluntary motherhood. For Sanger, it was 
overpopulation that had to be addressed while women’s reproductive choice was a 
solution to the problematized population, and more significantly, a new political niche 
for women. On the other hand, Yamakawa tackled intersectionality between sex and 
class. For Yamakawa, women’s reproductive choice was the means of protest against 
the depoliticized realm of reproduction in the socialist movement. Ironically, the 
different definitions of voluntary motherhood were analogous to each other in terms of 
the politicization of motherhood. For both, reproduction had been in the politics of sex 
where motherhood had been represented as the terrain of nature by androcentrism. By 
the same reasoning, reproduction had to be in a different politics of sex where women 
could exercise their individual rights instead of obeying the laws of mothers’ nature.        
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Birth Control for Japanese Mothers: Ishimoto Shizue’s Eugenic Feminism179 
 Ishimoto Shizue was another vociferous feminist in support of birth control 
since the beginning of 1920s. Like Yamakawa, she made an effort to justify the 
socioeconomic necessity and the morality of birth control practice as a leading 
ideologue during the 1920s. In the early 1930s, her involvement with the birth control 
movement as an ideologue shifted to include more directly encouraging birth control 
practices while she operated a birth control clinic in Tokyo. While the form of her 
birth control advocacy work changed over time, the underlying idea of her vocal 
support for birth control remained consistent. Her thought was anchored in Neo-
Malthusianism, eugenics, and feminism.  
In many cases, Ishimoto’s logic for justifying birth control was similar to that 
of Sanger. As described previously, Sanger supported women’s free choice to 
reproduction by reframing women’s reproductive role as a scientific means to control 
the quality and quantity of population. Birth control and eugenics were the new tactics 
and language of feminism, by which the improvement of women’s political status 
joined forces with the improvement of race. This refashioned feminism, or “eugenic 
feminism”—a term I adopt to indicate the historical link between the feminist 
movements for gender equality and the eugenic idea of racial betterment—echoed in 
Ishimoto’s argument for birth control. Ishimoto also found new political potential for 
                                                
179 I borrowed the term Eugenic Feminism from Asha Nadkarni in her book Eugenic Feminism: 
Reproductive Nationalism in the United States and India (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2014). Nadkarni adopts “eugenic feminism” to illuminate the historical link between feminism, 
eugenics, and nation-state (nationalism) in the twentieth century India and the United States. Agreeing 
with Nadkarni’s definition of eugenic feminism that “a specific kind of maternal feminist investment in 
biological reproduction, biological reproduction as the means of progress and improvement, as the 
platform for women’s rights within the state,” I will adopt this term in explaining how Ishimoto’s 
advocacy for birth control was closely linked to her political pursuit of women’s empowerment, the 
goal of eugenics, and nationalism. Nadkarni, Eugenic Feminism, 7.     
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women’s reproductive roles by imaging birth control as a scientific solution for 
overpopulation and racial degeneration. In view of this, it is not exaggerated to liken 
Ishimoto to “the Margaret Sanger of Japan.”180  
 In August 1921, Ishimoto published a pamphlet titled “Shin-marusasu shugi 
(Neo-Malthusianism).”181 The concept of Shin-marusasu shugi and the thrust of its 
argument for contraception were already being discussed among Japanese intellectuals 
at that time.182 Debates over the pros and cons of controlling fertility revealed a vague 
and confusing distinction between Neo-Malthusianism (Shin-marusasu shugi), birth 
control (sanji seigen or basu kontororu), and contraception (hinin). The ambiguity of 
terminology itself was a symptom of the numerous issues surrounding birth control. 
Ishimoto was one of the pro-birth control participants in this struggle for the 
justification of birth control. Her pamphlet Shin-marusasu shugi can be read as her 
initial effort to justify birth control in relation to specific social problems.            
                                                
180 Both historically and academically, Ishimoto has been likened to Sanger, given their personal 
relationship, and Sanger’s influence on Ishimoto’s birth control movement in prewar times and her 
family planning project in postwar years. It also cannot be overlooked that both were eulogized as the 
pioneering figures of the birth control movement in each country in terms of humanitarian and 
progressive movements. However, simple comparison between two figures based on their personal 
relationship or humanitarian feminism can be problematic because it may overlook the complexity of 
the discourses of reproduction in a particular social context while idolizing two figures on the ground of 
their contribution to women’s liberation. As for the existing studies focusing on Ishimoto’s leading role 
in the birth control movement in Japan, see Elise K. Tipton, “Birth Control and the Population Problem,” 
in Society and the State in Interwar Japan, ed. Elise K. Tipton (New York: Routledge, 1997), 42-62; 
“Ishimoto Shizue: The Margaret Sanger of Japan,” Women's History Review 6, no. 3 (1997): 337-55; 
Aiko Takeuchi-Demirci, “Birth Control and Socialism: The Frustration of Margaret Sanger and 
Ishimoto Shizue's Mission,” The Journal of American-East Asian relations 17 no. 3 (2010): 257-80.   
181 Ishimoto Shizue, Shin-marusasu shugi, Nihon Pamphlet Hakkosho, August 1921. 
182 The main platform for the public discussion of the pros and cons of birth control was a popular or 
general interest magazine. For example, the August 1920 issue of fujin kōron, one of the representative 
women’s magazine during the Taishō period, ran an article titled “Waga kuni no genjō ni terashite mita 
hinin kahiron (The pros and cons over contraception in view of the current situation in our nation)” that 
contained diverse opinions on the necessity of contraception in Japan in comparison to the 
contemporary Western countries. Meanwhile, the October 1920 issue of Kaizo, the magazine mainly 
focused on the progressive ideas of the time, published an article with a title of “Shin-marusasu kenkyū 
(The study of Neo-Malthusianism)” containing the socialist critiques of Neo-Malthusianism.   
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Sanji seigen or birth control in English can be paraphrased as 
“voluntarily having a child” in the original sense. In other words, it 
means that giving birth to a child when one wants to. Recently, people 
in America are using a term voluntary parenthood [or motherhood] or 
jishuteki bosei to refer to giving birth to a child when one wants to be 
parents. However, insofar as we live in the era of capitalism under 
which parents’ duty of childrearing is a social convention, “voluntarily 
having a child” necessarily pursues the goal of sanji seigen. Therefore, 
it is inevitably appropriate to translate birth control as sanji seigen.183   
 
 As seen above, Ishimoto introduced two terms for controlling fertility: 
voluntary motherhood and birth control. According to Ishimoto, voluntary 
motherhood, translated to jishuteki bosei or in a more literal sense autonomous 
motherhood, referred to a women’s free choice to have a child. “Birth control,” or 
sanji seigen was used when emphasizing the socioeconomic reasons for contraception. 
Thus, the two terms were distinguished from each other when the specific purpose of 
contraception was explicitly expressed. In other words, the term voluntary motherhood 
was employed to empower mothers to reproduce at their will. The term “birth control” 
was often used when addressing the malaise of capitalism by controlling reproduction.  
 Despite this distinction between the two terms, voluntary motherhood and birth 
control were not necessarily mutually exclusive, but rather exemplified the 
multilayered advantages of contraception from Ishimoto’s viewpoint. In fact, the 
                                                
183 Ishimoto, Shin-marusasu shugi, 1. It is unclear that Ishimoto meant to use voluntary parenthood in 
this paragraph, given that she translated it into “jishuteki bosei,” or autonomous motherhood in literal 
translation. Voluntary parenthood is possibly a misprint for “voluntary motherhood,” given the Japanese 
translation and also the historical context of the American birth control movement. As for the latter, 
Sanger advocated for voluntary motherhood while there was another group named the “Voluntary 
Parenthood League” led by a Feminist activist Mary Ware Dennett. In early 1920s, Sanger and Dennett 
were rivalries due to their advocacy of different strategies for the birth control movement. Considering 
Ishimoto’s sympathy for Sanger, “voluntary motherhood” appears to be correct in this paragraph. As for 
the relationship between Sanger and Dennett, see Coates, Margaret Sanger and the Origin of the Birth 
Control Movement, 188-189.     
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unsettled terminology opened up space for a potentially productive public debate of 
contraception. As a pioneering participant in that discussion, Ishimoto stressed the 
urgent need for the birth control practice in the light of the population problem on one 
hand, and the liberation of women on the other.  
 Ishimoto raised population issues in the context of the Neo-Malthusian 
concerns. For Ishimoto, Neo-Malthusianism pinpointed the “problem” of excess 
population and predicted Japan’s population crisis in the near future. The breakout of 
the First World War was interpreted as being a disastrous result of an immoderate 
increase in population in European countries. This “population problem” in terms of 
its excessive quantities was closely associated with the quality of population and life. 
In view of cultural life (bunka seikatsu) as a desirable form of modern life, Ishimoto 
pointed out that the quality of life, encompassing physical health, the advanced mode 
of living, the levels of income and consumption, among the European population 
decreased as the rates of human reproduction increased.184  
 Meanwhile, Ishimoto interpreted Japan’s population crisis through European 
situation. She reasoned that the imbalance between population growth and food 
resources in Japan was worse than that in European countries; Japan’s mountainous 
territory which made agriculture difficult and high population density. Ishimoto 
presented Japan’s population problem as a fait accompli, and hence, a solution had to 
be found to reduce the population size. In other words, “the population problem” was 
the discursive concept which simultaneously created the problem of overpopulation 
and its desirable solution, rather than it merely analyzed the actual cause of social 
                                                
184 Ishimoto, Shin-marusasu shugi, 2-6. 
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problems. The causal link between uncontrolled fertility and a wide range of social 
problems formed a discursive structure of problem, in which Ishimoto linked 
overpopulation with social poverty and living difficulties. Insofar as the uncontrolled 
fertility of Japanese people was the root cause of such socioeconomic problems, birth 
control was already a determined solution. 
 Women’s liberation was another crucial factor in Ishimoto’s advocacy for birth 
control. In the pamphlet “Shin-marusasu shugi,” Ishimoto claimed that Japanese 
women’s social status was relatively low because they lacked “time” and “money” to 
develop and liberate themselves. This dearth of time and money was a result of 
women’s frequent pregnancies, and the physical and economic burdens of childrearing 
and domestic labor.185 Ishimoto pointed out that uncontrolled fertility was not only 
the reason for women’s mental and physical exhaustion, but also had a detrimental 
effect on the health of Japanese children. The link between birth control and children’s 
health points to Ishimoto’s embrace of eugenics. In her use of eugenics as the expected 
effect of birth control, the question of whether genetic or environmental factors was 
more determinant in human reproduction was less important than the goal of eugenics 
itself. In other words, eugenics was synonymous with its goal, that is, the reproduction 
of mentally and physically healthy offspring. Healthy, enlightened mothers who 
practiced birth control were seen as embodying this goal of eugenics.  
 One can notice a sudden substitution of the goal of women’s liberation to the 
goal of eugenic reproduction. How did the former guarantee the latter, or conversely in 
what sense did the latter necessitate the former? What is the implication of the gap 
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between women and mothers in this transposition? As already seen, Sanger also 
advocated for women’s reproductive choice in pursuit of the goal of eugenics. For her, 
birth control was not only a means of liberating women from their roles as breeding 
machines, but also a way of enhancing their political status as the key agent who could 
solve the “population problem.” Likewise, Ishimoto shed new light on the link 
between women’s empowerment and the ultimate resolution of the population 
problem. In the light of this eugenic feminism, Ishimoto concluded that “the only 
solution for the population problem in Japan is birth control … [it is] primarily a 
women’s issue. It is not strange at all that the population problem that has troubled 
great male politicians so far can be resolved by women.”186 The goal of women’s 
liberation was not synonymous with women’s civil freedom, but rather the 
rearrangement of gender norms through an altered meaning of reproduction. For 
Ishimoto, reproducing children itself was no longer the desirable norm for women. 
Instead, reproducing healthy children was women’s new norm. 
 There was a paradox in the link between feminism and eugenics: the focus on 
women as mothers. In other words, women’s liberation from their duty of 
“involuntary” motherhood still depended on women’s reproductive role. The 
differences were that desirable mothers could control their fertility, and that mothers 
were political subjects only to the extent that their reproductive role influenced the 
total national population. Initially, Ishimoto championed women’s liberation as one of 
the chief principles of birth control while, at the same time, arguing that “voluntary 
motherhood” would strengthen motherhood. Her article titled “Women’s liberation 
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and birth control” published in the first issue of Small Family exemplifies this 
ambivalence of women’s liberation.  
 
The birth control movement is a prerequisite for the issue of women’s 
liberation. We women have been ruled by slavish morality and have 
resigned themselves to the forced duty of motherhood. However, times 
have changed. The motherhood in the true sense becomes possible only 
when a married woman who is physically, mentally, and financially 
qualified to be a mother gives birth to a beloved baby at her own will. 
In light of this, birth control can be interpreted as voluntary 
motherhood.187    
 
 For Ishimoto, voluntary motherhood was an ideal form of motherhood as well 
as a condition for the liberation of women. In other words, women’s freedom was 
mediated by their motherhood, particularly eugenic-minded mothers. According to this 
logic, women were not only reduced to mothers, or at least potential mothers with 
reproductive functions. They were also granted new morality, that is, the science of 
birth control and eugenics in place of conventional sexual morality. The significance 
of motherhood in terms of eugenics was highlighted in the concept of voluntary 
motherhood.  
Although this term itself was borrowed from Sanger, there was a difference in 
direction between the two definitions of voluntary motherhood. For Ishimoto, it was 
motherhood that conditioned women’s reproductive choice whereas Sanger noted that 
women’s autonomy outweighed motherhood. Sanger’s claim that “[v]oluntary 
motherhood…, [that] morality will, first of all, prevent the submergence of 
womanhood into motherhood” clearly shows Sanger’s privileging of the self-
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awareness of women.188 Meanwhile, the differences between Ishimoto and 
Yamakawa in reconfiguring voluntary motherhood was obvious. While Ishimoto 
attempted to endow women with political agency through their reproductive roles, 
Yamakawa considered women’s reproductive choices as an expression of their innate 
political subjectivity. The differences between the multiple definition of “motherhood” 
depended upon the vision for political subjectivity each individual birth control 
advocate pursued.  
In fact, the issues of motherhood and womanhood were not new in feminist 
discussion in Japan. The motherhood protection debate (bosei hogo ronsō) between 
1918 and 1919 was a watershed for early feminism, which was largely divided into 
two strains: feminists who argued for the rights of mother (boken) on one hand, and 
those who advocated for the rights of woman (joken) on the other. Two pioneering 
feminists, Hiratsuka Raichō and Yosano Akiko opposed to each other in this earlier 
motherhood protection debate. Endorsing the Swedish feminist Ellen Key’s ultimate 
maternalism, Hiratsuka supported the rights of mothers whereas Yosano advocated for 
improving the rights of women by helping women gain economic independence based 
on Olive Schreiner’s claim.189  
                                                
188 Sanger, Woman and the New Race, 226. 
189 Hiratsuka and the members of Seitō enthusiastically introduced Ellen Key’s maternal feminism in 
Japan through translating and discussing her representative work Love and Marriage (New York and 
London: G.P. Putnam's sons, 1911) and the Century of the Child (New York and London: G.P. Putnam's 
sons, 1909) between 1913 and 1916. Hiratsuka particularly emphasized the importance of motherhood 
as the foundation of womanhood in pursuit of new gender ideology. On Hiratsuka’s favorable reception 
of Key’s thoughts, see Dina Lowy, “Love and Marriage: Ellen Key and Hiratsuka Raichō Explore 
Alternatives,” Women's Studies 33, no. 4 (2004): 361-380; Meanwhile, Olive Schreiner who was the 
South African author of Women and Labor (London: T.F. Unwin, 1911) and an advocate for women’s 
economic independence was another influential figure in early Japanese feminism. In the Japanese 
feminist discourses of the 1910s, Schreiner’s condemnation of the condition of women’s domesticity as 
sex-parasitism was often contrasted with Key’s emphasis on the protection of motherhood. For more on 
Yosano’s response to Schreiner’ feminist thoughts, see Laurel Rasplica Rodd, “Yosano Akiko and the 
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These two feminist voices sharply conflicted on issues of gender equality and 
gender differences. Working to improve the status of women and increase sex 
equality, Yosano argued for women’s economic independence through their 
participation in the paid labor force. For Yosano, domestic labor, including 
reproduction, nurturing, and various household chores, was nothing more than 
“parasitism (iraishugi),” and by the same reasoning, the governmental protection of 
domestic work would result in an intensification of women’s economic dependency 
and their servitude. In contrast, Yosano’s disavowal of the value of domestic work, 
Hiratsuka argued that the state should provide social assistance for the protection of 
motherhood. Influenced by Key’s view on the importance of motherhood, which she 
considered the natural vocation of women, Hiratsuka believed that the rights of 
mothers were central to women’s rights. The inevitable conflict between the rights of 
women and the rights of mothers reveals a fundamental discrepancy in acknowledging 
gender equality and difference. For Yosano, gender equality was the ultimate goal 
whereas for Hiratsuka, gender difference had to be protected as a means for ensuring 
equality.   
Years later, Ishimoto’s advocacy for motherhood would resemble Hiratsuka’s 
argument for protecting motherhood. Ishimoto also pursued equality between men and 
women by strengthening women’s distinctive reproductive roles. However, it was not 
precisely the mother’s rights that Ishimoto attempted to uphold. Rather, she 
emphasized mothers’ political and biological responsibility for national or racial 
progress. Moreover, reproduction was not simply women’s inborn nature; it was also 
                                                                                                                                       
Taisho Debate over the "New Woman",” in Recreating Japanese Women, 1600-1945, ed. Gail Lee 
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an important component in the political economy, i.e., Neo-Malthusianism as well as 
an important part of the science of eugenics. Thus, Ishimoto’s eugenic feminism was 
different from the feminist argument for mother’s rights in terms of the coupling of 
women’s bodies and population control. By reconfiguring this simultaneously 
biological and ideological coupling, she replaced the protection of motherhood with a 
new improvement of motherhood. Motherhood was not an end in itself, but a way of 
pursuing population control and race betterment.  
As her involvement in the birth control movement deepened, Ishimoto’s 
insistence upon the link between women’s reproductive role and population control 
became increasingly clear. Ishimoto newly defined birth control that “[b]irth control 
(sanji seigen) is a conscious control of population, far from race suicide or the 
advocacy for sinful abortions. What birth control aims is to breed the better humans 
based on individuals’ self-consciousness” in the pamphlet of Chōsetsukai.190 This 
statement illuminates the fact that Ishimoto’s eugenic feminism called for women’s 
self-conscious embrace of responsibility for the future human bodies such as 
population (jinkō), race (jinshu), and ultimately humankind (jinrui) instead of 
women’s liberation.  
Ishimoto does not address how the different human categories she 
mentioned—for example, population, race, and humankind—relate to one another in 
her eugenic feminism. Does the obscure demarcation between race and population, or 
the abstract organic relationship between population and humankind disclose a 
weakness of Ishimoto’s argument? Otherwise, what are the effects of her 
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representation of universal homogeneity in a specifically biological sense? Ishimoto’s 
silence on the relationship between population, race, and humankind allows an 
ideological vision of organic community in which individual bodies directly connect 
to racial bodies which in turn, become all humankind. Such ideology functions to 
produce political subjects among individuals, as Louis Althusser theorizes ideology as 
a “representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence.”191 Althusser’s notion of ideology can be paraphrased as “the 
representation of the imaginary organic relationship of individuals whose real 
conditions of lives are rearranged by the knowledge of life,” like the biological 
community Ishimoto envisioned.  
 Neo-Malthusianism and eugenics were the knowledge of life which 
transformed individuals into biological subjects. In particular, what these modern 
forms of knowledge specifically created was not precisely the sameness of bodies, but 
a series of dichotomous relations of living beings, such as the superior and the inferior, 
the fit and the unfit, and the we-race and other-races and so forth. The way Ishimoto 
problematized overpopulation, namely the “the sharp increase in the size of the 
unhealthy population” who would “burden the superior and healthy humankind and 
diminish national strength”192 clearly illustrates what Foucault terms “a biological-
                                                
191 Althusser suggests the twofold attribute of ideology with regard to its transformative relationship 
between imaginary and reality, by arguing that ideologies “do make allusion to reality, and that they 
need only be ‘interpreted’ to discover the reality of the world behind their imaginary representation of 
that world (ideology = illusion/ allusion).” Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses: Notes toward an Investigation,” in Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1972), 109-110. 
192 Ishimoto, Sanji seigen ron o sho hōmen yori kansatsu shi te, 2-8. 
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type relationship.”193 Put it simply, the decrease in the population of the unfit ensures 
the proliferation of the fit. On the basis of this biological logic, Ishimoto demanded 
selective birth control depending on the quality of bodies as a solution to the 
population problem. Individual bodies were never equal in terms of their qualities; 
bodies were differentiated between the superior and the inferior ones. Furthermore, 
women were subjected not only to the autonomous choice of giving birth or not giving 
birth, but also to the ethical categories of “being entitled to give birth” and “being 
banned from giving birth.” This combination of Neo-Malthusianism and eugenics 
functioned as an objective and preventive science by which reproductive rights and 
norms were rationalized.  
 In 1931, Ishimoto resumed her movement for birth control after a brief hiatus 
during the mid to late 1920s.194 In May 1932, she organized Nihon Sanji Chōsetsu 
Fujin Domei (the Women’s Birth Control League of Japan, hereafter Fujin Domei), 
the first women’s birth control advocacy group in Japan with a number of liberal 
feminists involved in the women’s suffrage movement, Kawasaki Natsu and Niizuma 
Itoko, the labor activist Akamatsu Tsuneko, a daughter of Yamamuro Gunpei and a 
Christian who worked for the salvation army Yamamuro Tamiko, and Yamamoto 
                                                
193 Foucault refers to the “biological-type relationship” as the fundamental mechanism of biopower, 
namely, a modern form of power ceaselessly addressing the biological continuum of life while creating 
the caesuras within it. The creation of caesuras is what Foucault calls “racism.” According to him, 
racism in modern biopower conditions a twofold technology in terms of making our species proliferate 
through eliminating other species. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 255.  
194 During this hiatus from birth control advocacy, Ishimoto was still involved in other social 
movements. She participated in the League for the Attainment of Women’s Political Rights (Fujin 
Sanseiken Kakutoku Kisei Dōmeikai), an organization for women’s suffrage movement founded in 1924, 
and renamed “Women’s Suffrage League (Fusen Kakutoku Dōmei)” about one year later. In the late 
1920s, however, she limited her social activities mainly because of marital discord. Her marriage with 
Baron Ishimoto virtually ended in 1936 when they attempted to divorce but failed because of their 
kazoku—the hereditary peerage in modern Japan—social status. Hopper, Katô Shidzue, 37-9. 
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Sugiko, a female medical doctor.195 The chief aim of this group was to educate 
women in the specific methods of contraception, provide medical guidance regarding 
birth control, and to manufacture and sell contraceptive devices.196 In Ishimoto’s birth 
control movement in the early 1930s, there was an obvious shift primarily form from 
textual and ideological activities to more practical and technological education 
campaign. The operation of birth control clinics in the Shinagawa district of Tokyo 
since 1934, and the manufacture and sales of contraceptive devices such as pessaries 
and jellies became the new channel by which Ishimoto promoted birth control, and 
further attempted to transform individual women into self-conscious subjects of 
population control.  
 This shift in the strategies of birth control movement, however, did not 
necessarily mean the absence of ideological justifications. Motherhood and biological 
relationships which had been emphasized in Ishimoto’s eugenic feminism took on a 
more specific form of “Japanese mothers.” One of the pamphlets published by Fujin 
Domei, titled “Sechigarai yononaka ni (In a world full of difficulties)” illustrates how 
motherhood and organic bodies were articulated as being the basis of the family and 
the nation-state.197 The family and the nation-state constituted the two poles of birth 
control practice in a sense that the former was the principal unit of reproduction 
                                                
195 In June 1931, one year before the foundation of the Women’s Birth Control League of Japan, 
Ishimoto participated in the Japan Birth Control League (Nihon Sanji Chōsetsu Renmei) as a president 
of the organization. The group was organized to bring activists involved in the birth control movement 
together across ideological lines, but ended up being short-lived mainly due to the conflicting interests 
between Ishimoto and Majima Kan, the chief director of the group. After the dissolution of the Nihon 
Sanji Chōsetsu Renmei, a number of female members including Ishimoto, Kawasaki, and Niizuma 
founded the Women’s Birth Control League of Japan. Ogino, Kazoku keikaku e no michi, 55-57.    
196 Ishimoto Shizue, Sanji chōsetsu no kokoroe (The knowledge of birth control) (September 1936), 
reprinted in Sei to seishoku no jinken mondai shiryō shūsei, vol. 7, 290-292. 
197 Nihon Sanji Chōsetsu Fujin Dōmei, Sechigarai yononaka ni (In a world full of difficulties) 
(February 1934), reprinted in Sei to seishoku no jinken mondai shiryō shūsei, vol. 7, 130. 
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whereas the latter demarcated the line within which a biological relationship could be 
considered effective. The slogan for women’s liberation was replaced with family-
oriented emphasis on the protection of mothers, particularly, the bodies of mothers 
(botai). What determined the importance of a mother’s physicality was her 
reproductive role, that is, giving birth only to the number of children one can afford, 
and reproducing and raising healthy children. Moreover, the bodies of mothers were 
represented as a basic biological unit which the health of the nation-state depended 
on.198 The following statement illuminates the convergence of nationalism with 
eugenic feminism, which paradoxically reduced women to breeding machines, which 
should be “healthy.” In the above-mentioned pamphlet, Fujin Domei declares: 
 
A child is a family treasure as well as a social treasure. Giving birth to 
a child is the vocation of a woman (josei). We, Japanese women, 
should give birth to strong children for the society, and to good children 
for the family.199         
 
 This declaration presented to “Japanese women” reveals the complex structure 
of women’s gender identity. Those who were identified as “Japanese women” 
belonged to a specific gender which was defined by their connections to family, 
                                                
198 In the mid 1930s, there was a feminist movement calling for the law for the protection of 
motherhood led by women’s suffrage movement groups. The first organization named the Alliance for 
the Promotion of a Mother and Child Protection Act (Bosei Hogo Hō Setei Sokushin Fujin Renmei) was 
founded in 1934, with the aims of institutionalizing the financial assistance to mothers with the burden 
of raising their children. In the next year, the group was renamed as “Motherhood Protection Alliance 
(Bosei Hogo Renmei)” and reorganized in concert with social work organizations. The groups’ appeal 
of the enactment of the Mother and Child Protection Act eventually was passed by the Japanese 
parliament in 1937, although the main goal of the law veered to the reproduction of strong human 
resources for the state-led war. Ishimoto was also a member of the Motherhood Protection Alliance, 
which reveals another example of the complicity between her eugenic feminism and nationalism. As for 
the prewar feminist movement for the motherhood protection law, see Mackie, Feminism In Modern 
Japan, 104-106; Imai Konomi, “The Study on the Process of Enacting Boshi-hogo hō: An Analysis of 
the Activism of the Maternal Protection Union,” Osaka University of Health and Sport Sciences 1 
(2004): 67-84.       
199 Nihon Sanji Chōsetsu Fujin Dōmei, Sechigarai yononaka ni, 130.  
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society, and the nation-state. Women’s physicality and reproduction, namely their sex, 
was central in determining “womanhood” as their gender identity. However, it should 
be noted that sex was hardly natural, but biopolitical in its discursive construction. The 
centrality of reproduction in female sexuality itself was the political-cum-scientific 
product for creating the eugenic chain of life which moved from healthy mothers to 
healthy offspring, and further onto a healthy nation. While Ishimoto previously 
maintained the ambiguity of universal bodily categories in her eugenic feminism, the 
representation of organic bodies became enclosed by a national border. In place of the 
ambiguous terrain between womanhood and motherhood, Ishimoto reconfigured 
women as mothers, or at least potential mothers, whose vocation was to have children, 
and morally to have healthy children. Thus, Ishimoto’s long pursuit for eugenic 
feminism remained consistent to her birth control movement, and also took a concrete 
form by drawing both the national border and a biological chain around mother’s 
bodies.   
 
Reproduction, Evolving Questions of Politics  
This chapter delved into the multifaceted meanings, objectives, and questions 
of motherhood in Japanese feminists’ advocacy for birth control during the interwar 
period. Feminists’ arguments for birth control practice mainly adopted the notion of 
voluntary motherhood to link the empowerment of women with women’s free choice 
to reproduction. Although the political representation of motherhood was commonly 
shared by pro-birth control feminists, there was also difference among feminist voices 
depended on different ideological views toward the politico-economic system. Hence, 
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the feminist debate on birth control was hardly limited to the women’s issues isolated 
from the social structure, but was embedded in the contemporary social context. 
Simultaneously, the context was reconfigured as a series of problems related to 
questions of women, reproduction, and population. 
Two prominent Japanese feminists discussed in this chapter, Yamakawa Kikue 
and Ishimoto Shizue illustrate this multiple, conflicting nature of the birth control 
debate. As Yamakawa’s socialist view exemplifies, the question of birth control 
created a discursive space which unsettled the relationship between production and 
reproduction under capitalism; it also upset the desired location of women between 
sex and class. In this space, Yamakawa’s advocacy for birth control was not only a 
magnifying lens that reflected the double shackle of women under the patriarchal 
capitalist system, but also a new channel for protesting against that oppressive system 
by means of a birth strike. Ishimoto’s argument illustrates the discursive coupling of 
feminism, eugenics, and nationalism. Ishimoto regarded birth control as a new 
political niche for the empowerment of women. Her argument was based on eugenic 
concerns with population quality and a nationalist vision of an organic biological 
community. Through this process, women were reduced to their reproductive roles and 
motherhood was redefined along two lines of national borders as well as placed in a 
biological hierarchy.       
 This chapter began with a question about implications of multilayered feminist 
voices for birth control within the contemporary social context. I have shown the irony 
embedded in the convergence of multiple voices into the goal of birth control. 
However, divergent and convergent feminist arguments reveal the political centrality 
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of reproduction. Reproduction lay at the center of politico-economic concerns. In 
particular, concerns about the reproduction of the labor force in a capitalist system, the 
population of the nation-state, and that of desired life in eugenics, were emphasized. 
These different goals of reproduction were not separate from each other. They were 
closely related in the discourse of birth control. Therefore, the feminists’ questions of 
reproduction were simultaneously the symptoms of the politico-economic 
representation of reproduction, and the respective critiques of it, that is, the formation 
of women’s political subjectivity by means of reproductive autonomy. Regardless of 
Japanese feminists’ different ideological visions, the discursive link between the 
voluntary control of reproduction and women’s autonomy was consistent in the 
feminist voices.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Interwar Governmentality: Population, Colonialism, and Science 
 
The Government of Population 
 
 The previous three chapters focused on Japanese birth control advocates who 
addressed the population problem from different angles. Neo-Malthusian reformers 
attributed the fundamental cause of social ills—unemployment; poverty; and physical, 
mental, and moral deterioration—to overpopulation. Pro-birth control class activists 
dismissed the idea of overpopulation as catering to the interests of the bourgeois class. 
They reframed birth control as a means of self-defense for the proletariat. Meanwhile, 
feminists who engaged in the birth control movement invariably prioritized the goals 
of women’s empowerment and reproductive self-determination, regardless of the 
different ideological positions held among them. These different patterns of the birth 
control movement during the interwar years, however, had much in common in terms 
of their sympathy for eugenic ideas and, essentially, for social and technological 
interventions into individual reproductive practices. 
 This chapter turns to the roles of governmental elites in the development of 
population policies during the interwar period. Compared to birth control advocacy 
groups who had raised population issues since the late 1910s, the Japanese 
government was a latecomer to discourses about the population problem. It was not 
until the late 1920s that the Japanese government began to realize the importance of 
comprehensive governmental control of the population and to institutionalize 
population studies against the backdrop of economic depression and the rise in 
agrarian and industrial disputes. However, one big difference existed between birth 
  138 
control advocates and governmental elites: the pros and cons of using birth control 
methods. While birth control advocates spoke with one voice about spreading 
adequate knowledge and methods of birth control among the masses to solve whatever 
social problems the advocates were tackling, the elites who were involved in the 
making of population policies strictly opposed the idea of birth control. Governmental 
elites were not only skeptical of the effectiveness of birth control in curbing 
population growth, they also adopted a comprehensive approach for the government of 
the population.   
The comprehensive agenda of the interwar population policies aimed at 
regulating and managing multifaceted dimensions of population: population quantity 
and quality, density, birth-rates and death-rates, the standard of living, public health, 
sanitation, employment, distribution of resources, food production and consumption, 
and so forth. For governmental elites, the population problem did not refer to a single 
issue; rather, the population itself had to be problematized in multiple ways in order to 
be scientifically studied and managed according to governmental policies. The 
development of comprehensive population policies during the interwar period laid the 
foundation for wartime population management (1938-1945), and later on, for postwar 
welfare policies. The importance of the interwar population policies lies in the facts 
that the agenda for the comprehensive government of the population crystalized into 
the establishment of the Ministry of Health and Welfare (Koseishō) and the National 
Eugenic Law during wartime, and afterward into a series of postwar policies including 
the Eugenic Protection Law of 1948 and a family-planning campaign that began in the 
mid-1950s. 
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 In this chapter, I will trace the development of the principles of the interwar 
population policies. These principles range from multiple definitions of the population 
problem to the emphasis on scientific research about population phenomena, as well as 
to the necessity of a permanent national institution to regulate and manage the 
population. The primary bodies that laid down such principles during the interwar 
period include the Population and Food Problems Investigation Committee (Jinkō 
Shokuryō Mondai Chōsakai, established in 1927 and dissolved in 1930) and the 
Institute for the Research of Population Problems (Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūkai, 
established in 1933). In addition to these two governmental research institutes, this 
chapter will focus on two power elites: diplomat and agricultural economist Nitobe 
Inazō (1862-1933) and bureaucrat and social reformer Nagai Tōru (1878-1973). Both 
Nitobe and Nagai led the foundation of governmental institutions in their pursuit of 
scientific research on various population issues and they designed a comprehensive 
agenda for the government of population.  
 The history of the formation of interwar population policies provides a 
revealing look at Foucault’s theory of governmentality. Using the notion 
“governmentality,” Foucault highlights a complex form of power that emerged in the 
eighteenth century, and which primarily has “as its target population, as its principal 
form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses 
of security.”200 Through this new ensemble of modern political apparatuses that 
modified, if not entirely abolished, the preceding sovereignty mode, population 
became reconfigured as the end of the government for the first time in history. This 
                                                
200 Foucault, “Governmentality,” 102. 
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chapter will delve into three strands of inquiry, which will add concrete historical 
dynamics to Foucault’s distinctive understanding of the modern form of power: first, 
population both as a multifaceted problem and the target of the government; second, 
the roles of governmental elites—intellectuals and experts who were involved in the 
policy-making process—in rationalizing a series of instruments for governing the 
population; and last, the intersection of governmentality and colonialism.  
 
The Emergence of the Science of the Japanese Population  
 
 The population problem had been a buzzword among intellectuals and social 
reformers since the late 1910s in Japan. Neo-Malthusian reformers such as Abe Isoo 
and Ishimoto Shizue initiated a public discussion about overpopulation in Japan. 
These reformers interpreted the extended economic downturn and growing social 
unrest after the end of the temporary economic boom during the First World War as 
being caused by surplus population. Malthus’ theory on population growth and the 
food supply was revived and recreated by these Japanese reformers who reduced a 
series of social and economic problems to the problem of population. Meanwhile, 
proletarian activists and Marxian intellectuals like Yamamoto Senji, Yamakawa Kikue, 
and Kawakami Hajime saw overpopulation as a relative term. For these Marxist critics, 
the cause of pressing social problems, particularly rising unemployment and poverty 
in both urban and rural areas, was irrelevant to absolute population size; the fault 
undoubtedly lay in a capitalist system. While dismissing overpopulation as a mere 
illusion, they identified the essential problem as capitalism, or more specifically as 
capitalism’s unfair ways of controlling the means of production and distribution of 
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resources. 
 The debate on the Japanese population problem between sociologist and 
economist Takada Yasuma (1883-1972) and Marxist economist Kawakami Hajime 
(1879-1946) in the mid-1920s is another symbolic event that shows different or even 
conflicting interpretations regarding the population problem. The debate was triggered 
when Takada published his paper “Umeyo Ueyo (Be fruitful and multiply)” in 1926. 
Takada claimed that the real problem was the decrease in birth rates in comparison 
with other civilized nations. In opposition to both Neo-Malthusianism and Marxism, 
Takada adhered to a distinct view on the population problem while advocating for 
lowering the standard of living to solve poverty.201 Meanwhile, Kawakami Hajime 
criticized Takada in his pamphlet titled “Jinkō Mondai Hihan (Critiques of the 
Population Problem)” in 1927 by arguing that a wage reduction was only for the 
benefit of capitalists.202 This debate between Takada and Kawakami developed into 
further population debates among economists and demographers that lasted until the 
mid-1930s. The continuing debates were mainly focused on whether the cause of 
poverty was overpopulation or the uneven distribution of wealth in the capitalist 
system.   
 Whereas intellectuals and social reformers began turning to the population 
problem and resultant social problems as early as the late 1910s, the Japanese 
government belatedly joined the debate over the population problem. It was not until 
1927 that the government recognized the gravity of the problem and took action at an 
                                                
201 Takada Yasuma, “Umeyo ueyo (Be fruitful and multiply),” Keizaiōrai (Economic Correspondence) 
1, no. 5 (1926), 15-16. 
202 Kawakami Hjime, Jinkō Mondai Hihan (Critiques of the Population Problem), (Tokyo: Sōbunkaku, 
1927), 51-57. 
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institutional level. The establishment of the Population and Food Problems 
Investigation Committee (hereafter the Investigation Committee) in the Cabinet was 
the first step by the government toward conducting scientific research on the Japanese 
population and the development of population policies. Although the Investigation 
Committee remained a temporary body, it took an initiating role in outlining the 
primary agenda of population policies during the years of 1927-1930. The 
Investigation Committee was largely divided into two parts: the Department of 
Population (Jinkō-bu) and the Department of Food (Shokuryō-bu). Both consisted of 
bureaucrats, politicians, businessmen, experts, and professors in diverse fields—
particularly economics, sociology, demographics, agriculture, and biology.203 As an 
advisory group to the government, these governmental elites created a bridge between 
research and policies. 
 As its name suggests, the Investigation Committee was mainly focused on the 
problems of population and food resources. Given a marked lack of consensus in 
social and intellectual realms regarding the definition of the population problem, it is 
worth looking closely at how the Investigation Committee defined the population 
problem and what their solutions were. Nagai Tōru, a leading member of the 
Department of Population, provides a revealing glimpse into the Committee’s 
distinctive view, not only of the population problem but more fundamentally of the 
population itself.            
 
A society consists of its people and is geographically divided. What 
                                                
203 Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūkai (The Society for Population Problem Studies), Jinkō mondai kenkyūkai 50-
nen ryakushi (A Fifty-Year History of the Society for Population Problem Studies) (Tokyo: Jinkō 
Mondai Kenkyūkai, 1983), 3-8. 
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limits the society’s productivity is its resources whether they are above 
ground or underground. Productivity is also regulated by social 
organizations formed among the people, particularly economic 
organizations. In addition, other factors such as national mentality and 
social traditions combine to condition and determine productivity. In 
this light, population problems not only arise between the productivity 
of a nation or a society as a whole and the size of the population who 
composes the society. The causes and conditions of the population 
problems also lie in different factors including natural resources, social 
organizations, and national mentality.204   
 
 As a social policy specialist, Nagai shed new light on the complexity of the 
population problem in a society. The complex causes of the problem included 
environmental and socioeconomic structures, national productivity, and characteristics 
of a population that might affect social relations and economic behavior. Nagai’s 
distinctive view of the population problem is also noticeable in his critique of both 
Malthusian and Marxian framings of the problem. Despite ostensible differences 
between the two groups, Nagai pointed out that neither Malthusian nor Marxist 
advocates penetrated the essence of the population problem, but merely replaced the 
problem with something else. While Malthusians equated the problem with food 
resource issues or poverty under the rubric “overpopulation,” Marxists reduced the 
problem to that of labor or unemployment according to the simple law of the relation 
between wage labor and capital.205 Instead, Nagai turned to “social scientific” or 
“sociological” approaches to population.206 His emphasis on the social complexity of 
the population problem marks a sharp break from both Malthus’ absolute law of 
                                                
204 Nagai Tōru, Nihon jinkōron (The Study of the Japanese Population) (Tokyo: Ganshōdō Shoten, 
1929), 64-65. 
205 Nagai Tōru, “Kajō jinkō no jitsugyō to no kankei wo ronjite jinkō mondai no honshitsu ni oyobu 
(Towards the essence of the population problem by discussing about the relation between 
overpopulation and unemployment),” Jinkō mondai (The Population Problem) 1, no. 3 (1936): 37-41. 
206 Nagai, Nihon jinkōron, 19. 
  144 
population and Marx’ ideological critique of capitalism.207 
 The reframing of the population problem as a set of complex social problems 
was groundbreaking in two senses: First, addressing the population problem no longer 
meant removing a single cause of the problem (whether the cause was overpopulation 
or capitalist exploitation). Instead, the population per se became the target of 
government. In other words, the population had to be problematized in multiple ways, 
and intervened into by bureaucratic, scientific, and technological apparatuses so that it 
could be managed at an optimal level. It was imperative for Nagai to use “population 
problems” in the plural to indicate a wide range of elements in human lives—from the 
variable to the invariable, and from the environmental to the biological. Second, 
insofar as population “problems” arise out of complex social relations, each society 
has its own problems that are different from those of other societies. Nagai highlighted 
the nation-state as a necessary condition for a society to exist; he argued that “it is an 
established fact that the modern population problem deals with the whole society in a 
nation-state—the state comprised of a certain ethnic society (minzoku shakai)—and its 
ethnic group (minzoku) or its people (kokumin).”208 For Nagai, just as the border of a 
society was drawn along the national border, the population problems had to be 
demarcated along its national territorial line. The need to formulate the theory of the 
Japanese population problem arose from this national border.   
                                                
207 In many articles, Nagai traced the trajectory of population theories, beginning from Malthus’ theory 
of population and food to Darwin’s theory of evolution to Marx’s study of capitalism. For this stream of 
intellectual history, Nagai noted that theories of the law of population had moved from economics to 
biology, then to social Darwinism, and finally to socialism. His emphasis on social science and 
sociology, therefore, reveals his effort to keep a critical distance from the existing theories and to 
reframe the law of population. Nagai Tōru, “Sekai no jinkō-ron yori nihon no jinkō-ron e (From the 
global theory of population to the Japanese theory of population) (I),” Taiyō (The Sun) 34, no. 1 (1928): 
2-10.   
208 Nagai, Nihon jinkōron, 32. 
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 Nagai’s ideas for reframing the population problem were crystalized in the 
Investigation Committee. Given Nagai’s crucial role in designing the agenda of the 
Committee and drafting reports for submission to the government, it is no 
exaggeration to say that the agenda and activities of the Committee were largely a 
reflection of Nagai’s interest in the social scientific study of the Japanese 
population.209 During the years of 1927-1930, the Department of Population in the 
Investigation Committee published a total of eight official reports about Mainland 
Japan and its colonies on  a wide range of  population problems and possible 
solutions. The subjects of the official reports are as follows: 1) domestic and overseas 
migration policy, 2) the control of supply and demand for labor, 3) population policies 
outside Mainland Japan, 4) population control measures, 5) increases in productivity, 
6) the distribution of resources for living and the rationalization of consumption, 7) the 
establishment of a permanent body for the investigation of population problems, and 8) 
the establishment of the Ministry of Social Affairs (shakai-shō).210  
 Among the varied pressing issues and solutions suggested by the Investigation 
Committee, the report on population control measures (“Jinkō tōsei ni kansuru sho-
hōsaku”) embodied an effort to integrate the different modes of knowledge needed for 
the government of the population. As the following outline of the report shows, the 
population problem lay at the nexus of statistics, demographics, medicine, public 
                                                
209 The Department of Population in the Investigation Committee submitted a total of eight reports on 
the population problems in Japan to the government during the years of 1927-1930. Nagai took the lead 
in drafting all the reports for the Department of Population that dealt with various population issues 
including emigration, labor demands, colonial policies, population control, productivity, resource 
distribution, and consumption. For Nagai’s drafts and the official reports of the Department of 
Population, see Jinkō shokuryō mondai chōsakai, Jinkō shokuryō mondai chōsakai jinkō-bu tōshin 
setsumei (A description of the reports of the Department of Population by the Population and Food 
Problems Investigation Committee), (Tokyo: Jinkō shokuryō mondai chōsakai, 1930). 
210 Ibid., 1-3. 
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hygiene, and eugenics. These different modes of modern knowledge determined 
particular ways in which the population was problematized, rather than merely 
functioning as a toolkit for analyzing the actual problems.   
 
Even if the population is in sound living conditions, it is impossible to 
improve national strength and promote industry without measures for 
population control. According to the dynamic statistics of the Japanese 
population, the death rate remains high with little possibility of decline. 
Moreover, because of the remarkably high birth rate, the natural 
population growth rate continues to rise. This pattern, categorized as 
“high fecundity and high mortality,” is more noticeable in rural farming 
areas and places with lower standards of living than in urban areas. 
Especially, when compared with other countries, Japan has a lower life 
expectancy and a smaller working-age population due to the high 
mortality of infants, children, and adolescents. The higher mortality of 
female adolescents than male adolescents is particularly a matter of 
serious concern. With regard to solutions for the population problem in 
Japan, there is an urgent need to improve such living conditions, and to 
create a healthy population both in quantity and quality.211   
 
 The Investigation Committee diagnosed the Japanese population problems 
from multiple angles. The problems included high fecundity and high mortality, low 
life expectancy, low numbers in the working-age population, poor living conditions, 
and low standards of living. Varied statistical data on the Japanese population also 
showed marked differences in demographic patterns between rural and urban areas, 
male and female populations, and among age groups. All these demographic indicators 
highlighted peculiar patterns of the Japanese population that were different from other 
nation-states. Furthermore, the population problems as a reflection of national 
character contributed to justifying the state’s control of its population in order to meet 
its aims: “create a healthy Japanese population both in quality and quantity.”      
 The notion of “population control,” therefore, did not necessarily refer to 
                                                
211 Ibid., 56-57. 
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measures for decreasing the population size. The Investigation Committee proposed 
various measures for population control, which exemplifies a comprehensive approach 
to the lives of the Japanese people. According to the report on population control, the 
measures ranged from the improvement of social infrastructure—including sanitation 
and hygiene facilities; the protection of female, child, and adolescent workers from 
labor exploitation; and social services for the protection of motherhood and 
childhood—to the improvement of individual physical and reproductive health, 
including physical and nutritional education for women; medical consultation about 
marriage, pregnancy, and contraception; the regulation of illegitimate sales and 
promotion of contraceptives; and investigations of eugenics-related facilities.212 These 
various measures to integrate social reforms with biological betterment, and the 
population as a whole with the health of each individual, embody what Foucault calls 
“governmentality.” Foucault highlights the purposes of modern government as “the 
welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, 
longevity, health, etc.”213 In other words, the primary role of the modern state lies in 
the government of population. The report on the population control measures was the 
blueprint for the government of the Japanese population, more specifically, for 
regulating, managing, and optimizing the lives of the Japanese population.  
 Women’s physical and reproductive health was of a particular concern in the 
blueprint for the government of the Japanese population. Just as birth control 
advocates focused on women’s bodies as the key factor for solving the population 
problem, the Investigation Committee showed great interest in improving women’s 
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physical and reproductive health as a primary means for improving the health of the 
population as whole. However, there was a sharp difference between the Investigation 
Committee and birth control advocates in their views on birth control. While birth 
control advocates, particularly Neo-Malthusian activists, justified the use of birth 
control methods in their concern over high birth-rates and the resultant overpopulation, 
the Investigation Committee held a defensive attitude toward birth control, mainly for 
the following two reasons: First, their aim was neither decreasing birth-rates nor 
reducing the population size, but decreasing death-rates by improving socioeconomic 
conditions. The second reason, which is not irrelevant to the first, is that the 
Committee gave importance to the welfare of the population and their physical and 
mental health. Unlike the birth control advocates who saw women’s bodies as a means 
of controlling population size and improving population quality, the Committee 
members regarded women’s health as the target of the government itself. For these 
reasons, the Investigation Committee attempted to limit the use of birth control to only 
eugenic grounds or hereditary reasons, and apply strict restrictions on the illegitimate 
sale and promotion of contraceptives.214 The latter idea came to fruition when the 
Harmful Contraceptive Devices Control Regulation (Yūgai hinin yō kigu torishimari 
                                                
214 The drafts of the report on population control provide more a detailed explanation of why the 
members of the Department of Population demanded that the use of birth control be minimized. Nagai, 
who drafted the report, argued that since birth control was merely a stopgap measure, there should be 
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other writings. For example, in an article published in 1928, Nagai highlighted that the only necessary 
condition for promoting birth control was to ensure the health and welfare of the population. For Nagai, 
the role of social institutions ought to have priority over individual responsibility in implementing 
contraceptive measures. His conditional approval of birth control gives a glimpse into institutional and 
technological apparatuses for the government of the population. Jinkō shokuryō mondai chōsakai, jinkō-
bu tōshin setsumei, 39-40; Nagai Tōru. “Sekai no jinkō-ron yori nihon no jinkō-ron e (II).” Taiyō 34, no. 
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kisoku) was issued by the Home Ministry in 1930.215 
 As seen so far, the Investigation Committee laid the groundwork for the 
reframing of population problems and the population itself. The health and welfare of 
the Japanese population became the priority of population control, or to put it in other 
terms, the government of the Japanese population. The Investigation Committee stated 
that population problems, or the effects of various state apparatuses for problematizing 
the lives of its people, ought to be addressed by each nation-state based upon a full 
understanding of its peculiar population patterns. Hence, for the Committee members, 
the state’s role in the government of the population and in comprehensive, long-term 
research of various population patterns were the two most important principles to be 
implemented at the institutional level. Among the reports of the Department of 
Population, the seventh report on the establishment of a permanent body for the 
investigation of population problems particularly stressed such principles. Since the 
Investigation Committee was set to expire by the end of March 1930, leading elites on 
the Committee looked for ways to continue implementing the principles of increasing 
the state’s roles and collecting academic knowledge.  
 Ironically, this blueprint for “Japanizing” the systems and knowledge for the 
government of population reflected an international trend at that time in the scientific 
discourse on populations. The birth of the International Union for the Scientific 
Investigation of Population Problems (IUSIPP) in 1928 was a symbolic event for 
increasing international cooperation for collecting demographic data and integrating 
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knowledge and skills about the government of populations.216 The purposes of the 
IUSIPP, articulated in its statutes, reveal its specific strategy to make scientific 
research as well as national and international institutions the global norm of 
population control.        
 
(A) To initiate and organize researches which depend upon 
international cooperation, to provide for the scientific discussion of the 
results of such researches, and to publish them without duplicating the 
publications of existing international statistical agencies. (B) To 
facilitate the establishment of common standards for the collection, 
tabulation, and analysis of data regarding human populations, including 
not only demographic, but also agricultural, economic, sociologic, and 
biologic data in the broadest sense. (C) To serve as a clearing house for 
the interchange of information about population, for the purpose of 
facilitating research. (D) To cooperate to the fullest extent with other 
organizations of a scientific character having similar objects. (E) The 
Union confines itself solely to scientific investigation in the strict sense, 
and refuses either to enter upon religious, moral, or political discussion, 
or as a Union to support a policy regarding population, of any sort 
whatever, particularly in the direction either of increased or of 
diminished birth rates.217        
 
 As both its name and statutes denote, the IUSIPP sought a “scientific” 
approach to the investigation of each nation’s population issues and “international” 
benchmarks for such scientific knowledge. Here, the term science encompassed 
                                                
216 The IUSIPP was founded in 1928 following a resolution made in the World Population Conference 
in Geneva in September 1927. The participants in the Population Conference agreed upon the need for a 
permanent organization for international cooperation in the scientific investigation of population 
problems. This eventually came to fruition in the following year. In July 1928, the IUSIPP members 
had their first general Assembly in Paris and completed the Statutes of the Union. The initial members 
of the IUSIPP came from twelve nations including Belguim, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, 
Holland, Italy, South America (as a whole), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. 
Raymond Pearl, an American biologist, was elected as the first president. The IUSIPP was reorganized 
as the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population in 1947, and has continued its 
international activities since then in conjunction with the United Nations (UN). “Interim Report of the 
Proceedings of the First General Assembly of the International Union for the Scientific Investigation of 
Population Problems,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 23, no. 163 (1928): 306-317; 
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different forms of knowledge including sociology, economics, agriculture, 
demographics, and biology. The plan to establish common standards at the 
international level aimed at collecting national data on each population and integrating 
that data into international knowledge.  
 Nitobe Inazō—the former Under-Secretary General of the League of Nations 
who became the Head of the Japanese delegation at the Institute of Pacific Relations 
after his return to Japan in 1926— paid great attention to this growing international 
cooperation for facilitating the scientific study of populations. While serving as a 
member of the Investigation Committee, Nitobe took the initiative in establishing a 
permanent organization for scientific research about the Japanese population. He also 
conceived the idea of developing the permanent organization into a liaison with the 
IUISSP. In his recommendation to the government, submitted in February in 1928, 
Nitobe stressed the necessity for an academic research institution that consisted of 
experts in population problems to contribute to communicating with the IUISSP and to 
resolving domestic population problems.218 The Department of Population officially 
adopted this suggestion made by Nitobe and submitted a recommendation to the 
permanent investigating organization to the government in January in 1930. According 
to the report, the main purposes of the permanent organization included academic 
research on the domestic population—i.e., basic demographic research, scientific 
research on population control, investigation of solutions to population problems, 
theoretical study of the population and its related problems, presentations and 
publications about the results of research, lectures on population issues, and, as an 
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official IUISPP member, sending Japanese delegates to the IUISPP.219 This 
recommendation eventually came to fruition in 1933, when the Institute for the 
Research of Population Problems (hereafter the Research Institute) was founded as a 
semi-public organization. 
 The continuity between the Investigation Committee and the Research Institute 
lay in the long-term pursuit of comprehensive research—whether it be called scientific 
or social science—on population problems. The Research Institute was not merely a 
successor to the Investigation Committee, but also its successful product that would 
serve as a mediator between the State’s population policies and scientific research. 
However, changing domestic and international political conditions beginning in the 
early 1930s also played a considerable role in the design and implementation of 
population policies. In particular, in terms of potential sources of food supply or land 
for Japanese settlement, the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and the establishment of 
Manchukuo in 1932 as the puppet state of the Japanese empire created new conditions 
for the population problems in Mainland Japan. How did the governmental elites of 
the Research Institute view Japan’s growing military and economic expansion into 
Manchuria? What was the relationship between colonialism and the government of 
population in the Japanese Empire? In the following sections, I will delve into the 
intersection between colonialism and governmentality by focusing on the Japanese 
governmental elites’ changing ideas of population policies in the 1930s. By focusing 
on Nitobe’s conception of colonial government, Section 3 explores how governmental 
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elites conceived the roles of Japan’s colonies in resolving the population issues in the 
Mainland before the Manchurian crisis arose. Section 4 turns to the remaking of 
population policies after the founding of Manchukuo in 1932.   
 
Colonization as a Solution to the Population Problems in the Metropole  
 
 Despite controversy over the overpopulation problem, the increase in the 
absolute population numbers in Mainland Japan had been an undeniable fact from the 
late Meiji period onward. According to the national census, the population of 
Mainland Japan had been growing by more than 700,000-800,000 every year since 
1926. Ueda Tejirō, a demographer involved in the Research Institute, estimated that 
the population in Mainland Japan would increase from 60 million in the late 1920s to 
90 million in the late 1950s, given the consistent tendency of the population to 
grow.220 Moreover, a high population density in relation to insufficient arable land in 
the Mainland was another pressing concern for those who demanded scientific 
population policies. In particular, demographers and economists viewed the density 
indicator from a socio-economic angle. For example, Nasu Hiroshi, professor of 
agricultural economics at Tokyo Imperial University, stressed the increase in both 
agricultural and industrial productivity and the promotion of Japanese emigration as a 
means to relieve population pressure in the Mainland.221 Socio-economic solutions to 
the high population density marked a departure from the Malthusian theory of 
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population; put another way, population growth was no longer an inexorable law of 
nature, but a social condition to be addressed by institutional interventions.  
 Among various possible solutions to population growth and the high 
population density in the Mainland, emigration (imin) was often a subject of debate in 
the 1920s. As soon as the Investigation Committee was founded in 1927, the 
Committee members launched an investigation into the current economic and 
demographic conditions of Japan’s colonies and foreign territories under military 
occupation, and determined the effectiveness of emigration for relieving the 
population problems in the Mainland.222 The report on population solutions outside of 
Mainland Japan (Naichi igai sho chihō ni okeru jinkō taisaku) provides a glimpse into 
governmental elites’ initially negative outlook on Japanese emigration. In the report, 
the Committee members articulated the practical difficulty of promoting mass 
emigration and the risk of fomenting instability in colonized and native societies.223 
The fact that the colonies had not heretofore functioned as an outlet for the Japanese 
labor population, due to differences in the standards of living and labor costs between 
the metropole and colonies, was obvious proof that reinforced their negative outlook 
on emigration.224 Given the many barriers to encouraging Japanese immigration to the 
                                                
222 Since Japanese immigration to the United States was halted as a result of the Immigration Act of 1924, possible 
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colonies, the Investigation Committee concluded that the role of the colonies in 
resolving the population problems in the metropole should be limited to an increase in 
Japan’s productivity and the use of available resources through the development and 
utilization of economic resources in the colonies. The following comments in the 
report sum up the Committee’s preference for colonial economic development over 
mass emigration. 
 
There are many factors that need to be carefully considered with 
regards to population problems in territories outside of the Mainland, 
particularly Chōsun [sic] and Taiwan. The population problems in 
exterior territories cannot be overlooked; not only because of their 
effects on the population problems in the Mainland Japan, but also 
because planting (ishoku) many Japanese people in the territories 
outside the Mainland might cause insecurity among local people, and in 
fact, mass settlement is impossible to fulfill. Moreover, the goal of 
taking measures for population policies in other territories such as 
Manchuria, Mongolia, Siberia, and the South Islands is not to curb 
Japanese population growth, but to improve national productivity 
through reclaiming land, developing natural resources, and advancing 
industry in those territories.225     
 
 The governmental elites’ skepticism about Japanese settlement in the colonies 
is closely interwoven with the question of different forms of colonialism. In particular, 
the question whether the colonies should be integrated into the Japanese Empire only 
as a resource provider or for long-term settlement by Japanese became a primary 
                                                                                                                                       
promoting Japanese colonial migration. For example, the Governor-General of Korea reported in 1927 
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criterion for assessing the population policies in the metropole.226 However, it cannot 
be overlooked that colonialism itself, whatever its form is—whether exploiting the 
native workers to produce the resources necessary to improve the economy of the 
metropole, or having the colonizers permanently settle on the native land to exploit 
resources in the colonies—was thought to be indispensable for solving the population 
problems in Mainland Japan. Given this, the fact that the governmental elites initially 
gave priority to economic development in the colonies over Japanese migration hardly 
reflects an anti-colonial attitude. On the contrary, their idea of associating colonial 
development with population control in the metropole exemplifies the complex layers 
of colonialism: more specifically, the governmentality of the metropole and its 
impacts on the nature of colonial regimes and vice versa. 
 Nitobe Inazō was an especially prominent leading figure amongst the 
bureaucratic and academic elites who opposed settler colonies while acknowledging 
the role of colonialism in relieving the population problems. As a professor teaching 
colonial policy at Sapporo Agricultural College (Sapporo nōgakko) in the 1890s and 
Tokyo Imperial University in the 1910s, Nitobe espoused colonial studies 
(shokumingaku), that is, the scientific study of the principles of colonial government. 
His lectures at Tokyo University on colonial policies reflect his distinctive view of 
colonialism as an evolving system of rules over time: from political and militarist 
expansion into foreign territories, to the diffusion of advanced cultural values to the 
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colonized peoples. Nitobe’s well-known phrase that “colonialism is the spread of 
civilization (Shokumin wa bunmei no denpa)” represents not only a euphemism for 
military and economic expansionism, but also his aspiration for colonialism as a 
civilizing mission to be fulfilled in Japan’s neighboring colonies.227  
Although the ways in which Nitobe justified colonial expansion seemingly 
resemble Social Darwinism, he did not overlook the drawbacks of civilization, 
particularly the economic hardships and social conflicts caused by industrial 
development. Interestingly, Nitobe’s ambivalent position toward civilization remained 
unproblematic because he understood colonialism as a part of the international order 
rather than as a pseudo-natural law—i.e., the survival of the fittest. For Nitobe, 
internationalism, or “the coordination of many powers” by his definition, was a 
historical condition in which a nation could expand itself into other nations.228 In 
other words, colonialism was not incompatible with the international system unless a 
nation’s expansion into other territories disturb an equilibrium among the colonizing 
powers. Nitobe noted that whereas Social Darwinist thinking was merely the dominant 
rhetoric used among the nineteenth-century Western powers for justifying colonization, 
it was the international order—manifested as diplomatic relations and international 
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laws—that sanctioned colonial expansions in the twentieth century.229 Given that, 
nationalism and colonialism were harmoniously embedded in Nitobe’s aspirations for 
internationalism. 
 While Nitobe firmly justified colonialism under the rubrics of civilization and 
internationalism, the question as to which form of colonialism Japan should adopt 
remained problematic. For Nitobe, the high population density and resultant social 
issues in Mainland Japan were indispensable considerations for shaping the policies of 
colonial government. Regardless of the fact that “shokumin,” colonization in Japanese, 
originally referred to “planting people,” Nitobe often conveyed skepticism about 
settler colonies as the preferred option for the Japanese Empire. There were largely 
two reasons for Nitobe’s opposition to Japanese settlement in the colonies: his critical 
view of Malthusian overpopulation concerns and the infeasibility of a mass migration 
large enough to solve social problems in the Mainland. The former reason was 
undergirded by many cases of European nations such as Belgium, whose population 
was relatively small but who colonized Congo in pursuit of its commercial interests; or 
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Italy and Ireland, who because of their high population density became sender 
countries of migrants, mostly to the United States, at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Nitobe used these European cases as references to support his point that there was no 
essential link between overpopulation and colonization.230 With regard to the second 
reason, Nitobe noted that the promotion of Japanese settlement in the colonized 
territories was only a temporary and passive measure that was ineffective in relieving 
the Japanese people of the population pressure in the Mainland. Nitobe’s persistent 
skepticism about the promotion of colonial settlements is well exemplified in his 
statement at the IPR Conference in 1929 that “emigration afforded no possible aid to 
the nation’s problem.”231       
 Then, for Nitobe, what was an ideal form of colonial government to solve the 
population problems in Mainland Japan? Throughout his long-term career as an expert 
in colonial studies, Nitobe put more stress on economic development in Japan’s 
colonies than on colonial settlement policy. In particular, his experience as a colonial 
officer serving for the Taiwan Government General in the 1900s provided him with an 
example of successful colonial government policies. During his stay in Taiwan, Nitobe 
initiated a series of economic development policies ranging from the industrialization 
and mechanization of sugar production to market expansion for the sugar trade. 
Nitobe’s efforts to promote the sugar industry influenced his thoughts on the 
principles of colonial government. One of the principles was that the process of 
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integrating the economy of the colonies with that of the metropole—by investing 
capital, reforming agriculture, rationalizing production, exploiting native resources 
and workers—was crucial for Mainland Japan to overcome the limits of productivity 
and sustain the livelihoods of its population.232 According to his view, colonization 
was a part of the economic planning of the metropole, and more fundamentally, the 
population policies of the metropole.233 
 The idea of integrating colonial policies into the population policies of 
Mainland Japan did not remain a minority view, but was reflected in the reports of the 
Investigation Committee and resonated with Nitobe’s contemporaries. As shown 
above, the report on population solutions outside of Mainland Japan outlined an 
agenda for developing resources in colonial and foreign territories. The priority goal of 
colonial or semi-colonial development was to sustain the Japanese population or even 
advance their lives in Mainland Japan rather than to improve the living conditions of 
the native people in the colonies. Another report by the Committee on increases in 
productivity (“seisanryoku zōshin ni kansuru tōshin-an,” submitted to the government 
in December, 1929) also included an agenda for increasing the supply of natural 
resources both from domestic and foreign territories, which echoed the idea of 
combining colonial economic development with metropolitan governmentality.234  
Meanwhile, Yanaihara Tadao, who was a disciple of Nitobe at Tokyo 
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University and followed in his footsteps by assuming the chair in colonial policy 
between 1923 and 1937, had a view similar to Nitobe’s about solutions for the 
population problems in the Mainland. Inspired by the thoughts of Marx and Lenin, 
Yanaihara emphasized that the central issue of the population problems lay in 
unemployment, while criticizing as a fear-mongering tactic the Malthusian hypothesis 
about the lack of food production. Although Yanaihara did not overlook various 
possible options for relieving the population problems in the Mainland, ranging from 
industrial and technological development to emigration or settlement in the colonies, 
he concluded that the primary solution was the improvement of socioeconomic 
systems. In particular, Yanaihara noted that emigration had limited effects on the 
decrease in absolute population size; and furthermore, Japanese emigrants were 
outnumbered by immigrants from the colonies. Yanaihara’s initially skeptical attitude 
toward the promotion of emigration and settlement in the colonies as a solution for 
population problems culminated in his opposition to the program of mass migration to 
Manchuria in the mid-1930s.235  
 In September 1931, two years before Nitobe died, the Kwantung Army 
invaded Manchuria following the Mukden Incident. The Japanese military operations 
in Manchuria lasted more than a year and resulted in the founding of the puppet state 
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of Manchukuo in February 1932. The continued aggressive policy and military 
operations in the Manchurian region in the early 1930s put Nitobe, who had 
emphasized international cooperation while denying Japan’s interest in colonizing 
Manchuria and Mongolia, in a difficult position. Between 1932 and 1933, he took a 
lecture trip to the United States in the capacity of the Chairman of the Japanese 
delegation of IPR. A series of lectures Nitobe gave to American audiences reveals the 
dilemma between his long-term aspirations for internationalism and the growing 
military expansionism in the Mainland. Despite this newly unfolding conflict in 
Manchuria, however, the question of incorporating the economic resources of the 
colonies into solutions for the population problems in the metropole remained 
unproblematic. In one of his lectures given in 1932, Nitobe’s comment about 
Manchuria as “the lifeline of Japan” reveals his persistent effort to justify the fact that 
colonization was essential for the lives of the Japanese population.236  
 
I have said, over and over again, that unless Japan can develop 
industries, she cannot exist. In the country itself there are not sufficient 
materials for industry, little coal, less iron, and a very small amount of 
oil. All these are found in abundance in Manchuria, and Japanese 
capital has developed the mines. Then, even for the prosperity of our 
agricultural industry, we must import fertilizers, and the best of them, 
soya bean cakes, are obtainable in Manchuria. This is why that region 
is called the lifeline of Japan.237 
     
 As seen so far, Japanese governmental elites had put emphasis on colonial 
                                                
236 The slogan “Manchuria as Japan’s lifeline” was used by politicians and militarists who supported 
Japanese expansion into Manchuria. Matsuoka Yōsuke, who was a diplomat and known for his speech 
condemning the League of Nations and announcing Japan’s withdrawal in 1933, is credited as the first 
person to use the phrase “lifeline.” This slogan was used to propagate a utopian image of Manchuria, as 
well as the importance of its territory for Japan’s national defense and economic development. 
Townsend, Yanaihara Tadao and Japanese Colonial Policy, 177-178; Park, “The New Horizons of 
Colonial Policy Studies and Recognition of Manchurian Problems,” 171.  
237 Nitobe, “The Manchurian Question and Sino-Japanese Relations (xi.21.1932),” in The Works of 
Inazō Nitobe, 231-232. 
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development as a means to support the population in the metropole, while the 
promotion of settlement colonies had remained a vexed question until the early 1930s. 
The creation of Manchukuo in 1932 marked a watershed in the discourse of population 
problems in Japan. The utopian image of Manchuria as fertile soil for Japanese settlers 
and as an outlet for an overflowing population in the metropole gained ascendancy 
throughout the 1930s due to the impact of the Manchurian settlement campaign. How 
did governmental elites respond to this new frontier? How did the establishment of 
Manchukuo create a new condition for Japan’s population policies? With a focus on 
the Research Institute, the next section delves into the remaking of population policies 
after the founding of Manchukuo.  
 
Agrarian-Imperialism and the Resurrection of Malthusian Rhetoric  
 
 The early 1930s was a turbulent period in Japan in both political and economic 
terms. The domestic political scene in Mainland Japan witnessed a succession of 
short-lived cabinets due to the growing military influence and the instability of the 
parliamentary system that symbolized the end of so-called Taishō Democracy. The 
rise in militarism was more evident in international politics. A series of Japan’s 
militarist and imperialist moves—from Japanese territorial expansion into Manchuria 
in 1931 to the creation of Manchukuo in 1932 to Japan’s withdrawal from the League 
of Nations in 1933—opened a rapid path toward Pan-Asianism, an imperialist vision 
that would replace internationalism. Meanwhile, the Japanese economy between 1930 
and 1932 was shaken by the repercussion of the Great Depression. In particular, the 
rural economy was more vulnerable than were urban areas due to the sharp decline in 
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agricultural prices and income levels. Rural problems (nōsōn mondai) emerged as a 
major issue to be addressed during the Shōwa Depression.238  
 It was against this backdrop of political and economic turmoil that the Institute 
for the Research of Population Problem was founded through co-operation between 
the government and private sectors. The original decision to establish a permanent 
research institution for the study of population problems was made in 1931 by the 
Imperial Diet. A series of replacements for the prime minister, however, impeded a 
budgetary allocation for the founding of the Research Institute.239 After three years of 
delays, the Institute was finally founded on October 27, 1933, under the military 
government led by former admiral Saitō Makoto. The birth of the Institute was an 
outcome of cooperation between the state, private, and academic sectors. The Home 
Ministry proposed the bill to form a research organization, while private foundations 
funded it by giving it two thousand yen in the first year of its establishment. Its 
members included governmental elites who were previously involved in the 
Investigation Committee, such as Nagai Tōru, Ueda Tejirō, Nasu Hiroshi, statistician 
and politician Yanagisawa Yasutoshi, and businessman Inoue Masaji. Under the 
                                                
238 Compared to 1926, rice prices dropped by 50% in 1931 and annual agricultural income per 
household fell from 1,162 to 414 Yen. Sericulture was one of the most damaged parts of the Japanese 
rural economy during this period due to the sharp decline in demand for Japanese silk. The prices of 
raw silk dropped by one-third between 1925 and 1929, and another one-third in 1931 alone. Penelope 
Francks, Rural Economic Development In Japan: From the Nineteenth Century to the Pacific War 
(London: Routledge, 2006), 209-217; Thomas R. H. Havens, Farm and Nation In Modern Japan: 
Agrarian Nationalism, 1870-1940. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 135-141. 
239 Hamaguchi Osachi (in office between March 1931-April 1931) was shot by a member of an 
ultranationalist secret society and was forced to resign due to severe injuries. Wakatsuki Reijirō who 
replaced Hamaguchi was ineffective in controlling the military and eventually resigned after serving as 
Prime Minister for only seven months. For another six months, from December 1931 to May 1932, 
Inukai Tsuyoshi was in office, but he also failed to control the growing power of the military. After 
Inukai was assassinated, Saitō Makoto, who was a former admiral in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 
became Prime Minister from May 1932 to July 1934. After that, the cabinets were taken over mostly by 
military men until the end of the Asia-Pacific War. Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 590-592.    
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leadership of the first chairman Yanagisawa, the Research Institute was involved in a 
wide array of activities—investigations of population problems and possible solutions, 
holding public lectures, publishing an official organ titled “Jinkō mondai” (with a total 
of 24 issues between February 1935 and March 1944), and attending international 
population conferences (e.g. the IUISPP Conference in Berlin in 1935).240 The 
members of the Institute served as a bridge between the government and the academy 
through these diverse activities.     
 It should be noted that the rise of militarism and the protracted economic crisis, 
on both the domestic and international scenes, impacted the purpose of the Research 
Institute. Despite the fact that the Research Institute succeeded the previous 
Investigation Committee to pursue scientific and comprehensive studies of population 
problems, there was a notable difference between the two organizations in the scope of 
their investigations: in contrast to the former Committee that maintained its negative 
outlook toward Japanese emigration and settlement to the colonies, its successor paid 
serious attention to the “emigration and settlement” option as a promising solution to 
the population problems in the Mainland. Yanagisawa’s speech at the first open 
lecture of the Research Institute, held in Tokyo in December 1933, exemplifies the 
government elites’ shifting opinion on the relationship between population problems 
and colonization. In his opening speech, Yanagisawa highlighted the two main goals 
of the Research Institute from domestic and international standpoints: one goal was to 
pursue scientific investigations of solutions to population problems and general 
demographic phenomena; whereas the other goal was to study colonial policies that 
                                                
240 For the brief history of the Research Committee, see Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūkai, Jinkō mondai 
kenkyūkai 50-nen ryakushi, 25-39.  
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would promote Japanese emigration and settlement into the colonies, and contribute to 
the growth of the Japanese race.241 Yanagisawa’s idea of associating the metropole’s 
population problems with colonial settlement policies marked a sharp departure from 
the previously dominant skepticism among government elites toward colonization.  
 The increasing attention among the members of the Research Institute to 
emigration and settlement in colonial territories is also reflected in the scope and 
content of their investigations. In pursuit of the comprehensive and professional 
studies of population problems and their optimum solutions, the Institute subdivided 
its research projects largely into five categories. The five categories included 
demographic trends and their impact on industry, the distribution of population and 
agricultural resources, overpopulation and employment, emigration, and population 
control.242 Among these five different research projects, the subjects of agriculture 
and emigration directly addressed the interconnected issues of colonization, 
emigration, and settlement. What were the decisive factors causing this shift from 
widespread skepticism toward embracement in the elites’ view of colonization? 
Japan’s de facto acquisition of Manchurian territory in 1932, regardless of its official 
status as a sovereign state, brought a new vision for population policy planning, 
mainly due to its large territory. The revised Malthusian outlook, which struck a 
                                                
241 Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūkai, Jinkō mondai kōenshū (A collection of lectures on population problems) 
vol. 1 (Tokyo: Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūkai, 1934), 5.  
242 Five different teams were responsible for conducting research on each assigned project, and each 
team was headed by a different director in accordance with their field of expertise. For example, 
economist Ueda Tejirō led the research on demographic trends and its impact on industry and trades, 
while professor of agricultural economics Nasu Hiroshi headed the team studying the distribution of 
population in rural and urban areas in relation to the limits of food and agricultural products or land 
economy. In addition, Nagai Tōru, Inoue Masaji, and government officer Shimomura Hiroshi served as 
the directors responsible for different research projects on overpopulation and employment, emigration 
policies, and population control policies, respectively. Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūkai, Jinkō mondai 
kenkyūkai 50-nen ryakushi, 34-5.      
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balance between population size and agricultural products, or between food demand 
and arable land supply, gradually gained acceptance among governmental elites.        
Nasu Hiroshi, who served as a director of the research team studying the 
distribution of population in relation to the land capacity and agricultural products of 
the metropole was the quintessential figure of pro-emigration elites. As mentioned 
above, as a prominent advocate of agrarianism (nōhonshugi), Nasu had demanded 
Japanese farmers’ emigration to the colonial territories as a solution to the lack of 
arable land, even before the Manchukuo was founded. His initial support for Japan’s 
colonial expansionism was based on the assumption that the exploitation of land, the 
intensity of labor utilization, and the supply of fertilizer had already reached their 
limits in the Mainland.243 Before 1932, Nasu was not alone in supporting the 
emigration of the Japanese farming population, although this pro-emigration idea was 
highly unpopular among many experts in population problems due to their doubts 
about the feasibility of mass migration. The so-called Katō group—a group of 
government bureaucrats and experts who advocated an agrarian ideology under the 
leadership of right-wing agrarianist Katō Kanji—had been an active promoter of 
Japanese colonial migration to Korea and Manchuria since the 1920s.244 The creation 
                                                
243 Hiroshi Nasu, Aspects of Japanese Agriculture: A Preliminary Survey (New York: International 
secretariat, Institute of Pacific relations, 1941), 107-119. This book is a revised edition of Land 
Utilization in Japan published in 1929.  
244 Katō Kanji (1884-1967) was a prominent agrarianist who was involved in youth education in rural 
areas such as Yamagata and Ibaraki prefectures, and was also an advocate for the colonization of 
Manchuria and Mongolia. A group of bureaucrats and scholars who echoed Katō’s agrarian imperialist 
ideal took part in his agrarian movement, which ultimately developed into the so-called Katō group. 
The members of the group included Katō himself, Nasu, Hashimoto Denzaemon of the Kyoto 
University Department of Agriculture, Ishiguro Tada’atsu of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 
Ikoma Takatsune of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, Sō Mitsuhiko as the head of a Mantetsu-affiliated 
agricultural training center, Yamazaki Yoshio of Fuji Kōgyō Company in Colonial Korea and so forth. 
For Katō Kanji and the Katō group, see Asada Kyōji, “Manshū nōgyō imin seisaku no ritsuan katei 
(The process of planning the policy of peasant emigration to Manchuria),” in Nihon teikokushugika no 
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of Manchukuo finally provided Nasu and his agrarianist colleagues in the Katō group 
with a feasible opportunity to realize the ideal of colonial expansionism blended with 
his longstanding agrarianism.  
The start of a trial peasant emigration plan in 1932 was the outcome of 
coordination between the agrarian-imperialist elites, the Kwantung Army, and the 
Ministry of Colonial Affairs (Takumu-shō). In February 1932, when the Kwantung 
Army was planning to establish a puppet state in Japan’s newly acquired territory, 
Nasu and Hashimoto Denzaemon—both prominent professors of agricultural 
economics and the members of the Katō group—offered consultation to the Kwantung 
Army about the promotion of Japanese emigration to Manchuria. In their consultation, 
Nasu and Hashimoto underlined the core purposes of their promotion of peasant 
emigration, including the protection of land ownership through land reclamation and 
policy making, mass emigration for security reasons, and coordinated efforts to train 
Japanese immigrants in Manchuria.245 The blueprint for promoting Japanese peasants’ 
emigration and settlement in Manchuria, suggested by these two brains of the Katō 
group, was embraced by the Kwantung Army, which attempted to utilize the peasant 
population primarily for military and security reasons—i.e., for security against anti-
Japanese guerilla forces.  
Meanwhile, the Katō group also contacted the bureaucrats of the Ministry of 
Colonial Affairs who initially objected to the emigration campaign. Three agrarianist 
                                                                                                                                       
Manshū imin (Emigration to Manchuria under Japanese imperialism), ed. Manshu iminshi kenkyukai 
(Tōkyō: Ryūkei Shosha, 1976), 24-29; Louise Young, Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the 
Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 318-322; and Sung-
Mo Lim, “The Conflict between the Kwantung Army and the Korean Government General over the 
Agricultural Emigration Policy to Manchuria and its Consequence,” Journal of Japanese History 29 
(2009): 139-141. 
245 Asada Kyōji, “Manshū nōgyō imin seisaku no ritsuan katei,” 7-8. 
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members of the group, Katō, Ishiguro Tada’atsu, and Sō Mitsuhiko, took the initiative 
to draw up a plan for “the emigration of 6,000 people to Manchuria and Mongolia 
(Manmō rokusenjin imin an).” This plan not only sought the promotion of peasants’ 
mass emigration, but also specified target regions for the mass emigration campaign. 
The main targets were the Tōhoku (North East region of the Mainland), Hokuriku 
(Northwestern region), and Kantō regions, all which struggled with land shortages and 
poor peasant populations.246 The Ministry of Colonial Affairs eventually welcomed 
the Katō group’s outlook on the relief of poor peasants through the promotion of mass 
emigration. Both the Kwantung Army and the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, regardless 
of the different goals they embraced, join forces to execute the trial plan for Japanese 
peasant emigration and settlement in Manchuria between 1932 and 1935. Over four 
years, a total of 1,667 households, recruited on a nation-wide scale, moved to and 
resettled in Manchuria.247 The relative success of the trial emigration campaign 
eventually grew into the Kwantung Army-initiated “One Million Households to 
Manchuria Plan” in 1936, that is, a full-blown campaign for Japanese settlement in 
Manchuria.248 
 As the advocates for the promotion of peasant emigration to Manchuria gained 
ascendancy among bureaucrats, military men, and agrarian-imperialist scholars, the 
Research Institute jumped on the “Manchurian-solution” bandwagon. In April 1936, 
when the Kwantung Army and the Army Ministry of Japan were drawing up a five-
year plan for the “One Million Households to Manchuria,” the leading members of the 
                                                
246 Ibid., 25-8.  
247 Manshūkoku Tsūshinsha, Manshū Kaitaku Nenkan (The yearbook of Manchuria Colonization) 
(Tokyo: Howa shuppan, 1986), 129. This volume was originally published in 1944.  
248 For the “One Million Households to Manchuria plan,” see Ibid., 44-50.  
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Institute submitted two proposals to Prime Minister Hirota Kōki: one proposal 
addressed the promotion of emigration and settlement in general while the other 
specifically focused on the issues of emigration to Manchuria. Both proposals 
manifested the members’ concerted effort to terminate the protracted controversy over 
emigration and to place a high priority on the promotion of Japanese emigration and 
resettlement to solve the population problems in the Mainland. The specific demands 
of the Research Institute to promote emigration as a fundamental solution for 
population growth were as follows: 1) the establishment of national migration policies, 
2) diplomatic efforts to build amicable relationships with host countries, 3) the 
revision of the “Migrants’ Protection Act (Imin Hogo hō, passed in 1896),” 4) 
investigations of new lands suitable for Japanese emigrants, 5) the installment and 
management of economic and social facilities to help Japanese migrants settle and 
stabilize their livelihoods, 6) protection of Japanese migrants, 7) promotion of 
economic relations between the host countries and Japan, and 8) education and 
advertisements about migration.249 All these demands converged on a single goal, that 
is, the establishment of comprehensive national migration policies.250    
 Meanwhile, another proposal by the Research Institute titled “Manshū imin ni 
kansuru kengi (A proposal on emigration to Manchuria)” confirmed the growing 
                                                
249 Jinkō mondai kenkyūkai, “Ishokumin shinkō hōsaku ni kansuru kengi (A policy proposal for the 
promotion of emigration and settlement),” Jinkō mondai 1 no. 4 (1936): 16-24.  
250 In the proposal for the promotion of emigration and settlement, the Research Institute notes that 
private sectors must take a leading role in promoting the campaign for emigration and settlement, while 
the government plays a subsidiary role such as regulating the emigration campaign and protecting 
Japanese settlers. However, this statement contradicts the basic premise of this proposal, namely, 
“establishing comprehensive national policies on migration and settlement inside and outside the 
Mainland.” This self-contradiction reflects the Institute’s self-censorship and its wariness of 
international opinion, given its loaded comment that “the government should avoid being 
misunderstood as directly planning and managing the migration campaign.” Ibid. 17-20. 
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importance of Manchuria as an outlet for Japan’s overflowing peasant population. 
Unlike the above-mentioned proposal that addressed population problems in general, 
the proposal on emigration to Manchuria mainly dealt with the problems of rural areas 
and supported the extension of the campaign to promote collective peasant emigration 
to Manchuria. The logic behind this approval was that overpopulation was the main 
cause of rural poverty, which reiterated the agrarian-imperialist argument in favor of 
peasant migration. This overpopulation theme was a rhetoric of displacement in two 
senses. On one hand, the theme displaced the pressing agricultural crisis and 
increasing interregional disparities, and reduced complex actual socio-economic issues 
to the problem of population size.251 On the other hand, the overpopulation theme 
displaced the agenda for a comprehensive government of population, and revived a 
Malthusian panacea, that is, the control of population size. The Research Institute’s 
proposal for the promotion of emigration and settlement in Manchuria symbolizes the 
resurrection of Malthusian logic in combination with contemporary agrarian-
imperialism.     
Seen in the broader context of the shaping of population policies during the 
interwar period, the goal for these policies drastically shrank from the optimization of 
life to that of population quantity. In comparison to the agenda for the comprehensive 
government of the population set by the Investigation Committee, the Research 
Institute limited its function to the regulation of population size in proportion to the 
                                                
251 Louise Young points out that the overpopulation theme was employed as a rhetorical tactic. 
According to Young, “it was not distress caused by overpopulation, but rather the unevenly felt 
agricultural crisis that led certain regions to promote Manchurian emigration.” Young, Japan's Total 
Empire, 330. My analysis of overpopulation also sheds light on its discursive dimensions, that is, the 
social process in which the overpopulation theme emerged as a form of rational knowledge, instead of 
overpopulation as an established fact.  
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production of food resources and arable land areas. However, this changing agenda 
cannot simply be understood as a regression. The government’s changing perception 
of the Japanese population and its aim toward quantifiable resources for the sake of 
Japan’s imperialist expansion not only intervenes into a linear narrative of Foucault’s 
history of governmentality, but also shines a new light on the population in a state of 
flux, or the ambiguity of the population at the nexus of governmentality and 
colonialism. The mobilization of Japanese peasants for the promotion of collective 
emigration and settlement in Manchuria is a typical example of overdetermined life—
life oscillating between a population and an ethnic group (minzoku), the end and the 
means of the modern government, and a national and an imperial subject. The 
following statements exemplify that the governmental elites constantly reorder the 
Japanese population—ranging from the government’s concern for their welfare to its 
view of the population as a labor resource for the state’s colonial expansion, and to its 
vision of them as imperial subjects representing Japan’s superiority. 
When considering the origin of Manchukuo, there is no question about 
the importance of Japanese immigration to Manchuria in establishing 
the social and cultural basis for consolidating and developing a special 
relationship between Japan and Manchuria. Notwithstanding, it is of 
urgent necessity to pay special attention to the issue of migration to 
Manchuria in terms of a solution for population problems. … There are 
a few things to keep in mind when talking about farming immigrants in 
Manchuria—particularly preparing them sufficiently for a different 
climate, culture, and style of living from Japan to prevent a “brilliant 
but vain attempt,” and to make full use of Japanese farmers’ superior 
technology, management skills, and civilized life to achieve 
coexistence and co-prosperity between Japan and Manchukuo, as well 
as to lead cultural improvement in rural areas in Manchuria.252 
 
When the military regime took over the government after the February 26 
                                                
252 Jinkō mondai kenkyūkai, “Manshū imin ni kansuru kengi,” Jinkō mondai 1 no. 4 (1936): 25-26.  
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Incident in 1936, the role of the Research Institute became highly limited to a 
supporting role in implementing national policies. The government elites who once 
pursued governmentalizing the nation by mobilizing a wide range of state apparatuses 
for the welfare of the population now turned to mobilizing the population—in 
particular, its health, labor force, fertility, and daily lives—in conformity with the 
national population policies. The government elites’ pro-emigration stance in the mid-
1930s might have been a harbinger of this transition of the goal of population policies 
from social and welfare reforms to the mobilization of human resources.  
However, governmental elites cannot simply be considered as victims or 
passive supporters of escalating militarism. Given the goal to centralize population 
policies under the national policy set by the Investigation Committee, the government 
elites themselves laid the stepping stone for integrating various bureaucratic, social, 
and scientific apparatuses into a unified national policy for population control. As a 
successor to the Committee, as soon as the Sino-Japanese war broke out, the members 
of the Research Institute also strongly demanded a comprehensive system of 
population policies in preparation for a protracted war.253 As a result, the National 
Institute of Population Problems (Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūsho), an affiliated organization 
with the Ministry of Health and Welfare, was established in August 1938. After its 
establishment, the National Institute took charge of population control and gave 
priority to enhancing national physical strength and to increasing Japan’s population 
                                                
253 In the first and the second national meetings of the Research Institute, held in November 1937 and 
October 1938, respectively, the participants of the meetings discussed the need for a national institute 
that would integrate population policies. Jinkō mondai kenkyūkai 50-nen ryakushi, 56-7; Jinkō mondai 
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from 70 million to 100 million by 1960.254 Despite the different goals of the 
population policies of the interwar and wartime regimes, the interwar plan to establish 
a comprehensive, scientific system for population control survived and even came to 
fruition under the wartime regime.       
   
Japanese Population in Question, Governmentality in Flux  
 
Through the lenses of different discourses of Japanese population that were 
developed by government elites, this chapter traced the process of the formation of 
population policies during the interwar period. The trajectory of interwar population 
policies reveals the leading role of the elites in designing and establishing a 
comprehensive and scientific approach to controlling, optimizing, and managing the 
Japanese population. The two interwar research organizations, the Investigation 
Committee and the Research Institute, and the two bureaucrat-cum-intellectuals, Nagai 
and Nitobe, are concrete examples of “governmentality from below,” and 
“governmentality in flux.” While the former underlines the roles of social and 
intellectual circles in initiating and developing the integrated and systematic 
management of the population for its welfare, the latter highlights different goals and 
strategies within such social sectors, and how forms of governmentality change 
depending on the political context—e.g., the Japanese Empire—that conditions the 
pattern and the scope of population, territory, and economy. In particular, the fact that 
government elites embraced colonialism as part of their solution to the population 
                                                
254 Takaoka Hiroyuki explains the direction of population policy was to integrate population problems 
into the problem of the Yamato race. This wartime discourse of homogenizing the population was led 
by Tachi Minoru and Koya Yoshio, both the leading members of the National Institute of Population 
Problems. For the transition in population policy during the wartime and the roles of the National 
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problems in the metropole sheds new light on the relationship between colonization 
and governmentality: colonial expansion was indispensable for the development of 
governmentality in the Japanese Empire. Meanwhile, the creation of Manchuria in 
1932 marked a watershed for interwar population policies, resulting in the reordering 
of the population as human resources and as the Japanese race. In sum, the population 
continued to be problematized and the form of governmentality remained in a state of 
flux in the Japanese Empire during the interwar period.   
In July 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War began and Japan entered into a 
state of war that lasted until August 1945. The total war system (sōryokusen taisei) 
integrated various political, economic, and social apparatuses into a unified and 
rationalized system that required full-scale mobilization of resources for war.255 
Human resources, whether they be military forces or labor forces, were not an 
exception. The Ministry of Health and Welfare established in January 1938 played an 
important role in integrating the population policies into a unified national policy with 
an aim to mobilize, manage, and reproduce human resources. Under the total war 
system, the focus of population control shifted from overpopulation and colonization 
to “healthy soldiers and healthy citizens (kenhei kenmin).” Neither overpopulation nor 
rural problems, allegedly caused by the overflowing population in rural areas, was a 
pressing concern for the bureaucracy, the military, and the government elites during 
wartime. This sudden shift certainly does not imply that the nation’s war effort finally 
cured the longstanding overpopulation problem. As the wartime slogan “healthy 
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soldiers and healthy citizens” symbolizes, it was rather the redefining of the Japanese 
population as mobilizable human resources that invalidated the resurrected Malthusian 
logic.  
Given this, questions about the impacts of the government elites’ plan for 
population control in the total war system arise: Is wartime population control 
connected or disconnected from the interwar population policies? What is the 
relationship between the interwar and the wartime social systems in Japan if viewed 
from the perspective of the history of population policies? Although it will require 
further detailed research on wartime population policy to answer the aforementioned 
questions, any question about the link between interwar and wartime population 
policies cannot be reduced to a simple “continuity versus discontinuity” choice. A 
series of population policies during the wartime, including the National Eugenic Law 
(kokumin yūsei hō) in 1940, the Outline for the Establishment of Population Policies 
(jinkō seisaku kakuritsu yōkō) in 1941, and the National Physical Strength Act 
(kokumin tairyoku hō) in 1941 clearly “modified” the preceding social reform plans 
and population discourses developed by governmental elites during the interwar 
period. Meanwhile, the wartime population policies “transformed” the main goal and 
the scope of governmentality: under the total war regime, the population policies 
aimed at increasing both quantity and quality of its population, not only on eugenic 
grounds, but, more fundamentally, for the nation’s war efforts and the prosperity of 
the Empire. Total war governmentality even expanded the boundary of the population 
to include colonized people who were previously excluded from population policies. 
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256 To sum up, changing forms of governmentality and different ways in which the 
population was problematized are the keys to understanding the relationships between 
the interwar and wartime regimes.  
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whether it be exclusive or inclusive, but as a product of wartime governmentality within the broader 
scope of the Japanese Empire. Takashi Fujitani, Race for Empire Koreans As Japanese and Japanese 
As Americans During World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 26.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion:  
The Reappraisal of Interwar Japan  
through the Lens of Population Discourse  
  
This dissertation originated from a simple question: Why and how does 
population matter? Numerous documents published in Japan during the interwar 
period invariably included remarks about the “jinkō mondai” despite a lack of 
consensus on the substance of the population problem among contemporary social 
scientists, social reformers, and government elites. These interwar intellectuals’ 
attempts to diagnose various social ills using the catch-all notion of a “population 
problem” provide a glimpse of the pervasive discourse on population between 1920s 
and 1930s. As repeatedly emphasized in this dissertation, the prevalence of this 
population discourse must be understood as an obvious symptom of the growing 
attention among contemporary Japanese intellectuals to the population in order to 
study, manage, and optimize both its size and quality. Therefore, this dissertation 
attempted to dissect the discursive structure of the population problem and grasp 
multiple layers within the discourse while avoiding taking the problem at face value. 
The first step in dissecting the population discourse was to reappraise it as the process 
of “problematizing the population.” In other words, the population problem is a 
product of diverse modern apparatuses that are bureaucratic, scientific, and social. 
Through examining different groups and individuals who sought to problematize the 
Japanese population and solve that problem, whatever it referred to, this dissertation 
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aimed to answer comprehensively the simple, yet significant question of why and how 
population mattered in interwar Japan. 
 Answering the abovementioned question required two different lenses through 
which the multifaceted discourse of the population could be addressed: clarifying it 
from a micro-perspective, on one hand, and placing it in interwar history using a 
macro-perspective, on the other. At the micro level, the definitions, solutions, and 
underlying political agenda of the population problem were so varied that among those 
who were addressing the problem there were often conflicts and disagreements over 
how to solve it. The complete disagreement between the Japanese government and 
birth control advocates over the promotion of birth control typifies this cacophony 
within the population discourse. While the government elites opposed birth control 
because of its ineffectiveness in solving overpopulation in Mainland Japan, birth 
control advocates, particularly Neo-Malthusian social reformers, maintained that the 
scientific use of contraceptives was the ultimate way of curbing population growth and 
improving the quality of the Japanese population. This antagonism between the 
government and birth control activists only worsened as the Home Ministry issued the 
Harmful Contraceptive Devices Control Regulation in 1930 and suppressed the 
promoters of birth control afterwards. Meanwhile, dissonance also existed amongst 
birth control supporters. Despite the fact that different birth control groups spoke with 
one voice to spread scientific knowledge of birth control and effective contraceptive 
methods, these groups kept rearranging themselves and remaining divided, mainly, 
though not exclusively, along ideological lines. The age-old debate between Malthus 
and Marx on overpopulation was succeeded by the debate between Neo-Malthusian 
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reformers and proletarian birth control activists. Whilst the former considered 
overpopulation on the Japanese Mainland as an irrefutable statistical fact, the latter 
unfavorably characterized this Malthusian stance as bourgeois ideology. In the same 
vein, while birth control was a scientific tool to fix the side effects of capitalist 
modernization from a Neo-Malthusian perspective, proletarian activists stressed the 
proletarians’ exclusive use of birth control as a temporary, defensive measure under 
the capitalist mode of production. In this light, these different claims within birth 
control groups contributed to the economic, political, and ideological reconfiguration 
of birth control, population, and reproduction. 
 At the macro level, the population discourse reveals the interplay between 
scientific progressivism, nationalism, and imperialism, and thus, changing patterns of 
modernity during the interwar period. Japan’s interwar period can be understood as the 
crucial stage for reorganizing modernity in the aftermath of the World War I at both 
domestic and transnational levels. The so-called “Great War” had a global effect on 
the overhaul of Western modernity, mainly anchored in European civilization, 
individualism, and Social Darwinism. In particular, population issues—namely, 
population degeneration and decreasing birth rates—became a pressing concern 
among Western intellectuals who attempted to reconstruct modernity through 
controlling the size and quality of population. Against this backdrop of growing 
concern about population issues, Neo-Malthusianism and the eugenic discourse that 
emerged after the late nineteenth century became the linchpin of the interwar 
population discourse: Neo-Malthusianists who initially aimed at poverty relief and 
women’s empowerment through artificial birth control began to embrace eugenic 
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ideas and broaden the scope of their movements to include the achievement of 
optimum population size and racial improvement. The population discourse, in a 
global context, provided a utopian vision of reformed modernity by presenting itself as 
“science.” 
 The multifaceted discourse of the population problem in interwar Japan can be 
situated in this transnational post-World War I discourse. Harry Harootunian’s notion 
of “co-eval modernity”—highlighting “contemporaneity yet the possibility of 
difference” in modernity within a worldwide context—rightly grasps the nature of 
modernity as a shared temporality that is unevenly experienced in different 
societies.257 As a latecomer to modernization and capitalist development, Japanese 
society went through distinctive patterns of the population crisis (i.e., high fertility and 
high mortality) and economic depression (i.e., increasing rural and urban disparity). 
Hence, although Japanese intellectuals, social reformers, and bureaucrats who 
participated in the population discourse shared a scientific progressivism with their 
European and U.S. counterparts, their solutions were not simply limited to 
reproductive control, but also closely tied to the reconstruction of Japanese modernity. 
In other words, different solutions to the population problem hinged upon different 
visions of the politico-economic systems in Mainland Japan. Here, it should be noted 
that the population discourse in the Japanese metropole was unavoidably bound up 
with nationalism and imperialism. The dual project of Japan’s modernization since the 
Meiji period, namely nation-building and empire-building, led to ambiguity and 
complexity in categorizing the population: the population discourse in the metropole 
                                                
257 Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity, xvi-xvii. 
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tended to abstract the population as “Japanese” while obliterating complex social 
relations—e.g., migration and resource exploitation—conditioned by the expanding 
territory of the Japanese Empire. For the governmental elites, in particular, colonial 
expansion and exploitation were essential to relieving the population pressure and 
ultimately, to the government of life in the metropole.   
 As seen so far, this dissertation used both microscopic and macroscopic 
lenses to provide a complex picture of interwar Japan: a heterogeneous realm 
including the population discourse and the process of remodeling modernity 
through integrating scientific progressivism, nationalism, and imperialism. The 
reappraisal of the history of Japan’s interwar period is the first crucial step 
toward a more thorough understanding of the politics of population and sexual 
reproduction during the wartime period and in the aftermath of the Japanese 
Empire. Although the wartime and postwar population discourses are beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, the following points are worth noting.  
Throughout transwar Japan, the goals, patterns, and scope of the 
population discourse went through marked changes. The difference between 
the interwar and the wartime population discourses can be summed up by the 
transition from population to human resources as the target of problematizing. 
The wartime population policy that centered on “healthy soldiers and healthy 
citizens (kenhei kenmin)” and the encouragement to “give birth and multiply 
(umeyo fuyaseyo)” typifies the shifting direction of population discourses from 
solving the population problem—notably overpopulation—and its resultant 
social issues toward ensuring maximum efficiency, productivity, and supply of 
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the wartime workforce. In the meantime, the postwar population discourse 
became interwoven with the New Life Movement, national reconstruction, and 
economic recovery amid the ruins of the protracted total war. The Japanese 
government, which originally suppressed birth control during the prewar and 
wartime periods, took the initiative in launching a family planning program in 
1952 in order to address overpopulation.258   
However, the marked difference between the interwar, wartime, and postwar 
population discourses should not be understood as a complete discontinuity. The 
lingering impacts of the interwar population discourses on the wartime and postwar 
policies reveal how the total war system and the postwar government modified, if not 
preserved, various apparatuses for problematizing the population as a necessary step 
toward winning the war and reconstructing the nation-state, respectively. The impacts 
of the interwar discourses in regards to population problems include the unified and 
systemic control of the Japanese population, and the governmental and scientific 
interventions into reproductive health on eugenic grounds. While the former factor 
resembled the interwar population policies developed by governmental elites, the latter 
was linked with sociomedical movements for birth control and eugenics during the 
interwar years. Understanding the lingering influences of population discourses 
throughout transwar Japan challenges the “continuity and discontinuity” dichotomy in 
modern Japanese history by casting a new light on the relationship between interwar, 
wartime, and postwar governmental structures. Such an understanding will help us 
                                                
258 Ogino Miho, “From natalism to family planning: population policy in wartime and the post-war 
period,” in Gender, Nation and State In Modern Japan, ed. Andrea Germer et al. (Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge, 2014), 203-206.  
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answer more thoroughly the primary question of this dissertation: Why and how did 
population become a political problem in modern Japan? 
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